Is the person trade-off a valid method for allocating health care resources? Some caveats

The Person Trade-Off (PTO) is a methodology aimed at measuring thesocial value of health states. The rest of methodologies would measure individualutility and would be less appropriate for taking resource allocation decisions.However few studies have been conducted to test the validity of the method.We present a pilot study with this objective. The study is based on theresult of interviews to 30 undergraduate students in Economics. We judgethe validity of PTO answers by their adequacy to three hypothesis of rationality.First, we show that, given certain rationality assumptions, PTO answersshould be predicted from answers to Standard Gamble questions. This firsthypothesis is not verified. The second hypothesis is that PTO answersshould not vary with different frames of equivalent PTO questions. Thissecond hypothesis is also not verified. Our third hypothesis is that PTOvalues should predict social preferences for allocating resources betweenpatients. This hypothesis is verified. The evidence on the validity of themethod is then conflicting.

Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intendingdefectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

Hybrid consumption paths in the attribute space: A model and application with scanner data

This paper presents and estimates a dynamic choice model in the attribute space considering rational consumers. In light of the evidence of several state-dependence patterns, the standard attribute-based model is extended by considering a general utility function where pure inertia and pure variety-seeking behaviors can be explained in the model as particular linear cases. The dynamics of the model are fully characterized by standard dynamic programming techniques. The model presents a stationary consumption pattern that can be inertial, where the consumer only buys one product, or a variety-seeking one, where the consumer shifts among varied products.We run some simulations to analyze the consumption paths out of the steady state. Underthe hybrid utility assumption, the consumer behaves inertially among the unfamiliar brandsfor several periods, eventually switching to a variety-seeking behavior when the stationary levels are approached. An empirical analysis is run using scanner databases for three different product categories: fabric softener, saltine cracker, and catsup. Non-linear specifications provide the best fit of the data, as hybrid functional forms are found in all the product categories for most attributes and segments. These results reveal the statistical superiority of the non-linear structure and confirm the gradual trend to seek variety as the level of familiarity with the purchased items increases.

The organization of research corporations and researcher ability

This paper analyzes the formation of Research Corporations as an alternative governance structure for performing R&D compared to pursuing in-house R&D projects. Research Corporations are privatefor-profit research centers that bring together several firms with similar research goals. In a Research Corporation formal authority over the choice of projects is jointly exercised by the top management of the member firms. A private for-profit organization cannot commit not to interfere with the project choice of the researchers. However, increasing the number of member firms of the Research Corporation reduces the incentive of member firms to meddle with the research projects of researchers because exercising formal authority over the choice of research projects is a public good. The Research Corporation thus offers researchers greater autonomy than a single firm pursuing an identical research program in its in-house R&D department. This attracts higher ability researchers to the Research Corporation compared to the internal R&D department. The paper uses the theoretical model to analyze the organization of the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC). The facts of this case confirm the existence of a tension between control over the choice of research projects and the ability of researchers that the organization is able to attract or hold onto.

Influence activity and the organization of research and development

The organizational design of research and development conditions theincentives of the researchers of the research project. In particular,the organizational form determines the allocation of effort of theresearcher between time spent on research and time spent lobbying management. Researchers prefer to spend their time on research. However,the researchers only get utility from performing research if theproject is approved for its full duration. Spending time lobbyingmanagement for the continuation of the researcher s project increasesthe probability that the management observes a favorable signal aboutthe project. Organizing a research joint venture increases theflexibility of the organizational form with respect to the continuationdecision. For low correlation between the signals of the partners aboutthe expected profitability of the project, we find that the organizationof a research joint venture reduces influence activity by the researchersand increases expected profits of the partners. For high correlationbetween the signals, internal research projects lower influence activityby the researchers. We try to relate the correlation of the partnerssignals to the characteristics of basic research versus more appliedresearch projects, and find that the model is consistent with theobservation that research joint ventures seem involved in more basicresearch projects compared to internal R&D departments, whichconcentrate on more applied research.

Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability

We consider the agency problem of a staff member managing microfinancing programs, who can abuse his discretion to embezzle borrowers' repayments. The fact that most borrowers of microfinancing programs are illiterate and live in rural areas where transportation costs are very high make staff's embezzlement particularly relevant as is documented by Mknelly and Kevane (2002). We study the trade-off between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and find that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from insurance. Our analysis explains rigid repayment schedules used by the Grameen bank as an optimal response to the bank staff's agency problem. Joint liability reduces borrowers' burden of respecting the rigid repayment schedules by providing them with partial insurance. However, the same insurance can be provided byborrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract.

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economictheory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Shouldcorporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two majorcontributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analyticalframework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insightsinto how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed bytheir employees.

Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Self-organization mechanisms for the formation on nearshore crescentic and transverse sand bars

The formation and development of transverse and crescentic sand bars in the coastal marine environment has been investigated by means of a nonlinear numerical model based on the shallow-water equations and on a simpli ed sediment transport parameterization. By assuming normally approaching waves and a saturated surf zone, rhythmic patterns develop from a planar slope where random perturbations of small amplitude have been superimposed. Two types of bedforms appear: one is a crescentic bar pattern centred around the breakpoint and the other, herein modelled for the rst time, is a transverse bar pattern. The feedback mechanism related to the formation and development of the patterns can be explained by coupling the water and sediment conservation equations. Basically, the waves stir up the sediment and keep it in suspension with a certain cross-shore distribution of depth-averaged concentration. Then, a current flowing with (against) the gradient of sediment concentration produces erosion (deposition). It is shown that inside the surf zone, these currents may occur due to the wave refraction and to the redistribution of wave breaking produced by the growing bedforms. Numerical simulations have been performed in order to understand the sensitivity of the pattern formation to the parameterization and to relate the hydro-morphodynamic input conditions to which of the patterns develops. It is suggested that crescentic bar growth would be favoured by high-energy conditions and ne sediment while transverse bars would grow for milder waves and coarser sediment. In intermediate conditions mixed patterns may occur.

Disseny d'un sistema de control del consum d'aigua automàtic

Avui en dia s’ha convertit en una necessitat tenir cura del medi ambient i optimitzar els recursos naturals. En el camp per estalviar energia s’han fet grans progressos i disposem d’un gran ventall de dispositius que ens ajuden i ens faciliten l’optimització del consum d’energia. Però és una realitat que en l’estalvi del consum d’aigua el progrés ha estat molt menor i es limita molt a donar consells i repartir dosificadors d’aigua. Qui no ha vist carrers o jardins o cases inundades amb milers de litres d’aigua? Aquesta realitat m’ha portat a dissenyar i desenvolupar un prototip que em permeti tenir un millor control del consum d’aigua. El prototip, a trets principals, consta d’un sensor, una electrovàlvula i una placa Arduino Atmega. El sensor ens permet mesurar els litres consumits durant un cert període de temps. Passat aquest temps de mostreig es compara els litres consumits amb el consum habitual, en aquell període de temps. En cas de sobrepassar el volum programat es tancarà l’electrovàlvula de forma automàtica i rebrem un SMS al telèfon. L’activació de l’alarma es pot ajustar que sigui al igualar-se els dos valors, litres programats i litres consumits. També es pot programar el percentatge que cal sobrepassar de litres consumits per activar l’alarma, com el temps de mostreig. El fet de poder programar tots aquests valors ens permet fer un ajust ideal per a la instal·lació que es vol tenir controlada. A més, el prototip es pot utilitzar per enviar a la companyia d’aigua el valor del comptador de forma automàtica. D’aquesta forma la companyia d’aigua també optimitza recursos estalviant-se el desplaçament de personal a la instal·lació per fer la lectura corresponent. El prototip està basat amb un Arduino Atmega que ens permet el processament de les dades programades i capturades pel sensor. També s’ha incorporat una pantalla TFT Touch 2’8”, que permet visualitzar i programar els valors d’una forma molt més intuïtiva. Per enviar els SMS s’utilitza una placa d’Arduino Cel·lular Shield - SM5100B, a la qual només cal afegir una targeta SIM. A priori, el prototip té un elevat cost al fabricar una sola unitat i pot semblar poc útil. Però ens pot estalviar alguna sorpresa en les factures d’aigua si tenim una fuita i no ens n’adonem fins a veure el rebut de la companyia. Si es fabriqués a grans quantitats es podria abaratir el preu i fer-lo encara més engrescador.

Deciphering the global organization of clustering in real complex networks

We uncover the global organization of clustering in real complex networks. To this end, we ask whether triangles in real networks organize as in maximally random graphs with given degree and clustering distributions, or as in maximally ordered graph models where triangles are forced into modules. The answer comes by way of exploring m-core landscapes, where the m-core is defined, akin to the k-core, as the maximal subgraph with edges participating in at least m triangles. This property defines a set of nested subgraphs that, contrarily to k-cores, is able to distinguish between hierarchical and modular architectures. We find that the clustering organization in real networks is neither completely random nor ordered although, surprisingly, it is more random than modular. This supports the idea that the structure of real networks may in fact be the outcome of self-organized processes based on local optimization rules, in contrast to global optimization principles.