Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Allocative and productive efficiency in REE with asymetric information

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.

Information networks and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.

La Accesibilidad en España. Diagnóstico y bases para un plan integral de supresión de barreras. Libro verde

Este Libro Verde pretende difundir, compartir y discutir públicamente la situación de la accesibilidad en España, así como los instrumentos y políticas puestos en marcha en los últimos años para su promoción y las necesarias reformas o iniciativas para avanzar en el proceso de supresión de todo tipo de barreras –arquitectónicas, urbanísticas, en el transporte, la comunicación e información, etc.– en nuestro país.

Bases boquímicas de resistencia a Penicillium expansum en manzana "golden delicious"

La producción frutícola española es muy importante y los problemas relacionados con su conservación, sobre todo desde la entrada de España en la UE, tienen un interés peculiar con el objetivo de mejorar la calidad y disminuir el uso de los productos susceptibles de perjudicar la salud humana. Para conseguir avances importantes en el aspecto tecnológico se precisa una profundización en los fenómenos bioquímicos que determinan las capacidades de conservación del fruto. Dentro de la complejidad de esta temática, este proyecto pretende determinar los factores bioquímicos involucrados en el control de podredumbres en la fruta y más específicamente los factores endógenos que determinan la resistencia del fruto a este tipo de daños. El objetivo general de este proyecto era de definir los mecanismos bioquímicos involucrados en la resistencia de la manzana ‘Golden Delicious’ contra la acción de un patógeno: Penicillium expansum. Para lograr este objetivo se plantearon las diferentes tareas: Tarea 1 (T1): determinación de madurez y del estado fisiológico a la cosecha Tarea 2 (T2): determinación de las capacidades de resistencia endógenas iniciales e influencia del estado de madurez a la cosecha Tarea 3 (T3): respuesta inicial a una inoculación artificial: cambios bioquímicos y sensibilidad al patógeno Tarea 4 (T4): comportamiento después de conservación: respuesta a una inoculación (cambios bioquímicos y sensibilidad al patógeno) y sensibilidad natural durante la conservación Tarea 5 (T5): determinación de un esquema explicativo y caracterización de los factores bioquímicos determinantes Tarea 6 (T6): elaboración de un test de predicción.

Programa vellesa, activitat física i dependència (Vafid): justificació i bases per a la sistematització

El present estudi es centra en els programes d’activitat física adreçats a persones grans en situació de dependència, que es esenvolupen en grup i que utilitzen el moviment actiu com a principal eina de treball. Es tracta d’una recerca que, per una banda, estudia i analitza les bases teòriques que avalen la importància i la necessitat de l’aplicació d’aquest tipus de programes. Per l’altra, justifica i defineix, amb detall, les línies directrius que han de guiar el seu desenvolupament i la seva aplicació en l’àmbit d’institucions d’atenció a les persones grans (residències, centres de dia i centres sòciosanitaris). El marc conceptual (capítol II) es construeix a partir d’una àmplia recerca bibliogràfica sobre les quatre dimensions d’anàlisi clau (l’envelliment, la dependència, l’atenció a les persones grans i l’activitat física) que fonamenta i justifica la proposta de programa que es fa en la segona part (capítol III). En aquesta es defineixen els referents, les finalitats, els objectius, els recursos que es poden utilitzar, les indicacions bàsiques per a organitzar el treball, els aspectes metodològics essencials per a l’aplicació del programa i les condicions necessàries per a poder-lo implementar. El resultat de tot el procés de recerca i estudi permet dir que, a nivell teòric, l’activitat física és una eina útil, eficaç i amb moltes possibilitats cara a l’atenció a les persones grans en situació de dependència. Que els esmentats programes han de ser fruit d’un procés de planificació, han de considerar les diferents dimensions de l’ésser en interacció constant, han de ser aplicats donant més importància al procés que al producte i que els recursos disponibles s’han d’utilitzar d’acord amb aquests plantejaments. En les línies de futur per a aquesta recerca, es planteja la seva continuació a partir de l’aplicació del programa VAFiD en diferents grups i la seva avaluació (seguint el model d’avaluació responent de Robert Stake) per determinar-ne la coherència i la qualitat.

Documentation and sport information: the challenges and opportunities brought by new technologies

This text corresponds to the contents of the seminar “Information Services at the Sport Institutions” held by the author as part of the programme of activities of the Invited Professor of Olympism of the International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB) in 2001. The seminar discusses the potential of technologies such as the Internet in sports documentation.

The Olympic Movement and Information Society: New Internet Challenges and Opportunities

Article describing the current situation of the Internet, the use of Internet by sport institutions, and the relationship between the Internet and the Olympic Games, and the Olympic Movement. This paper was presented at the International Symposium on Television in the Olympic Games held in Lausanne in October 1998.