Wage rigidity and job creation

Recent research in macroeconomics emphasizes the role of wage rigidity in accounting for the volatility of unemployment fluctuations. We use worker-level datafrom the CPS to measure the sensitivity of wages of newly hired workers to changesin aggregate labor market conditions. The wage of new hires, unlike the aggregatewage, is volatile and responds almost one-to-one to changes in labor productivity.We conclude that there is little evidence for wage stickiness in the data. We alsoshow, however, that a little wage rigidity goes a long way in amplifying the responseof job creation to productivity shocks.

Employee referrals and efficiency wages

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.

Job dynamics, correlated shocks and wage profiles

We generalize the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model of the labor marketwith a more realistic structure for the stochastic process of theshocks to the worker-firm match. In this way we can acommodate theempirical observation that hazard rates of job termination decrease andaverage wages increase with job tenure. Besides being able to fit bettersome observables of the model, the changes we introduce are nontrivialfor the analysis of policies as well.

Employee referrals and the inter-industry wage structure

This paper investigates the role of employee referrals in the labor market.Using an original data set, I find that industries that pay wage premia andhave characteristics associated with high-wage sectors rely mainly on employeereferrals to fill jobs. Moreover, unemployment rates are higher in industries which use employee referrals more extensively. This paper develops an equilibrium matching model which can explain these empirical regularities. Inthis model, the matching process sorts heterogeneous firms and workers into two distinct groups: referrals match "good" jobs to "good" workers, while formalmethods (e.g., newspaper ads and employment agencies) match less-attractive jobs to disadvantaged workers. Thus, well-connected workers who learn quickly aboutjob opportunities use referrals to jump job queues, while those who are less well placed in the labor market search for jobs through formal methods. The split of firms and workers between referrals and formal search is, however, not necessarily efficient. Congestion externalities in referral search imply that unemployment would be closer to the optimal rate if firms and workers 'at themargin' searched formally.

Reporting of methodologic information on trial registries for quality assessment: a study of trial records retrieved from the WHO search portal

Background: Although randomized clinical trials (RCTs) are considered the gold standard of evidence, their reporting is often suboptimal. Trial registries have the potential to contribute important methodologic information for critical appraisal of study results. Methods and Findings: The objective of the study was to evaluate the reporting of key methodologic study characteristics in trial registries. We identified a random sample (n = 265) of actively recruiting RCTs using the World Health Organization International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP) search portal in 2008. We assessed the reporting of relevant domains from the Cochrane Collaboration’s ‘Risk of bias’ tool and other key methodological aspects. Our primary outcomes were the proportion of registry records with adequate reporting of random sequence generation, allocation concealment, blinding, and trial outcomes. Two reviewers independently assessed each record. Weighted overall proportions in the ICTRP search portal for adequate reporting of sequence generation, allocation concealment, blinding (including and excluding open label RCT) and primary outcomes were 5.7% (95% CI 3.0–8.4%), 1.4% (0–2.8%), 41% (35–47%), 8.4% (4.1–13%), and 66% (60–72%), respectively. The proportion of adequately reported RCTs was higher for registries that used specific methodological fields for describing methods of randomization and allocation concealment compared to registries that did not. Concerning other key methodological aspects, weighted overall proportions of RCTs with adequately reported items were as follows: eligibility criteria (81%), secondary outcomes (46%), harm (5%) follow-up duration (62%), description of the interventions (53%) and sample size calculation (1%). Conclusions: Trial registries currently contain limited methodologic information about registered RCTs. In order to permit adequate critical appraisal of trial results reported in journals and registries, trial registries should consider requesting details on key RCT methods to complement journal publications. Full protocols remain the most comprehensive source of methodologic information and should be made publicly available.