Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Allocative and productive efficiency in REE with asymetric information

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.

Information networks and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.

Documentation and sport information: the challenges and opportunities brought by new technologies

This text corresponds to the contents of the seminar “Information Services at the Sport Institutions” held by the author as part of the programme of activities of the Invited Professor of Olympism of the International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB) in 2001. The seminar discusses the potential of technologies such as the Internet in sports documentation.

The Olympic Movement and Information Society: New Internet Challenges and Opportunities

Article describing the current situation of the Internet, the use of Internet by sport institutions, and the relationship between the Internet and the Olympic Games, and the Olympic Movement. This paper was presented at the International Symposium on Television in the Olympic Games held in Lausanne in October 1998.

Sistema gràfic de depuració per xarxes (NoC)

Aquest projecte descriu el disseny i desenvolupament d’una eina gràfica per a la depuració de projectes desenvolupats amb un llenguatge de descripció de sistemes com és el SystemC. Amb aquest llenguatge s’ha desenvolupat una NoC (Network on Chip). L’eina desenvolupada mostra de forma visual l’arquitectura de la xarxa NoC, els valors dels senyals que es transmeten a través de la xarxa i estadístiques sobre aquests per tal de poder fer un seguiment exhaustiu i agilitzar la recerca d’errors com interbloquejos, pèrdua de dades i d’altres. Al concentrar en un únic entorn la descripció de la NoC i les dades relatives a les senyals en temps de simulació, proporciona un valor afegit a altres eines disponibles per a realitzar aquesta tasca.

Simulació d'arquitectures VLIW

L'objectiu d'aquest projecte es dissenyar i implementar en Java una interfície gràfica que permeti simular l'arquitectura VLIW. Ha d'interactuar amb un simulador ja existent, VEX, i amb l'usuari. VEX permet analitzar, desenvolupar i depurar codi escrit en C sobre un processador VLIW configurable, des dels recursos hardware fíns al comportament de la "caché". L'interfície gràfica desenvolupada es diu JavaVEX. Té el gran avantatge d'evitar la introducció de les comandes de text que necesita VEX perquè son substituïdes per elements. És una eina més intuïtiva, ràpida i eficient. JavaVEX mostra informació sobre el codi C traduït a instruccions VLIW de fins a 4 operacions. També mostra els resultats de les instrucciones VLIW simulades. JavaVEX s'ha incorporat a un LiveCD. Així es pot executar l'aplicació sobre qualsevol ordinador. La finalitat docent de JavaVEX és ser utilitzada en les pràctiques de l'assignatura Arquitectura per a Computadors 2.

Co-movements between US and UK stock prices: the roles of macroeconomic information and time-series varying conditional correlations

This paper provides evidence on the sources of co-movement in monthly US and UK stock price movements by investigating the role of macroeconomic and financial variables in a bivariate system with time-varying conditional correlations. Crosscountry communality in response is uncovered, with changes in the US Federal Funds rate, UK bond yields and oil prices having similar negative effects in both markets. Other variables also play a role, especially for the UK market. These effects do not, however, explain the marked increase in cross-market correlations observed from around 2000, which we attribute to time variation in the correlations of shocks to these markets. A regime-switching smooth transition model captures this time variation well and shows the correlations increase dramatically around 1999-2000. JEL classifications: C32, C51, G15 Keywords: international stock returns, DCC-GARCH model, smooth transition conditional correlation GARCH model, model evaluation.

Label Space Reduction in All-Optical Label Switchiing Networks

Report for the scientific sojourn at the Department of Information Technology (INTEC) at the Ghent University, Belgium, from january to june 2007. All-Optical Label Swapping (AOLS) forms a key technology towards the implementation of All-Optical Packet Switching nodes (AOPS) for the future optical Internet. The capital expenditures of the deployment of AOLS increases with the size of the label spaces (i.e. the number of used labels), since a special optical device is needed for each recognized label on every node. Label space sizes are affected by the wayin which demands are routed. For instance, while shortest-path routing leads to the usage of fewer labels but high link utilization, minimum interference routing leads to the opposite. This project studies and proposes All-Optical Label Stacking (AOLStack), which is an extension of the AOLS architecture. AOLStack aims at reducing label spaces while easing the compromise with link utilization. In this project, an Integer Lineal Program is proposed with the objective of analyzing the softening of the aforementioned trade-off due to AOLStack. Furthermore, a heuristic aiming at finding good solutions in polynomial-time is proposed as well. Simulation results show that AOLStack either a) reduces the label spaces with a low increase in the link utilization or, similarly, b) uses better the residual bandwidth to decrease the number of labels even more.

RADIC II: a fault tolerant architecture with flexible dynamic redundancy

The demand for computational power has been leading the improvement of the High Performance Computing (HPC) area, generally represented by the use of distributed systems like clusters of computers running parallel applications. In this area, fault tolerance plays an important role in order to provide high availability isolating the application from the faults effects. Performance and availability form an undissociable binomial for some kind of applications. Therefore, the fault tolerant solutions must take into consideration these two constraints when it has been designed. In this dissertation, we present a few side-effects that some fault tolerant solutions may presents when recovering a failed process. These effects may causes degradation of the system, affecting mainly the overall performance and availability. We introduce RADIC-II, a fault tolerant architecture for message passing based on RADIC (Redundant Array of Distributed Independent Fault Tolerance Controllers) architecture. RADIC-II keeps as maximum as possible the RADIC features of transparency, decentralization, flexibility and scalability, incorporating a flexible dynamic redundancy feature, allowing to mitigate or to avoid some recovery side-effects.

System analysis of a Peer-to-Peer Video-on-Demand architecture: Kangaroo

Architectural design and deployment of Peer-to-Peer Video-on-Demand (P2PVoD) systems which support VCR functionalities is attracting the interest of an increasing number of research groups within the scientific community; especially due to the intrinsic characteristics of such systems and the benefits that peers could provide at reducing the server load. This work focuses on the performance analysis of a P2P-VoD system considering user behaviors obtained from real traces together with other synthetic user patterns. The experiments performed show that it is feasible to achieve a performance close to the best possible. Future work will consider monitoring the physical characteristics of the network in order to improve the design of different aspects of a VoD system.