The role of title insurance under recording and registration

This article outlines a transaction cost theory of title insurance andanalyses the role it plays in countries with recording and registrationof land titles. Title insurance indemnifies real estate right holdersfor losses caused by pre-existing title defects that are unknown whenthe policy is issued. It emerged to complement the errors and omissions insurance of professionals examining title quality. Poor organizationof public records led title insurers in the USA to integrate titleexamination and settlement services. Their residual claimant statusmotivates insurers to screen, cure and avoid title defects. Firmsintroducing title insurance abroad produce little information on titlequality, however. Their policies are instead issued on a casualty basis,complementing and enforcing the professional liability of conveyancers.Future development in markets with land registration is uncertainbecause of adverse selection, competitive reactions from establishedconveyancers and the ability of larger banks to self-insure title risks.

Evaluating Spanish pension expenditure under alternativa reform scenario

In this paper we evaluate the quantitative impact that a number ofalternative reform scenarios may have on the total expenditure for publicpensions in Spain. Our quantitative findings can be summarized in twosentences. For all the reforms considered, the financial impact of themechanical effect (change in benefits) is order of magnitudes larger thanthe behavioral impact or change in behavior. For the two Spanish reforms,we find once again that their effect on the outstanding liability of theSpanish Social Security System is essentially negligible: neither themechanical nor the behavioral effects amount to much for the 1997 reform,and amount to very little for the 2002 amendment.

Regulating financial conglomerates

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combinea bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate s risk-taking incentivesdepend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn isdetermined by the conglomerate s liability strucure. We examine optimal capitalrequirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates,and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies.For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability offailure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, whenrisk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reachof the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increasedrisk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract highercapital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to holdassets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirementsencourage this. Hence, the practice of regulatory arbitrage , or of transferingassets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss thepolicy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debateon the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existingUS bank holding company regulation.

Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economictheory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Shouldcorporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two majorcontributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analyticalframework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insightsinto how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed bytheir employees.

Wild bids. Gambling for resurrection in procurement contracts

This paper analyzes the problem of abnormally low tenders in theprocurement process. Limited liability causes firms in a bad financialsituation to bid more aggressively than good firms in the procurementauction. Therefore, it is more likely that the winning firm is a firm infinancial difficulties with a high risk of bankruptcy. The paper analyzesthe different regulatory practices to face this problem with a specialemphasis on surety bonds used e.g. in the US. We characterize the optimalsurety bond and show that it does not coincide with the current USregulation. In particular we show that under a natural assumption the USregulation is too expensive and provides overinsurance to the problem ofabnormally low tenders.

Failure to collude in the presence of asymmetric information

In this paper, we design the optimal contract when two agents can collude under asymmetric information. They have correlated types, produce complementary inputs and are protected by limited liability. Therefore, a joint manipulation of reports allows them to internalize informational and productive externalities. We show that by taking advantage of the transaction costs created by asymmetric information, even though they collude, the principal can achieve the outcome without collusion regardless of the sign and the degree of correlation. In particular, the principal can implement a non-monotonic quantity schedule in a collusion-proof way while this is impossible if collusion occurs under complete information.

Pension plan funding and stock market efficiency

The paper argues that the market signifficantly overvalues firms with severely underfunded pension plans. These companies earn lower stock returns than firms with healthier pension plans for at least five years after the first emergence of the underfunding. The low returns are not explained by risk, price momentum, earnings momentum, or accruals. Further, the evidence suggests that investors do not anticipate the impact of the pension liability on future earnings, and they are surprised when the negative implications of underfunding ultimately materialize. Finally, underfunded firms have poor operating performance, and they earn low returns, although they are value companies.

Els errors en les relacions assistencials: una aproximació des de la bioètica

De manera general, cal tenir present quel'error és habitual en els sistemes complexos, com la biologia ens ho ensenya ja a nivell cel·lular: els errors en la replicació de l'ADN els anomenem mutacions i pel que sabem han jugat i juguen un rol fonamental en l'evolució de les espècies vivents. L'error, per tant, és omnipresenten els organismes vivents; però, a diferènciade les màquines artificials, els organismesvivents poden funcionar amb l¿error i malgratl¿error.

A theoretical and practical study on linear reforms of dual taxes

[cat] En aquest treball extenem les reformes lineals introduïdes per Pfähler (1984) al cas d’impostos duals. Estudiem l’efecte relatiu que els retalls lineals duals d’un impost dual tenen sobre la distribució de la desigualtat -es pot fer un estudi simètric per al cas d’augments d’impostos-. Tambe introduïm mesures del grau de progressivitat d’impostos duals i mostrem que estan connectades amb el criteri de dominació de Lorenz. Addicionalment, estudiem l’elasticitat de la càrrega fiscal de cadascuna de les reformes proposades. Finalment, gràcies a un model de microsimulació i una gran base de dades que conté informació sobre l’IRPF espanyol de l’any 2004, 1) comparem l’efecte que diferents reformes tindrien sobre l’impost dual espanyol i 2) estudiem quina redistribució de la riquesa va suposar la reforma dual de l’IRPF (Llei ’35/2006’) respecte l’anterior impost.

A theoretical and practical study on linear reforms of dual taxes

[cat] En aquest treball extenem les reformes lineals introduïdes per Pfähler (1984) al cas d’impostos duals. Estudiem l’efecte relatiu que els retalls lineals duals d’un impost dual tenen sobre la distribució de la desigualtat -es pot fer un estudi simètric per al cas d’augments d’impostos-. Tambe introduïm mesures del grau de progressivitat d’impostos duals i mostrem que estan connectades amb el criteri de dominació de Lorenz. Addicionalment, estudiem l’elasticitat de la càrrega fiscal de cadascuna de les reformes proposades. Finalment, gràcies a un model de microsimulació i una gran base de dades que conté informació sobre l’IRPF espanyol de l’any 2004, 1) comparem l’efecte que diferents reformes tindrien sobre l’impost dual espanyol i 2) estudiem quina redistribució de la riquesa va suposar la reforma dual de l’IRPF (Llei ’35/2006’) respecte l’anterior impost.

La jurisdicción competente en materia de responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración: una polémica que no cesa. Comentario a los Autos de la Sala Especial de Conflictos de Competencia del Tribunal Supremo de 27 de diciembre de 2001 y 21 de octubre de 2002 y propuesta de reforma legislativa

En el presente trabajo se comenta la línea jurisprudencial iniciada por el Auto de la Sala Especial de Conflictos de Competencia del Tribunal Supremo de 27 de diciembre de 2001, por la que se atribuye al orden civil la competencia para enjuiciar las demandas dirigidas conjuntamente contra la Administraciónpública y su aseguradora de responsabilidad extracontractual, reabriendo la polémica que parecía zanjada tras la triple reforma legislativa de 1998 y 1999, que afirmó la competencia exclusiva de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa para conocer de los pleitos de responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración.

La jurisdicció competent en matèria de responsabilitat patrimonial de l'Administració: una polèmica que no acaba. Comentari a les Interlocutòries de la Sala Especial de Conflictes de Competència del Tribunal Suprem de 27 de desembre de 2001 i 21 de octubre de 2002 i proposta de reforma legislativa

En aquest treball es comenta la línia jurisprudencial iniciada per la Interlocutòria de la Sala Especial de Conflictes de Competència del Tribunal Suprem de 27 de desembre de 2001, per la qual s¿atribueix a l'orde civil la competència per jutjar les demandes dirigides conjuntament contra l'Administració pública i la seva asseguradora de responsabilitat extracontractual, reobrint la polèmica que semblava tancada després de la triple reforma legislativa de 1998 i 1999, que afirmà la competència exclusiva de la jurisdicció contenciosa administrativa per conèixer dels plets de responsabilitat patrimonial de l'Administració.

Sin opción. Comentario a la STS, 1ª, 17.2.2006, por la que se niega el derecho de opción de las víctimas de exigir responsabilidad civil a los funcionarios públicos ante los órganos de la jurisdicción ordinaria

Actualmente, tras la reforma del art. 146.1 de la Ley 30/1992, de 26 de noviembre, de régimen jurídico de las Administraciones públicas y del procedimiento administrativo común (LRJPAC) llevada a cabo por la Ley 4/1999, de 13 de enero, nadie duda ya que las víctimas de daños causados por los funcionarios y demás agentes públicos en el ejercicio de sus funciones están obligadas a dirigir su reclamación indemnizatoria a la Administración a la que aquellos pertenezcan, sin poder demandarles ante los órganos de la jurisdicción civil en exigencia de su responsabilidad extracontractual. Según el art. 145 LRJPAC, la víctima deberá reclamar directamente a la Administración ­iniciando la tramitación del procedimiento administrativo específico previsto en los arts. 142 y 143 LRJPAC e interponiendo, eventualmente, recurso contencioso-administrativo contra la resolución desestimatoria que le ponga fin­, y ésta, una vez haya satisfecho la indemnización, ejercerá acción de repetición contra el funcionario o agente responsable cuando el mismo haya ocasionado el daño con dolo o culpa grave. Ya no existe, por tanto, el genérico derecho de opción anteriormente reconocido por el art. 43 de la Ley de régimen jurídico de la administración del Estado de 1957.

Libertad condicional : propuestas para aumentar su concesión

La libertad condicional es una institución cuya aplicación no se da con la frecuencia que debería para lograr una resocialización y reinserción adecuada. Para reducir las tasas de encarcelamiento y los costes que se derivan, así como para igualar las tasas de liberados condicionales en Cataluña con las del resto del Estado, se proponen posibles mejoras para la concesión del último grado penitenciario. Las propuestas se desarrollan a partir de una investigación empírica basada en una revisión exhaustiva de los informes de pronóstico de reinserción de la Junta de Tratamiento y las resoluciones del Fiscal de Vigilancia Penitenciaria.Se formularán propuestas generales y específicas. Las primeras estarán encabezadas a modificar el punitivismo de la sociedad y la implementación de la libertad condicional. Las segundas estarán orientadas a focalizar el último grado penitenciario también a internos con alto riesgo de reincidencia, siempre y cuando se les proporcione una intervención intensiva; a mejorar y tratar tanto los factores estáticos como los dinámicos –hábitos laborales, toxicomanías, apoyo familiar– para facilitar el acceso a la libertad condicional según los actuales requisitos; a concienciar sobre la importancia de satisfacer la responsabilidad civil y a seguir la línea del modelo de riesgo, necesidad y responsividad.ABSTRACTParole is an institution whose application does not occur as often as it should to achieve resocialization and reintegration adequately. To reduce incarceration rates and its costs, as well as to equalize Catalonia’s parole rates with the rest of the state, it is suggested possible improvements for the last grade prison’s granting. The proposals were developed from an empirical research based on the analysis of the Treatment Assembly’s forecast reports reintegration and the Fiscal’s resolutions.It will be formulated general and specific proposals. The first one will be led to modify society’s punitivity and parole’s implementation. The second one will be directed on focusing parole in high risk prison inmates, as long as they have an intensive intervention; on improving and treat both static and dynamic factors –work habits, addictions, family support– to facilitate the access on parole under the current requirements; on raising the importance of paying the civil liability and follow the principles of the model of risk, needs and responsivity.