It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.

Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.

A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

Employment protection, international specialization and innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentivesfor R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firingcost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relativelysecure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle.Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where,roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country willspecialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existinggoods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primaryinnovation', that is, invention of new goods.

Who is afraid of the big bad ban? An evaluation of the effects of the Spanish clean air law on expenditure at hospitality venues

Background:In January 2011 Spain modified clean air legislation in force since 2006, removing all existing exceptions applicable to hospitality venues. Although this legal reform was backed by all political parties with parliamentary representation, the government's initiative was contested by the tobacco industry and its allies in the hospitality industry. One of the most voiced arguments against the reform was its potentially disruptive effect on the revenue of hospitality venues. This paper evaluates the impact of this reform on household expenditure at restaurants and bars and cafeterias. Methods and empirical strategy:We use micro-data from the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (EPF) for years 2006 to 2012 to estimate "two part" models where the probability of observing a positive expenditure and, for those who spend, the expected level of expenditure are functions of an array of explanatory variables. We apply a before-after analysis with a wide range of controls for confounding factors and a flexible modeling of time effects.Results:In line with the majority of studies that analyze the effects of smoking bans using objective data, our results suggest that the reform did not cause reductions in households' expenditures on restaurant services or on bars and cafeteria services.

The Case for Linking World Law Data

The present paper advocates for the creation of a federated, hybrid database in the cloud, integrating law data from all available public sources in one single open access system - adding, in the process, relevant meta-data to the indexed documents, including the identification of social and semantic entities and the relationships between them, using linked open data techniques and standards such as RDF. Examples of potential benefits and applications of this approach are also provided, including, among others, experiences from of our previous research, in which data integration, graph databases and social and semantic networks analysis were used to identify power relations, litigation dynamics and cross-references patterns both intra and inter-institutionally, covering most of the World international economic courts.

Catalan law in the European context

The article provides an overview of the Catalan law at the European context. How the Catalan institutions can tackle on the Spanish Government policies and decisions in front of the European Union. And how the European Union Law and policies are implemented in a decentralized country such Spain where Autonomous Communities have their own Governments and Parliaments. There is also examined how this Spanish territorial decentralized structure affects the implementation of such EU norms and its control. Finally, there is exposed how Catalan institutions manage to participate in front of the European Union institutions. Which are the instruments that can guarantee this participation and which are the EU responses to them.

Wages and productivity: the role of labour market institutions in OECD countries

In the context of a monetary union, to keep a territorial equilibrium in terms of economic activity and employment, the relationship between real wages and productivity is crucial. In this paper, empirical evidence about the response of wages to productivity is obtained for 20 OECD countries and the role of labour market institutions to explain differences in this response is analysed.