Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

A note on discrete claims problems

In this note, we consider claims problems with indivisible goods. Specifically, by applying recursively the P-rights lower bound (Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil (2008)), we ensure the fulfillment of Weak Order Preservation, considered by many authors as a minimal requirement of fairness. Moreover, we retrieve the Discrete Constrained Equal Losses and the Discrete Constrained Equal Awards rules (Herrero and Martíınez (2008)). Finally, by the recursive double imposition of a lower and an upper bound, we obtain the average between them. Keywords: Claims problems, Indivisibilities, Order Preservation, Constrained Egalitarian rules, Midpoint. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

A note on Luttens’ Minimal rights based solidarity

Following the approach developed by Luttens (2010), we consider a model where individuals with di fferent levels of skills exert di fferent levels of e ffor. Speci fically, we propose a redistribution mechanism based on a lower bound on what every individual deserves: the so-called minimal rights (O'Neill (1982)). Our re finement of Luttens' mechanism ensures at the same time minimal rights based solidarity, participation (non-negativity) and claims feasibility. Keywords: Redistribution mechanism, Minimal rights, Solidarity, Participation, Claims feasibility. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

A note on schooling in development accounting

How much would output increase if underdeveloped economies were to increase their levels of schooling? We contribute to the development accounting literature by describing a non-parametric upper bound on the increase in output that can be generated by more schooling. The advantage of our approach is that the upper bound is valid for any number of schooling levels with arbitrary patterns of substitution/complementarity. Another advantage is that the upper bound is robust to certain forms of endogenous technology response to changes in schooling. We also quantify the upper bound for all economies with the necessary data, compare our results with the standard development accounting approach, and provide an update on the results using the standard approach for a large sample of countries.

Skill, Luck, Overconfidence, and Risk Taking

In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We compare experimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill alone and combinations of skill and luck. We find more risk taking with skill and luck as opposed to skill alone, particularly for males, and little overconfidence. Our data support an explanation based on differential attitudes toward luck by those whose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making luck more important induces greater optimism for the former, while the latter maintain a belief that high levels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance.

A multilevel analysis on the determinants of regional health care expenditure. A note

We apply a multilevel hierarchical model to explore whether anaggregation fallacy exists in estimating the income elasticity of healthexpenditure by ignoring the regional composition of national healthexpenditure figures. We use data for 110 regions in eight OECD countriesin 1997: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden andUnited Kingdom. In doing this we have tried to identify two sources ofrandom variation: within countries and between-countries. Our resultsshow that: 1- Variability between countries amounts to (SD) 0.5433, andjust 13% of that can be attributed to income elasticity and the remaining87% to autonomous health expenditure; 2- Within countries, variabilityamounts to (SD) 1.0249; and 3- The intra-class correlation is 0.5300. Weconclude that we have to take into account the degree of fiscaldecentralisation within countries in estimating income elasticity ofhealth expenditure. Two reasons lie behind this: a) where there isdecentralisation to the regions, policies aimed at emulating diversitytend to increase national health care expenditure; and b) without fiscaldecentralisation, central monitoring of finance tends to reduce regionaldiversity and therefore decrease national health expenditure.

The evolution of adult height in Europe: A brief note

This paper presents new evidence on the evolution of adult height in 10 Europeancountries for cohorts born between 1950 and 1980 using the European CommunityHousehold Panel (ECHP), which collects height data from Austria, Belgium, Denmark,Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Our findings show agradual increase in adult height across all countries. However, countries from SouthernEurope (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) experienced higher gains in stature than thoselocated in Northern Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden).

A note on robust detection

We introduce a simple new hypothesis testing procedure, which,based on an independent sample drawn from a certain density, detects which of $k$ nominal densities is the true density is closest to, under the total variation (L_{1}) distance. Weobtain a density-free uniform exponential bound for the probability of false detection.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

A note on the dual scaling of dominance data and its relationship to correspondence analysis

Dual scaling of a subjects-by-objects table of dominance data (preferences,paired comparisons and successive categories data) has been contrasted with correspondence analysis, as if the two techniques were somehow different. In this note we show that dual scaling of dominance data is equivalent to the correspondence analysis of a table which is doubled with respect to subjects. We also show that the results of both methods can be recovered from a principal components analysis of the undoubled dominance table which is centred with respect to subject means.

When "hope springs eternal": The role of chance in risk taking

In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We contrastexperimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill as opposed tocombinations of skill and chance. Our data show differential attitudes toward chance by thosewhose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making chance more important induces greateroptimism for the former who start taking more risk, while the latter maintain a belief that highlevels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance. Finally, although weobserved excess entry (i.e., too many participants entered markets), this could not beattributed to overconfidence.

A note on the Malliavin differentiability of the Heston volatility

We show that the Heston volatility or equivalently the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process is Malliavin differentiable and give an explicit expression for the derivative. This result assures the applicability of Malliavin calculus in the framework of the Heston stochastic volatility model and the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model for interest rates.

An approach for linking score and audio recordings in Makam music of Turkey

The main information sources to study a particular piece of music are symbolic scores and audio recordings. These are complementary representations of the piece and it isvery useful to have a proper linking between the two of the musically meaningful events. For the case of makam music of Turkey, linking the available scores with the correspondingaudio recordings requires taking the specificities of this music into account, such as the particular tunings, the extensive usage of non-notated expressive elements, and the way in which the performer repeats fragmentsof the score. Moreover, for most of the pieces of the classical repertoire, there is no score written by the original composer. In this paper, we propose a methodology to pair sections of a score to the corresponding fragments of audio recording performances. The pitch information obtained from both sources is used as the common representationto be paired. From an audio recording, fundamental frequency estimation and tuning analysis is done to compute a pitch contour. From the corresponding score, symbolic note names and durations are converted to a syntheticpitch contour. Then, a linking operation is performed between these pitch contours in order to find the best correspondences.The method is tested on a dataset of 11 compositions spanning 44 audio recordings, which are mostly monophonic. An F3-score of 82% and 89% are obtained with automatic and semi-automatic karar detection respectively,showing that the methodology may give us a needed tool for further computational tasks such as form analysis, audio-score alignment and makam recognition.