Banks, Lies and Bricks: The Determinants of Home Value Inflation in Spain during the Housing Boom

During the first decade of this century, Spain experienced the most important economic and housing boom in its recent history. This situation led the lending industry to dramatically expand through the mortgage market. The high competition among lenders caused a dramatic lowering of credit standards. During this period, lenders operating in the Spanish mortgage market artificially inflated appraised home values in order to draw larger mortgages. By doing this, lenders gave financially constrained households access to mortgage credit. In this paper, we analyze this phenomenon for this first time. To do so, we resort to a unique dataset of matched mortgage-dwelling-borrower characteristics covering the period 2004–2010. Our data allow us to construct an unbiased measure of property’s over-appraisal, since transaction prices in our data also includes any potential side payment in the transactions. Our findings indicate that i) in Spain, appraised home values were inflated on average by around 30% with respect to transaction prices; ii) creditconstrained households were more likely to be involved in mortgages with inflated house values; and iii) a regional indicator of competition in the lending market suggests that inflated appraisal values were also more likely to appear in more competitive regional mortgage markets. Keywords: Housing demand, appraisal values, house prices, housing bubble, credit constraints, mortgage market. JEL Classification: R21, R31

Passarel·la de Pagaments

El treball consisteix en la realització d'una passarel·la de pagaments triangular. Una passarel·la d'aquest tipus permet gestionar pagaments on-line entre agents (comprador - comerciant - entitat financera), evitant que el comerciant conegui les dades de la tarjeta de crèdit i pugui realitzar canvis de la quantitat a pagar pel client.

Determining underlying macroeconomic fundamentals during emerging market crises: Are conditions as bad as they seem?

Emerging market crises are characterized by large swings in both macroeconomic fundamentalsand asset prices. The economic significance of observed movements in macroeconomicvariables is obscured by the brief and extreme nature of crises. In this paper we propose to study the macroeconomic consequences of crises by studying the behavior of effective fundamentals, constructed by studying the relative movements of stock prices during crises. We find that these effective fundamentals provide a different picture than that implied by observed fundamentals. First, asset prices often reflect expectations of improvement in fundamentals after the initial devaluations; specifically, effective depreciations are positive but not as large as the observed ones. Second, crises vary in their effect on credit market conditions, with investors expecting tightening of credit in some cases (Mexico 1994, Philippines 1997), but loosening of credit in others (Sweden 1992, Korea 1997, Brazil 1999).

Crises and growth: A re-evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

Systemic crises and growth

In this paper, we document the fact that countries that have experienced occasional financial crises have on average grown faster than countries with stable financial conditions. We measure the incidence of crisis with the skewness of credit growth, and find that it has a robust negative effect on GDP growth. This link coexists with the negative link between variance and growth typically found in the literature. To explain the link between crises and growth we present a model where weak institutions lead to severe financial constraints and low growth. Financial liberalization policies that facilitaterisk-taking increase leverage and investment. This leads to higher growth, but also toa greater incidence of crises. Conditions are established under which the costs of crises are outweighed by the benefits of higher growth.

Prices versus exams as strategic instruments for competing universities

In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universities in the presence of credit constraints. We first compare the optimal behavior of a public, welfare maximizing, monopoly and a private, profit maximizing, monopoly. Then we model competition between a public and a private institution and investigate the new role of exams/prices in this environment. We find that, under certain circumstances, the public university may have an interest to raise tuition fees from minimum levels if it cares for global welfare. This will be the case provided that (i) the private institution has higher quality and uses only prices to select applicants, or (ii) the private institution has lower quality and uses also exams to select students. When this is the case, there are efficiency grounds for raising public prices

The Adoption of agricultural credit cooperativism in Spain (1890-1935) : solidarity from below?

The spread of agrarian credit cooperativism in Spain (1890-1934) was done under a variety of ideological and economic orientations. This article focuses on the construction of a few tools and indicators to explain the characteristics of agricultural credit cooperatives. An analysis of financial operations of rural savings banks is related with socio-political aspects that influenced their development; This analysis helps us to explain the relative success of German credit cooperative models adopted in the context of Spanish agriculture, as happened on European periphery.

Leading indicator properties of US high-yield credit spreads

In this paper we examine the out-of-sample forecast performance of high-yield credit spreads regarding real-time and revised data on employment and industrial production in the US. We evaluate models using both a point forecast and a probability forecast exercise. Our main findings suggest the use of few factors obtained by pooling information from a number of sector-specific high-yield credit spreads. This can be justified by observing that, especially for employment, there is a gain from using a principal components model fitted to high-yield credit spreads compared to the prediction produced by benchmarks, such as an AR, and ARDL models that use either the term spread or the aggregate high-yield spread as exogenous regressor. Moreover, forecasts based on real-time data are generally comparable to forecasts based on revised data. JEL Classification: C22; C53; E32 Keywords: Credit spreads; Principal components; Forecasting; Real-time data.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

International capital flows and credit market imperfections: A tale of two frictions

The financial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financialmarkets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financialimperfections, however, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability.In this paper, we fill this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverseselection. Our main results are that, by fostering unproductive investment, adverse selection:(i) leads to an increase in the economy s equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) it generates a negativewedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate. Underfinancial integration, we show how this translates into excessive capital inflows and endogenouscycles. We also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limitedpledgeability coexist. We conclude that both frictions complement one another and show thatlimited pledgeability exacerbates the effects of adverse selection.

Towards a theory of the credit-risk balance sheet

This article designs what it calls a Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (the risk being that of default by customers), a tool which, in principle, can contribute to revealing, controlling and managing the bad debt risk arising from a company¿s commercial credit, whose amount can represent a significant proportion of both its current and total assets.To construct it, we start from the duality observed in any credit transaction of this nature, whose basic identity can be summed up as Credit = Risk. ¿Credit¿ is granted by a company to its customer, and can be ranked by quality (we suggest the credit scoring system) and ¿risk¿ can either be assumed (interiorised) by the company itself or transferred to third parties (exteriorised).What provides the approach that leads to us being able to talk with confidence of a real Credit-Risk Balance Sheet with its methodological robustness is that the dual vision of the credit transaction is not, as we demonstrate, merely a classificatory duality (a double risk-credit classification of reality) but rather a true causal relationship, that is, a risk-credit causal duality.Once said Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (which bears a certain structural similarity with the classic net asset balance sheet) has been built, and its methodological coherence demonstrated, its properties ¿static and dynamic¿ are studied.Analysis of the temporal evolution of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet and of its applications will be the object of subsequent works.