The determinants of university patenting: Do incentives matter?

In recent years various studies have examined the factors that may explain academic patents. Existing analyses have also underlined the substantial differences to be found in European countries in the institutional framework that defines property rights for academic patents. The objective of this study is to contribute to the empirical literature on the factors explaining academic patents and to determine whether the incentives that universities offer researchers contribute towards explaining the differences in academic patenting activity. The results of the econometric analysis for the Spanish universities point towards the conclusion that the principal factor determining the patents is funding of R&D while royalty incentives to researchers do not appear to be significant.

Analysing the innovation process in the EU Integrated Programme, ISAFRUIT

ISAFRUIT is an integrated European Union Project focussed on increasing fruit consumption as a means to improve human health, through evaluating the fruit chain and addressing bottlenecks therein.The innovations which are being developed throughout the ISAFRUIT Project have been analysed to determine both the success factors and the obstacles in reaching the commercialisation stage. Only 9.58% of the deliverables planned within the Project were focussed on developing technological innovations.There is evidence, however, of successes in the development of new innovations arising from the ISAFRUIT Project, with several other potential innovations in the pipeline. Of the technologies identified, 67% are still at the “invention stage”; that is, the stage prior to bridging the so-called “valley of death”, the stage between an invention and an innovation. Those which are considered to have moved over the “valley of death” either had industry partners included in the Project, or had consulted with industry to ensure that the technology was relevant, or met a recognised industry need. Many of the technologies which made less progress did not have the same interactions with industry. A number of other issues were identified which prevented further progress towards innovation. The need for scientists to publish scientific papers, both for their career pathways and to increase their chances of future funding, was identified as one issue, although the filing of patents is now becoming more accepted and recognised. The patenting system is considered complex by many scientists and is not well-understood. Finally, agreements between partners on the sharing of intellectual property rights can cause a delay in the innovation process.

Crecimiento, instituciones e hidrocarburos : el proyecto petrolero mexicano en perspectiva histórica comparada (1938-2000)

En este trabajo se analiza la política petrolera mexicana durante el período 1938-2000 y su aportación al crecimiento económico mexicano. La orientación de la producción petrolera permite distinguir dos modelos de gestión de la industria petrolera. El primero de ellos; entre 1938-1976 tuvo por finalidad el aprovisionamiento energético del mercado interior a bajos precios. El segundo a partir de 1976 orientado hacia la exportación y la captura de la renta petrolera internacional. Esta ruptura en la política petrolera asociada constituye un caso interesante en sí mismo porque permite comparar los efectos de dos políticas totalmente opuestas sobre el crecimiento económico y sobre el desempeño de la propia industria petrolera en un país donde el Estado tiene derechos de propiedad exclusivos sobre el sector petrolero. Por ello, se aborda el tema como una problemática institucional que toma en cuenta tanto las características internas de México como la dinámica del mercado petrolero internacional. Se incide en el hecho de que el Estado mexicano ha utilizado a la industria petrolera y; concretamente los recursos que ésta genera no sólo como un instrumento para favorecer el crecimiento económico del país sino también para mantener el control del poder político frente a la élite económica. Así el inmovilismo institucional; la falta de ingresos e inversiones propias y el comportamiento rentista del Estado parecen haber condenado al sector petrolero mexicano al atraso y la ineficiencia. De este modo; se focaliza en las interrelaciones entre las instituciones económicas y políticas como elemento explicativo del por qué la industria petrolera no ha logrado convertirse en un elemento dinamizador del crecimiento económico mexicano en el largo plazo.

Innovation or Imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms' R&D strategy choice

This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a firm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firms. characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German .rms from manufacturing and services sectors. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C35, D43, L13, L22, O31. Keywords: Innovation; imitation; spillovers; product differentiation; market competition; intellectual property rights protection.

One kind of lawlessness: estimating the welfare cost of Somali piracy

This paper estimates the effect of piracy attacks on shipping costs using a unique data set on shipping contracts in the dry bulk market. We look at shipping routes whose shortest path exposes them to piracy attacks and find that the increase in attacks in 2008 lead to around a ten percent increase in shipping costs. We use this estimate to get a sense of the welfare loss imposed by piracy. Our intermediate estimate suggests that the creation of $120 million of revenue for pirates in the Somalia area led to a welfare loss of over $1.5 billion.

PANACEA (Platform for Automatic, Normalised Annotation and Cost-Effective Acquisition of Language Resources for Human Language Technologies)

The objective of PANACEA is to build a factory of LRs that automates the stages involved in the acquisition, production, updating and maintenance of LRs required by MT systems and by other applications based on language technologies, and simplifies eventual issues regarding intellectual property rights. This automation will cut down the cost, time and human effort significantly. These reductions of costs and time are the only way to guarantee the continuous supply of LRs that MT and other language technologies will be demanding in the multilingual Europe.

The Law of Impersonal Transactions: Meaning and Difficulties

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchange in which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect to previous "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs by protecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent by property right holders to avoid damaging property enforcement-e.g., it is they as principals who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicial verifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automatic byproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, by requiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a sort of legal commodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocation and specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legal commoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency-the law first developed for personal trade-and an unbalance in vested interests, as luddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Globalization, Divergence and Stagnation

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights, market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Through this channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where intellectual property rights are weakly protected can slow down the world growth rate. A crucial implication of these results is that protection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction, which is novel in the literature, finds support in the data on a panel of 53 countries observed in the years 1965-1990.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes theform of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers.Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these newgoods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlightsa number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth anda potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function ofthe standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growthand welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary withthe skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovatingand standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model forthe skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade tointellectual property rights protection.

The role of title insurance under recording and registration

This article outlines a transaction cost theory of title insurance andanalyses the role it plays in countries with recording and registrationof land titles. Title insurance indemnifies real estate right holdersfor losses caused by pre-existing title defects that are unknown whenthe policy is issued. It emerged to complement the errors and omissions insurance of professionals examining title quality. Poor organizationof public records led title insurers in the USA to integrate titleexamination and settlement services. Their residual claimant statusmotivates insurers to screen, cure and avoid title defects. Firmsintroducing title insurance abroad produce little information on titlequality, however. Their policies are instead issued on a casualty basis,complementing and enforcing the professional liability of conveyancers.Future development in markets with land registration is uncertainbecause of adverse selection, competitive reactions from establishedconveyancers and the ability of larger banks to self-insure title risks.

New ideas need new space

We develop a setting with weak intellectual property rights, where firms' boundaries, location and knowledge spillovers are endogenous. We have two main results. The first one is that, if communication costs increase with distance, entrepreneurs concerned about information leakage have a benefit from locating away from the industry center: distance is an obstacle to collusive trades between members andnon-members. The second result is that we identify a trade-off for the entrepreneur between owning a facility (controlling all its characteristics) and sharing a facility with a {\it non-member} (an agent not involved in production), therefore losing control over some of its characteristics. We focus on ``location" as the relevant characteristic of the facility, but location can be used as a spatial metaphor for other relevant characteristics of the facility. For theentrepreneur, sharing the facility with non-members implies that the latter, as co-owners, know the location (even if they do not have access to it). Knowledge of the location for the co-owners facilitates collusion with employees, what increases leakage. The model yields a benefit for new plants from spatial dispersion (locating at the periphery of the industry), particularly so for new plants of new firms.We relate this result with recent empirical findings on the dynamics of industry location.

North-south trade and directed technical change

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual propertyrights, market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Throughthis channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the sametime, integration with countries where intellectual property rights are weakly protectedcan slow down the world growth rate. A crucial implication of these results is thatprotection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction,which is novel in the literature, finds support in the data on a panel of 53 countriesobserved in the years 1965-1990.

The colonial origins of Civil War

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. We instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In our set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Our results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.