Migration and information flows. A new lens for the study of contemporary international migration

Aquest document de treball mira d'establir un nou camp d'investigació a la cruïlla entre els fluxos de migració i d'informació i comunicació. Hi ha diversos factors que fan que valgui la pena adoptar aquesta perspectiva. El punt central és que la migració internacional contemporània és incrustada en la dinàmica de la societat de la informació, seguint models comuns i dinàmiques interconnectades. Per consegüent, s'està començant a identificar els fluxos d'informació com a qüestions clau en les polítiques de migració. A més, hi ha una manca de coneixement empíric en el disseny de xarxes d'informació i l'ús de les tecnologies d'informació i comunicació en contextos migratoris. Aquest document de treball també mira de ser una font d'hipòtesis per a investigacions posteriors.

The Role of Information in Contemporary Migration. More Sources but Less Informed

La migració internacional contemporània és integrada en un procés d'interconnexió global definit per les revolucions del transport i de les tecnologies de la informació i la comunicació. Una de les conseqüències d'aquesta interconnexió global és que les persones migrants tenen més capacitat per a processar informació tant abans com després de marxar. Aquests canvis podrien tenir implicacions inesperades per a la migració contemporània pel que fa a la capacitat de les persones migrants per a prendre decisions més informades, la reducció de la incertesa en contextos migratoris, el desdibuixament del concepte de distància o la decisió d'emigrar cap a llocs més llunyans. Aquesta recerca és important, ja que la manca de coneixement sobre aquesta qüestió podria contribuir a fer augmentar la distància entre els objectius de les polítiques de migració i els seus resultats. El paper que tenen els agents de la informació en els contextos migratoris també podria canviar. En aquest escenari, perquè les polítiques de migració siguin més efectives, s'haurà de tenir en compte la major capacitat de la població migrant de processar la informació i les fonts d'informació en què es confia. Aquest article demostra que l'equació més informació equival a més ben informat no es compleix sempre. Fins i tot en l'era de la informació, les fonts no fiables, les expectatives falses, la sobreinformació i els rumors encara són presents en els contextos migratoris. Tanmateix, defensem l'argument que aquests efectes no volguts es podrien reduir complint quatre requisits de la informació fiable: que sigui exhaustiva, que sigui rellevant, que s'hi confiï i que sigui actualitzada.

Adding new components to the knowledge plane GMPLS over WDM networks

A recent study defines a new network plane: the knowledge plane. The incorporation of the knowledge plane over the network allows having more accurate information of the current and future network states. In this paper, the introduction and management of the network reliability information in the knowledge plane is proposed in order to improve the quality of service with protection routing algorithms in GMPLS over WDM networks. Different experiments prove the efficiency and scalability of the proposed scheme in terms of the percentage of resources used to protect the network

Do labour mobility and networks foster geographical knowledge diffusion? The case of European regions

The goal of this paper is twofold: first, we aim to assess the role played by inventors’ cross-regional mobility and networks of collaboration in fostering knowledge diffusion across regions and subsequent innovation. Second, we intend to evaluate the feasibility of using mobility and networks information to build cross-regional interaction matrices to be used within the spatial econometrics toolbox. To do so, we depart from a knowledge production function where regional innovation intensity is a function not only of the own regional innovation inputs but also external accessible R&D gained through interregional interactions. Differently from much of the previous literature, cross-section gravity models of mobility and networks are estimated to use the fitted values to build our ‘spatial’ weights matrices, which characterize the intensity of knowledge interactions across a panel of 269 regions covering most European countries over 6 years.

International regimes as knowledge syndicates? Energy and trends of global governance

El poder de l'Estat i la sobirania tradicional s'està deteriorant de manera constant, sobretot en termes de la provisió de certs béns públics fonamentals. Els Estats, en particular, són incapaços de manejar el coneixement i la informació que és essencial per mantenir la competitivitat i la sostenibilitat en una economia interdependent. Estructures fiables de la governança mundial i la cooperació internacional estan lluny de ser establertes. Energia com a problema a les agendes p dels governs, les empreses privades i la societat civil és un exemple manifest d'aquesta dinàmica.. L'actual sistema de governança mundial d'energia implica accions polítiques disperses per actors divers. L'Agència Internacional de l'Energia té un paper destacat, però està debilitat per la seva composició limitada i basada en el coneixement- epistèmic en lloc del material o executiu. Aquest treball sosté que ni la mida ni nombre de membres disponibles estan dificultant la governabilitat mundial d'energia. Més aviat, l'energia és una sèrie de béns públics que es troben als llimbs, on els estats no poden pagar la seva disposició, així com els diversos interessos impedir l'establiment d'una autoritat internacional. Després de la introducció de la teoria del règim internacional i el concepte de coneixement basats en les comunitats epistèmiques, l'article revisa l'estat actual de la governabilitat de l'energia mundia. A continuació es presenta una comparació d'aquesta estructura amb els règims de govern nacional i regional, d'una banda, i amb règims globals ambientals i de salut, de l'altra

Two-sided learning in new keynesian models: dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank (two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economy have asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. We assume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct for different sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model of the economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs through a statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study the short-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularly with respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learning can generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behavior of the variables in the model in a signifficant way. Our simulations do not converge to a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source that invalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identify a novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communication can be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified

Embedding objects into Matlab/Simulink for process supervision

This paper introduces how artificial intelligence technologies can be integrated into a known computer aided control system design (CACSD) framework, Matlab/Simulink, using an object oriented approach. The aim is to build a framework to aid supervisory systems analysis, design and implementation. The idea is to take advantage of an existing CACSD framework, Matlab/Simulink, so that engineers can proceed: first to design a control system, and then to design a straightforward supervisory system of the control system in the same framework. Thus, expert systems and qualitative reasoning tools are incorporated into this popular CACSD framework to develop a computer aided supervisory system design (CASSD) framework. Object-variables an introduced into Matlab/Simulink for sharing information between tools

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. Wereplace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probability p or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a kind of correlated equilibrium satisfying certain p-belief constraints, and that it varies continuously in the parameters p and, for p sufficiently close to one,with high probability is supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interimtypes, to games of incomplete information, as well as to the case of non-common priors.

Two-sided learning in New Keynesian models: Dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank(two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economyhave asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. Weassume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct fordifferent sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model ofthe economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs througha statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study theshort-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularlywith respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learningcan generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behaviorof the variables in the model in a significant way. Our simulations do not convergeto a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source thatinvalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identifya novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communicationcan be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified.

Shared knowledge

Agents use their knowledge on the history of the economy in orderto choose what is the optimal action to take at any given moment of time,but each individual observes history with some noise. This paper showsthat the amount of information available on the past evolution of theeconomy is an endogenous variable, and that this leads to overconcentrationof the investment, which can be interpreted as underinvestment in research.It presents a model in which agents have to invest at each period in one of$K$ sectors, each of them paying an exogenous return that follows a welldefined stochastic path. At any moment of time each agent receives an unbiasednoisy signal on the payoff of each sector. The signals differ across agents,but all of them have the same variance, which depends on the aggregate investmentin that particular sector (so that if almost everybody invests in it theperceptions of everybody will be very accurate, but if almost nobody doesthe perceptions of everybody will be very noisy). The degree of hetereogeneityacross agents is then an endogenous variable, evolving across time determining,and being determined by, the amount of information disclosed.As long as both the level of social interaction and the underlying precisionof the observations are relatively large agents behave in a very preciseway. This behavior is unmodified for a huge range of informational parameters,and it is characterized by an excessive concentration of the investment ina few sectors. Additionally the model shows that generalized improvements in thequality of the information that each agent gets may lead to a worse outcomefor all the agents due to the overconcentration of the investment that thisproduces.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Endogenous information structures

Many models in the economics literature deal with strategic situations withprivately informed agents. In those models the information structure isassumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. We consider whether suchmodels, and the results they produce, are robust with respect theendogenization of the information structure. The results depend on whetherinformation acquisition is secret or private, and on whether the strategicsituation involves simultaneous or sequential moves. In particular we findthat only when information is secretly acquired and moves are simultaneous,the results are fully robust. When information is acquired secretly butmoves are sequential additional equilibria may appear. Instead, privateinformation acquisition may make the equilibrium set smaller.

Duality in mean-variance frontiers with conditioning information

Portfolio and stochastic discount factor (SDF) frontiers are usually regarded as dual objects, and researchers sometimes use one to answer questions about the other. However, the introduction of conditioning information and active portfolio strategies alters this relationship. For instance, the unconditional portfolio frontier in Hansen and Richard (1987) is not dual to the unconditional SDF frontier in Gallant, Hansen and Tauchen (1990). We characterise the dual objects to those frontiers, and relate them to the frontiers generated with managed portfolios, which are commonly used in empirical work. We also study the implications of a safe asset and other special cases.