Justifying Institutional Investment in OER Development : OERs as Marketing Vehicle

The higher education sector has become increasingly competitive and prospective students are adopting a consumerist approach to institution and programme choice. In response, higher education marketing has become more complex, market-oriented and business-like. Financial sustainability of open education resource (OER) projects is a widespread concern. This paper explores the extent to which a classical product placement framework can be applied to OERs to justify institutional funding in OER projects as a marketing investment. It is argued that OERs designed on this premise can increase cognitive, affective and conative brand outcomes while providing the traditional educational and societal benefits associated with OERs. A series of propositions are presented that may form the basis of a future research agenda.

Modelling world investment markets using threshold conditional correlation models

In this paper we propose a parsimonious regime-switching approach to model the correlations between assets, the threshold conditional correlation (TCC) model. This method allows the dynamics of the correlations to change from one state (or regime) to another as a function of observable transition variables. Our model is similar in spirit to Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2009) and Pelletier (2006) but with the appealing feature that it does not suffer from the course of dimensionality. In particular, estimation of the parameters of the TCC involves a simple grid search procedure. In addition, it is easy to guarantee a positive definite correlation matrix because the TCC estimator is given by the sample correlation matrix, which is positive definite by construction. The methodology is illustrated by evaluating the behaviour of international equities, govenrment bonds and major exchange rates, first separately and then jointly. We also test and allow for different parts in the correlation matrix to be governed by different transition variables. For this, we estimate a multi-threshold TCC specification. Further, we evaluate the economic performance of the TCC model against a constant conditional correlation (CCC) estimator using a Diebold-Mariano type test. We conclude that threshold correlation modelling gives rise to a significant reduction in portfolio´s variance.

Investment, duration, and exit strategies for corporate and independent venture capital-backed start-ups

We propose a model of investment, duration, and exit strategies for start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) funds that accounts for the high level of uncertainty, the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and the discount rate. Our analysis predicts that start-ups backed by corporate VC funds remain for a longer period of time before exiting and receive larger investment amounts than those financed by independent VC funds. Although a longer duration leads to a higher likelihood of an exit through an acquisition, a larger investment increases the probability of an IPO exit. These predictions find strong empirical support.

Behavioral aspects of investment fund's markets: are good managers lucky or skilled?

It is generally accepted that financial markets are efficient in the long run a lthough there may be some deviations in the short run. It is also accepted that a good portfolio manager is the one who beats the market persistently along time, this type of manager could not exist if markets were perfectly efficient According to this in a pure efficient market we should find that managers know that they can not beat the market so they would undertake only pure passive management strategies. Assuming a certain degree of inefficiency in the short run, a market may show some managers who tr y to beat the market by undertaking active strategies. From Fama’s efficient markets theory we can state that these active managers may beat the market occasionally although they will not be able to enhance significantly their performance in the long run. On the other hand, in an inefficient market it would be expected to find a higher level of activity related with the higher probability of beating the market. In this paper we follow two objectives: first, we set a basis to analyse the level of efficiency in an asset invest- ment funds market by measuring performance, strategies activity and it’s persistence for a certain group of funds during the period of study. Second, we analyse individual performance persistence in order to determine the existence of skilled managers. The CAPM model is taken as theoretical background and the use of the Sharpe’s ratio as a suitable performance measure in a limited information environment leads to a group performance measurement proposal. The empiri- cal study takes quarterly data from 1999-2007 period, for the whole population of the Spanish asset investment funds market, provided by the CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores). This period of study has been chosen to ensure a wide enough range of efficient market observation so it would allow us to set a proper basis to compare with the following period. As a result we develop a model that allows us to measure efficiency in a given asset mutual funds market, based on the level of strategy’s activity undertaken by managers. We also observe persistence in individual performance for a certain group of funds

Studying the micro-angels approach to micro-investment decisions

Purpose: The paper analyzes the micro-angels investment behaviour, looking both to the criteria used in the selection of their investment projects and to the characteristics of their guidance role during the investment period. Design/Methodology/Approach: The paper focuses on a double bottom line movement of French micro-angels clubs that has been operating since 1983. Our primary source of data is an online survey carried out during March 2012, asking members of clubs all over France for different aspects of their procedures. Findings: Our findings suggest that micro-angels are interested in small, socially or environmentally friendly projects having the potential to contribute to the development of their neighbourhood. We find that women are even more interested than men in such projects. Educated micro-angels value entrepreneurial motivation and understanding of the project more than less-educated micro-angels. We also point out the factors that micro-angels consider important in accompanying enterprises. Here we find that gender makes little difference. However, retired micro-angels value financial diagnosis made conjointly with entrepreneurs, while both active micro-angels and educated micro-angels value more the use of their network to help micro-entrepreneurs. Practical/Social Implications: Given the potential benefits of micro-angels investing and guiding the development of micro-enterprises, a social micro-angel investment on a major scale in developing countries could help in tackling some of the problems faced by the development of microfinance, such as the over-indebtedness of micro-entrepreneurs. Practitioners and new initiatives would gain from understanding what adaptations need to be made. Originality/value: We expect to add to the venture capital theory to take into account non-economic motives.

Women's work histories in Italy: education as investment in reconciliation and legitimacy?

Within pre-enlargement Europe, Italy records one of the widest employment rate gaps between highly and poorly educated women, as well one of the largest differences in the share, among working women, of public sector employment. Building on these stylized facts and using the Longitudinal Survey of Italian Households (ILFI), we investigate the working trajectories of three cohorts of Italian women born between 1935 and 1964 and observed from their first job until they are in their forties. We use mainly, but not exclusively, event history analysis in order to identify the main factors that influence entry into and exit from paid work over the life course. Our results suggest that in the Italian context, where employment protection policies have also been used as surrogate measures to favour reconciliation between family and work, and where traditional gender norms still persist, education is so important for women's employment decisions because it represents an investment in 'reconciliation' and 'work legitimacy' over and above investment in human capital.

Children in the welfare state. A social investment approach

Children occupy centre-stage in any new welfare equilibrium. Failure to support families may produce either of two undesirable scenarios. We shall see a society without children if motherhood remains incompatible with work. A new family policy needs to recognize that children are a collective asset and that the cost of having children is rising. The double challenge is to eliminate the constraints on having children in the first place, and to ensure that the children we have are ensured optimal opportunities. The simple reason why a new social contract is called for is that fertility and child quality combine both private utility and societal gains. And like no other epoch in the past, the societal gains are mounting all-the-while that families’ ability to produce these social gains is weakening.In the following 1 analyze the twin challenges of fertility and child development. I then examine which kind of policy mix will ensure both the socially desired level of fertility and investment in our children? The task is to identify a Paretian optimum that will maximize efficiency gains and social equity simultaneously.

Financing Constraints, Irreversibility, and Investment Dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financing constraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firms cannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint that they can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and output in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three main results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investment is reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint on variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interaction between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material deliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

Firm-Specific Investment, Sticky Prices, and the Taylor Principle

According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest rate rules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.

Credit Constraints, Firms' Precautionary Investment, and the Business Cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' precautionary investment behavior in response to the anticipation of future financing constraints. Firms increase their demand for liquid and safe investments in order to alleviate future borrowing constraints and decrease the probability of having to forego future profitable investment opportunities. This results in an increase in the share of short-term projects that produces a temporary increase in output, at the expense of lower long-run investment and future output. I show in a calibrated model that this behavior is at the source of a novel and powerful channel of shock transmission of productivity shocks that produces short-run dampening and long-run propagation. Furthermore, it can account for the observed business cycle patterns of the aggregate and firm-level composition of investment.

A Model of Collateral, Investment, and Adverse Selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively high and; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuous fall in investment.

Banks and development: Jewish communities in the Italian Renaissance and current economic performance

Are differences in local banking development long-lasting? Do they affect long-term economic performance?I answer these questions by relying on an historical development that occurred in Italian cities during the 15thcentury. A sudden change in the Catholic doctrine had driven the Jews toward money lending. Cities thatwere hosting Jewish communities developed complex banking institutions for two reasons: first, the Jews werethe only people in Italy who were allowed to lend for a profit and, second, the Franciscan reaction to Jewishusury led to the creation of charity lending institutions, the Monti di Pietà, that have survived until today andhave become the basis of the Italian banking system. Using Jewish demography in 1500 as an instrument, Iprovide evidence of (1) an extraordinary persistence in the level of banking development across Italian cities (2)large effects of current local banking development on per-capita income. Additional firm-level analyses suggestthat well-functioning local banks exert large effects on aggregate productivity by reallocating resources towardmore efficient firms. I exploit the expulsion of the Jews from the Spanish territories in Italy in 1541 to arguethat my results are not driven by omitted institutional, cultural and geographical characteristics. In particular,I show that, in Central Italy, the difference in current income between cities that hosted Jewish communitiesand cities that did not exists only in those regions that were not Spanish territories in the 16th century.

The impact of investment in education on economic development: Spain in comparative perspective (1860-2000)

Throughout the 19th century and until the mid-20th century, in terms of long-terminvestment in human capital and, above all, in education, Spain lagged far behind theinternational standards and, more specifically, the levels attained by its neighbours inEurope. In 1900, only 55% of the population could read; in 1950, the figure was 93%.This no doubt contributed to a pattern of slower economic growth in which thephysical strength required for agricultural work, measured here through height, had alarger impact than education on economic growth. It was not until the 1970s, with thearrival of democracy, that the Spanish education system was modernized and theinfluence of education on economic growth increased.

Insider Trading and Real Investment

In this paper I analyze the effects of insider trading on real investmentand the insurance role of financial markets. There is a single entrepreneurwho, at a first stage, chooses the level of investment in a risky business.At the second stage, an asset with random payoff is issued and then the entrepreneurreceives some privileged information on the likely realization of productionreturn. At the third stage, trading occurs on the asset market, where theentrepreneur faces the aggregate demand coming from a continuum of rationaluniformed traders and some noise traders. I compare the equilibrium withinsider trading (when the entrepreneur trades on her inside information in theasset market) with the equilibrium in the same market without insider trading. Ifind that permitting insider trading tends to decrease the level of realinvestment. Moreover, the asset market is thinner and the entrepreneur's netsupply of the asset and the hedge ratio are lower, although the asset priceis more informative and volatile.