Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

Prime property institutions for a subprime era: Toward innovative models of homeownership

This Article breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and other types of public financing schemes, we suggest extending institutional and financial strategies such as time- and place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Two new solutions offer a broad theoretical basis for such developments in the economic and legal institution of homeownership: a for-profit shared equity scheme led by local governments alongside a private market shared equity model, one of "bootstrapping home buying with purchase options".

Property titling and conveyancing

This chapter analyzes titling institutions and the regulation of supporting conveyancingservices. After examining the tradeoff of enforcement benefits and consent costs posed byproperty rights, it explains how different public titling systems (privacy, recording andregistration) try to solve this tradeoff, and what the consequences are for the nature andregulation of private conveyancing services. The chapter ends with a discussion of someempirical issues and data which are useful for comparing, designing and managing titlingand conveyancing systems.

Property enforcement as organized consent

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that makeproperty rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing thecollateral value of assets and promoting growth. In contrast tocontractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affectedonly with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement butis costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in thesame asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consentsto overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs:recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights and evena regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionallysimilar services, but their relative performance varies with the numberof transactions, the risk of political opportunism and regulatoryconsistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowingcompetition in the preparation and support of private contractswhile requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registrationactivities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.

On the throughput-WIP trade-off in queueing systems, diminishing returns and the threshold property: A linear programming approach

We present a new unifying framework for investigating throughput-WIP(Work-in-Process) optimal control problems in queueing systems,based on reformulating them as linear programming (LP) problems withspecial structure: We show that if a throughput-WIP performance pairin a stochastic system satisfies the Threshold Property we introducein this paper, then we can reformulate the problem of optimizing alinear objective of throughput-WIP performance as a (semi-infinite)LP problem over a polygon with special structure (a thresholdpolygon). The strong structural properties of such polygones explainthe optimality of threshold policies for optimizing linearperformance objectives: their vertices correspond to the performancepairs of threshold policies. We analyze in this framework theversatile input-output queueing intensity control model introduced byChen and Yao (1990), obtaining a variety of new results, including (a)an exact reformulation of the control problem as an LP problem over athreshold polygon; (b) an analytical characterization of the Min WIPfunction (giving the minimum WIP level required to attain a targetthroughput level); (c) an LP Value Decomposition Theorem that relatesthe objective value under an arbitrary policy with that of a giventhreshold policy (thus revealing the LP interpretation of Chen andYao's optimality conditions); (d) diminishing returns and invarianceproperties of throughput-WIP performance, which underlie thresholdoptimality; (e) a unified treatment of the time-discounted andtime-average cases.

The effects of tax deductibility on the mix of property taxes and use charges: an empirical analysis of the spanish case

This paper tests some hypothesis about the determinants of the local tax structure. In particular, we focus on the effects that the property tax deductibility in the national income tax has on the relative use of the property tax and user charges. We deal with the incentive effects that local governments face regarding the different sources of revenue by means of a model in which the local tax structure and the level of public expenditure arise as a result of the maximizing behaviour of local politicians subject to the economic effects of the tax system. We attempt to test the hypothesis developed with data corresponding to a set of Spanish municipalities during the period 1987-9l. We find that tax deductibility provides incentives to raise revenues from the property tax but does not introduce a biass against user charges or in favor of overall spending growth

The effects of tax deductibility on the mix of property taxes and use charges: an empirical analysis of the spanish case

This paper tests some hypothesis about the determinants of the local tax structure. In particular, we focus on the effects that the property tax deductibility in the national income tax has on the relative use of the property tax and user charges. We deal with the incentive effects that local governments face regarding the different sources of revenue by means of a model in which the local tax structure and the level of public expenditure arise as a result of the maximizing behaviour of local politicians subject to the economic effects of the tax system. We attempt to test the hypothesis developed with data corresponding to a set of Spanish municipalities during the period 1987-9l. We find that tax deductibility provides incentives to raise revenues from the property tax but does not introduce a biass against user charges or in favor of overall spending growth

Does land titling matter? The role of land property rights in the war on illicit crops in Colombia

This paper analyzes the role of formalization of land property rights in the war against illicit crops in Colombia. We argue that as a consequence of the increase of state presence and visibility during the period of 2000 and 2009, municipalities with a higher level of formalization of their land property rights saw a greater reduction in the area allocated to illicit crops. We hypothesize that this is due to the increased cost of growing illicit crops on formal land compared to informal, and due to the possibility of obtaining more benets in the newly in- stalled institutional environment when land is formalized. We exploit the variation in the level of formalization of land property rights in a set of municipalities that had their rst cadastral census collected in the period of 1994-2000; this selection procedure guarantees reliable data and an unbiased source of variation. Using fixed effects estimators, we found a signicant negative relationship between the level of formalization of land property rights and the number of hectares allocated to coca crops per municipality. These results remain robust through a number of sensitivity analyses. Our ndings contribute to the growing body of evidence on the positive effects of formal land property rights, and e ective policies in the war on drugs in Colombia.

Bandlimited Lipschitz functions

We study the space of bandlimited Lipschitz functions in one variable. In particular we provide a geometrical description of interpolating and sampling sequences for this space. We also give a description of the trace of such functions to sequences of critical density in terms of a cancellation condition.