What explains the Great Moderation in the US? A structural analysis

This paper investigates what has caused output and inflation volatility to fall in the USusing a small scale structural model using Bayesian techniques and rolling samples. Thereare instabilities in the posterior of the parameters describing the private sector, the policyrule and the standard deviation of the shocks. Results are robust to the specification ofthe policy rule. Changes in the parameters describing the private sector are the largest,but those of the policy rule and the covariance matrix of the shocks explain the changes most.

The overhang hangover

We revisit the debt overhang question. We first use non-parametric techniques to isolate a panel of countries on the downward sloping section of a debt Laffer curve. In particular, overhang countries are ones where a threshold level of debt is reached in sample, beyond which (initial) debt ends up lowering (subsequent)growth. On average, significantly negative coefficients appear when debt face value reaches 60 percent of GDP or 200 percent of exports, and when its present value reaches 40 percent of GDP or 140 percent of exports. Second, we depart from reduced form growth regressions and perform direct tests of the theory on the thus selected sample of overhang countries. In the spirit of event studies, we ask whether, as overhang level of debt is reached: (i)investment falls precipitously as it should when it becomes optimal to default, (ii) economic policy deteriorates observably, as it should when debt contracts become unable to elicit effort on the part of the debtor, and (iii) the terms of borrowing worsen noticeably, as they should when it becomes optimal for creditors to pre-empt default and exact punitive interest rates. We find a systematic response of investment, particularly when property rights are weakly enforced, some worsening of the policy environment, and a fall in interest rates. This easing of borrowing conditions happens because lending by the private sector virtually disappears in overhang situations, and multilateral agencies step in with concessional rates. Thus, while debt relief is likely to improve economic policy (and especially investment) in overhang countries, it is doubtful that it would ease their terms of borrowing, or the burden of debt.

Against the mainstream: Nazi privatization in 1930s Germany

The Great Depression spurred State ownership in Western capitalist countries. Germany was no exception; the last governments of the Weimar Republic took over firms in diverse sectors. Later, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership and public services to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in the Western capitalist countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. Privatization in Nazi Germany was also unique in transferring to private hands the delivery f public services previously provided by government. The firms and the services transferred to private ownership belonged to diverse sectors. Privatization was part of an intentional policy with multiple objectives and was not ideologically driven. As in many recent privatizations, particularly within the European Union, strong financial restrictions were a central motivation. In addition, privatization was used as a political tool to enhance support for the government and for the Nazi Party.

Against the mainstream: Nazi privatization in 1930s Germany

The Great Depression spurred State ownership in Western capitalist countries. Germany was no exception; the last governments of the Weimar Republic took over firms in diverse sectors. Later, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership and public services to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in the Western capitalist countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. Privatization in Nazi Germany was also unique in transferring to private hands the delivery f public services previously provided by government. The firms and the services transferred to private ownership belonged to diverse sectors. Privatization was part of an intentional policy with multiple objectives and was not ideologically driven. As in many recent privatizations, particularly within the European Union, strong financial restrictions were a central motivation. In addition, privatization was used as a political tool to enhance support for the government and for the Nazi Party.

“Transformar les condicions de vida sense incidir en el sentit vital no serveix per a res”. Entrevista a Salvador Busquets

Salvador Busquets ha estat disset anys director d’Arrels Fundació, entitat dedicada a acompanyar persones en fase consolidada d’exclusió. No té formació teològica ni filosòfica, és llicenciat en Econòmiques, i va desenvolupar la seva activitat professional en el sector privat fins a l’any 1995, abans d’incorporar-se a Arrels Fundació. Actualment és el coordinador de totes les entitats d’acció social de la Companyia de Jesús a Catalunya. L’hem convidat a participar en la classe de l’assignatura “Diàleg interreligiós i acció social” que fan els estudiants de quart curs de Treball Social i Educació Social de la Facultat Pere Tarrés de la Universitat Ramon Llull. Entre tots tenim diverses qüestions que li volem plantejar, i així encetem el diàleg.

Privatization and Regulation of Toll Motorways in Europe

The private sector plays an increasing and relevant role in highway funding and management. For that reason, the regulation designed and enforced by public authorities becomes even more important for the social welfare results generated by this process. In this study, we analyze the current trends in highway funding and management paying special attention on the recent process of privatization and its motivations. Since public ownership and regulation are substitutes for government intervention, we check the hypothesis that highways privatization induces more strict regulation. Indeed, we observe that as the private sector increases its size, toll regulation becomes more detailed.