Designing institutions for financial stability: Regulation and supervision by objective for the Euro area

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons ofdifferent models for financial market regulationand supervision and we present a proposal forthe re-organisation of regulatory and supervisoryagencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments areconsistent with both new theories and effectivebehaviour of financial intermediaries inindustrialized countries. Our proposed architecturefor financial market regulation is based on theassignment of different objectives or "finalities"to different authorities, both at the domesticand the European level. According to thisperspective, the three objectives of supervision- microeconomic stability, investor protectionand proper behaviour, efficiency and competition- should be assigned to three distinct Europeanauthorities, each one at the centre of a Europeansystem of financial regulators and supervisorsspecialized in overseeing the entire financialmarket with respect to a single regulatoryobjective and regardless of the subjective natureof the intermediaries. Each system should bestructured and organized similarly to the EuropeanSystem of Central Banks and work in connectionwith the central bank which would remain theinstitution responsible for price and macroeconomicstability. We suggest a plausible path to buildour 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.

Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility forbanking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated bythe Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macroand microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems areclassified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that theinflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries wherethe Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides,although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them,they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to moresophisticated liabilities as a funding source.The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries.We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulationand supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independentEuropean System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to theESCB.

An enhanced concave program relaxation for choice network revenue management

The network choice revenue management problem models customers as choosing from an offer-set, andthe firm decides the best subset to offer at any given moment to maximize expected revenue. The resultingdynamic program for the firm is intractable and approximated by a deterministic linear programcalled the CDLP which has an exponential number of columns. However, under the choice-set paradigmwhen the segment consideration sets overlap, the CDLP is difficult to solve. Column generation has beenproposed but finding an entering column has been shown to be NP-hard. In this paper, starting with aconcave program formulation based on segment-level consideration sets called SDCP, we add a class ofconstraints called product constraints, that project onto subsets of intersections. In addition we proposea natural direct tightening of the SDCP called ?SDCP, and compare the performance of both methodson the benchmark data sets in the literature. Both the product constraints and the ?SDCP method arevery simple and easy to implement and are applicable to the case of overlapping segment considerationsets. In our computational testing on the benchmark data sets in the literature, SDCP with productconstraints achieves the CDLP value at a fraction of the CPU time taken by column generation and webelieve is a very promising approach for quickly approximating CDLP when segment consideration setsoverlap and the consideration sets themselves are relatively small.