One kind of lawlessness: estimating the welfare cost of Somali piracy

This paper estimates the effect of piracy attacks on shipping costs using a unique data set on shipping contracts in the dry bulk market. We look at shipping routes whose shortest path exposes them to piracy attacks and find that the increase in attacks in 2008 lead to around a ten percent increase in shipping costs. We use this estimate to get a sense of the welfare loss imposed by piracy. Our intermediate estimate suggests that the creation of $120 million of revenue for pirates in the Somalia area led to a welfare loss of over $1.5 billion.

Pla per optimitzar el cost d’adquisió i logística de medicaments en un hospital

Un dels àmbits d’actuació del Pla de Mesures publicat pel Departament de Salud és la racionalització de la despesa farmacèutica en els hospitals. Cal dir que, actualment aquesta suposa dins de les despeses d’explotació dels hospitals un 13-15% del total i que, a diferència del consum de receptes mèdiques, no ha deixat de créixer en els últims anys. Si desglossem aquest percentatge, en la seva gran majoria correspon a un tipus de medicació anomenada Medicació Hospitalària de Dispensació Ambulatòria (MHDA) i s’ha de diferenciar del consum de fàrmacs intrahospitalari. La MHDA és un tipus de medicació d’ús hospitalari que es dispensa des del servei de farmàcia de l’hospital a pacients no ingressats i tracta diferents patologies que pel seu seguiment o control, es precisa que es faci des del mateix hospital. L’Objectiu del treball és fer un anàlisi exhaustiu de la gestió d’adquisicions d’un servei de farmàcia estàndard. Aquest anàlisi es farà a partir de l’elaboració de processos interns relacionats amb les adquisicions, passant per fer una relació de les despeses del servei, enumerant els recursos necessaris, i identificant les despeses logístiques i de personal.

La Gestió del conflicte públic i la mediació comunitària a Catalunya. El cas del cost dels conflictes a les comunitats de propietaris i veïns

En els darrers anys, institucions públiques i organitzacions es troben amb dificultats per gestionar la munió de necessitats i interessos que es donen a la societat actual i que sovint es converteixen en conflictes. Davant d’aquesta situació, s’ha tractat d’actualitzar el tema de la governabilitat expressat com la capacitat dels governs i les organitzacions, en democràcia, d’oferir respostes als conflictes públics i socials. En aquest context, la Mediació Comunitària i la Gestió Alternativa de Conflictes (GAC) es mostren com a fórmules que aporten qualitat de govern des d’una nova manera de gestionar el conflicte col·lectiu, amb la finalitat de trobar acords o generar consens per poder actuar, i amb capacitat per reduir costos en la intervenció.

Platform for Automatic, Normalized Annotation and Cost-Effective Acquisition of Language Resources for Human Language Technologies: PANACEA

El objetivo de PANACEA es engranar diferentes herramientas avanzadas para construir una fábrica de Recursos Lingüísticos (RL), una línea de producción que automatice los pasos implicados en la adquisición, producción, actualización y mantenimiento de los RL que la Traducción Automática y otras tecnologías lingüísticas, necesitan.

PANACEA (Platform for Automatic, Normalised Annotation and Cost-Effective Acquisition of Language Resources for Human Language Technologies)

The objective of PANACEA is to build a factory of LRs that automates the stages involved in the acquisition, production, updating and maintenance of LRs required by MT systems and by other applications based on language technologies, and simplifies eventual issues regarding intellectual property rights. This automation will cut down the cost, time and human effort significantly. These reductions of costs and time are the only way to guarantee the continuous supply of LRs that MT and other language technologies will be demanding in the multilingual Europe.

Cost del tractament del SIDA i d'Hepatitis C per a l'Estat : Comparació de la despesa d'una persona en llibertat vs. un pres

Un dels principals motius que ens va impulsar en l’elecció del tema és que es tracta d’untema que pot despertar curiositat entre la població.Un altre motiu, es que varem trobar que està íntimament relacionat amb els estudis queestem cursant, donat que afecta als pressupostos de l’estat i a la seva restricciópressupostària, i per tant, està directament relacionat amb la macroeconomia. En el nostrecas, reduirem l’àmbit d’estudi al territori català, de manera que estudiarem aquestes duesmalalties dins la despesa en sanitat pública catalana. A demés, estan finançades amb elsnostres impostos, i per tant la seva despesa afecta a la restricció pressupostària delsciutadans.L’elecció d’aquestes malalties no ha estat feta a l’atzar. Inicialment, varem pensar enestudiar els costos dels interns penitenciaris que patien aquestes malalties. Com que laSIDA i d’hepatitis C són les malalties més freqüents dins la presó, i les que tenen unscostos més característics donada la complexitat dels seus tractaments, varem pensar queserien prou representatives.No obstant, a mesura que ens anàvem endinsant en el tema, ens varem adonar que tambéseria molt interessant comparar el cost de les malalties amb el de les persones no recluses, iesbrinar si hi havia algun tipus de cost diferencial. És per això que varem decidir analitzaraquestes dues malalties tant dins com fora.Un altre factor que ens ha impulsat en l’elecció del tema és el fet que el nombre d’interns ales presons té un ritme de creixement constant que s’ha accelerat en els últims anys,sobretot degut a l’augment de la immigració. Això implica un augment progressiu de ladespesa, que es tradueix en una necessitat d’ingressos majors per tal de poder equilibrar larestricció de la qual parlàvem abans.També varem voler anar una mica més lluny i analitzar el pes d’aquestes malalties dins dela despesa que la generalitat ha establert per a la sanitat pública. Com les dues son MDO (malalties de declaració obligatòria ) estan finançades completament pel sector públic.L’objectiu era veure si representaven un cost tant elevat com pensàvem.OBJECTIUS DEL TREBALL:· Demostrar l’elevat cost que suposen certes malalties per l’estat.· Manifestar els canvis en el cost de les malalties amb l’evolució delstractaments.· Analitzar els costos sanitaris extres que es produeixen a les presons.· Destacar l’augment accelerat del nombre d’interns i l’augment del cost sanitarique això suposa. METODOLOGIA: Per tal de poder realitzar l’estudi comparatiu, hem hagut de calcular manualment els costosde les malalties, tot informant-nos del preu dels medicament, les dosis, el cost de lesconsultes externes,etc. A més, per a calcular el cost del tractament dins la presó, ens hemhagut d’informar dels aspectes més generals que envolten a un pres, per poder veure sirealment existeix un cost diferencial respecte la malaltia a l’exterior. Per obtenir aquestesdiverses informacions, ens hem hagut de posar en contacte amb el personal que treballa ala presó que hem pres com a model d’estudi.Així, podem dividir les nostres fonts d’informació en 3 categories:• Obtenció d’informació directament amb el personal de la presó:– Entrevista amb la directora d’infermeria de la Secretaria de ServeisPenitenciaris, Rehabilitació i Justícia Juvenil– Entrevista amb la Cap d’infermeria del Centre Quatre Camins.• Informació a partir de mostres facilitades pels propis funcionaris de la presó• Informació a partir d’estudis sobre el tema i de dades oficials, concretament lesdades oficials sobre els Pressupostos de la Generalitat.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Caution, children crossing: Heterogeneity of victim's cost of care and negligence rule

The paper deals with a bilateral accident situation in which victims haveheterogeneous costs of care. With perfect information,efficient care bythe injurer raises with the victim's cost. When the injurer cannot observeat all the victim's type, and this fact can be verified by Courts, first-bestcannot be implemented with the use of a negligence rule based on thefirst-best levels of care. Second-best leads the injurer to intermediate care,and the two types of victims to choose the best response to it. This second-bestsolution can be easily implemented by a negligence rule with second-best as duecare. We explore imperfect observation of the victim's type, characterizing theoptimal solution and examining the different legal alternatives when Courts cannotverify the injurers' statements. Counterintuitively, we show that there is nodifference at all between the use by Courts of a rule of complete trust and arule of complete distrust towards the injurers' statements. We then relate thefindings of the model to existing rules and doctrines in Common Law and Civil Lawlegal systems.

Cost system design and cost management in the Spanish public sector

Cost systems have been shown to have developed considerably in recent years andactivity-based costing (ABC) has been shown to be a contribution to cost management,particularly in service businesses. The public sector is composed to a very great extentof service functions, yet considerably less has been reported of the use of ABC tosupport cost management in this sector.In Spain, cost systems are essential for city councils as they are obliged to calculate thecost of the services subject to taxation (eg. waste collection, etc). City councils musthave a cost system in place to calculate the cost of services, as they are legally requirednot to profit , from these services.This paper examines the development of systems to support cost management in theSpanish Public Sector. Through semi-structured interviews with 28 subjects within oneCity Council it contains a case study of cost management. The paper contains extractsfrom interviews and a number of factors are identified which contribute to thesuccessful development of the cost management system.Following the case study a number of other City Councils were identified where activity-based techniques had either failed or stalled. Based on the factors identified inthe single case study a further enquiry is reported. The paper includes a summary usingstatistical analysis which draws attention to change management, funding and politicalincentives as factors which had an influence on system success or failure.

A dilution cost approach to financial intermediation and securities markets

This paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance,with asymmetric information and no taxes, where equity issues, Bankdebt and Bond financing may all co-exist in equilibrium. The paperemphasizes the relationship Banking aspect of financial intermediation:firms turn to banks as a source of investment mainly because banks aregood at helping them through times of financial distress. The debtrestructuring service that banks may offer, however, is costly. Therefore,the firms which do not expect to be financially distressed prefer toobtain a cheaper market source of funding through bond or equity issues.This explains why bank lending and bond financing may co-exist inequilibrium. The reason why firms or banks also issue equity in our modelis simply to avoid bankruptcy. Banks have the additional motive that theyneed to satisfy minimum capital adequacy requeriments. Several types ofequilibria are possible, one of which has all the main characteristics ofa "credit crunch". This multiplicity implies that the channels of monetarypolicy may depend on the type of equilibrium that prevails, leadingsometimes to support a "credit view" and other times the classical "moneyview".

Convertibility, currency controls and the cost of capital in Western Europe, 1950-1999

For most of the post-war period, Europe s capital markets remained largely closed to international capital flows. Thispaper explores the costs of this policy. Using an event-study methodology, I examine the extent to which restrictions ofcurrent and capital account convertibility affected stock returns. The delayed introduction of full currency convertibilityincreased the cost of capital. Also, a string of measures designed to reduce capital mobility before the ultimate collapseof the Bretton Woods System had considerable negative effects. These findings offer an explanation for the mountingevidence suggesting that capital account liberalization facilitates growth.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Monetary unions and the transaction cost savings of a single currency

This paper studies the transaction cost savings of moving froma multi-currency exchange system to a single currency one. Theanalysis concentrates exclusively on the transaction andprecautionary demand for money and abstracts from any othermotives to hold currency. A continuous-time, stochastic Baumol-like model similar to that in Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980) isgeneralized to include several currencies and calibrated to fitEuropean data. The analysis implies an upper bound for thesavings associated with reductions of transaction costs derivedfrom the European Monetary Union of approximately 0.6\% of theCommunity GDP. Additionally, the magnitudes of the brokeragefee and the volatility of transactions, whose estimation hastraditionally been difficult to address empirically, areapproximated for Europe.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Cost-containment in health care: The case of Spain from the eighties up to 1997

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the evolutionof health care expenditure in Spain during the period 1980-1997, andhenceforth to comment on the cost containment measures put forwardto control its growth. The paper is divided into three separatesections. The first offers a brief description of the Spanish HealthCare System, with emphasis placed on the issue of expenditure controland health planning targets. The second part outlines a set of costcontainment measures that has accompanied the process of extendinguniversal health care coverage which occurred during the mentionedperiod and which has helped keep public expenditure under control.Finally, the third part describes some of the more recent proposalsfor reform of the Spanish Health Care Sector.