Social bases of changing income distributions

On the backdrop of very little sociological concern with rising income inequality, this paper examines how key changes in sociodemographic behaviour may help shed additional light on changes in household income distribution and especially on long-term income dynamics and inter-generational mobility. The paper argues that the joint effect of rising marital homogamy in terms of human capital and labour supply contributes generally to widen the income gap between households. Only uner very restrictive conditions, namely when the labour supply of low educated women grows dis-proportionally fast, will women's earnings contribute to more equality. Finally, the paper suggests that women's rising employment commitments contribute positively to equalizing the opportunity structure both via the income effect and if quality care is available, also via more homogenous cultural and cognitive stimulation of children. Mother's work does not generally have adverse effects for children's development.

Predictable Life-Cycle Shocks, Income Risk and Consumption Inequality

Was the increase in income inequality in the US due to permanent shocks or merely to an increase in the variance of transitory shocks? The implications for consumption and welfare depend crucially on the answer to this question. We use CEX repeated cross-section data on consumption and income to decompose idiosyncratic changes in income into predictable life-cycle changes, transitory and permanent shocks and estimate the contribution of each to total inequality. Our model fits the joint evolution of consumption and income inequality well and delivers two main results. First, we find that permanent changes in income explain all of the increase in inequality in the 1980s and 90s. Second, we reconcile this finding with the fact that consumption inequality did not increase much over this period. Our results support the view that many permanent changes in income are predictable for consumers, even if they look unpredictable to the econometrician, consistent with models of heterogeneous income profiles.

Social spending and demographics: The role of public policies in the intergenerational redistribution of income. Empirical evidence from Spain and Catalonia

The demographic shift underway in Southern Europe requires a revision of some of the fundamental principles of the traditional welfare state. We analyze the evolution of several aspects of welfare and social expenditure over the last two decades. We find that in the context of the present demographic changes and real estate boom current social and pension policy leads to a new distribution of benefits and burdens which is highly intergenerationally unequal. We argue for a revised definition of public policy based on Musgrave's proposition as a possible rule for an intergenerationally fair distribution.

The world distribution of income (estimated from individual country distributions)

We estimate the world distribution of income by integrating individualincome distributions for 125 countries between 1970 and 1998. Weestimate poverty rates and headcounts by integrating the density functionbelow the $1/day and $2/day poverty lines. We find that poverty ratesdecline substantially over the last twenty years. We compute povertyheadcounts and find that the number of one-dollar poor declined by 235million between 1976 and 1998. The number of $2/day poor declined by 450million over the same period. We analyze poverty across different regionsand countries. Asia is a great success, especially after 1980. LatinAmerica reduced poverty substantially in the 1970s but progress stoppedin the 1980s and 1990s. The worst performer was Africa, where povertyrates increased substantially over the last thirty years: the number of$1/day poor in Africa increased by 175 million between 1970 and 1998,and the number of $2/day poor increased by 227. Africa hosted 11% ofthe world s poor in 1960. It hosted 66% of them in 1998. We estimatenine indexes of income inequality implied by our world distribution ofincome. All of them show substantial reductions in global incomeinequality during the 1980s and 1990s.

On the distribution of income and worker assignment under intra-firm spillovers, with an application to ideas and networks

We study the earnings structure and the equilibrium assignment of workers when workers exert intra-firm spillovers on each other.We allow for arbitrary spillovers provided output depends on some aggregate index of workers' skill. Despite the possibility of increasing returns to skills, equilibrium typically exists. We show that equilibrium will typically be segregated; that the skill space can be partitioned into a set of segments and any firm hires from only one segment. Next, we apply the model to analyze the effect of information technology on segmentation and the distribution of income. There are two types of human capital, productivity and creativity, i.e. the ability to produce ideas that may be duplicated over a network. Under plausible assumptions, inequality rises and then falls when network size increases, and the poorest workers cannot lose. We also analyze the impact of an improvement in worker quality and of an increased international mobility of ideas.

Oil price shocks, income and democracy

We examine the effect of oil price fluctuations ondemocratic institutions over the 1960-2007 period. We also exploitthe very persistent response of income to oil price fluctuations tostudy the effect of persistent (oil price-driven) income shocks ondemocracy. Our results indicate that countries with greater net oilexports over GDP see improvements in democratic institutionsfollowing upturns in international oil prices. We estimate that a 1percentage point increase in per capita GDP growth due to apositive oil price shock increases the Polity democracy score byaround 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentagepoints in the long run. The effect on the probability of a democratictransition is around 0.4 percentage points.

Testing for convergence clubs in income per-capita: A predictive density approach

The paper proposes a technique to jointly test for groupings of unknown size in the cross sectional dimension of a panel and estimates the parameters of each group, and applies it to identifying convergence clubs in income per-capita. The approach uses the predictive density of the data, conditional on the parameters of the model. The steady state distribution of European regional data clusters around four poles of attraction with different economic features. The distribution of incomeper-capita of OECD countries has two poles of attraction and each grouphas clearly identifiable economic characteristics.

Targeting fertility and female participation through the income tax

We evaluate the effect of a 2003 reform in the Spanish income tax on fertility and the employment of mothers with small children. The reform introduced a tax credit for working mothers with children under the age of three, while also increasing child deductions for all households with children. Theoretically, given the interplay of these two components, the expected effect of the reform is ambiguous on both outcomes. We find that the combined reforms significantly increased both fertility (by almost five percent) and the employment rate of mothers with children under three (by two percent). These effects were more pronounced among less-educated women. In addition, to disentangle the impact of the two reform components, we use an earlier reform that increased child deductions in 1999. We find that the child deductions affect mothers employment negatively, which implies that the 2003 tax credit would have increased employment even more (up to five percent) in the absence of the change in child deductions.

The disturbing 'rise' of global income inequality

We use aggregate GDP data and within-country income shares for theperiod 1970-1998 to assign a level of income to each person in theworld. We then estimate the gaussian kernel density function for theworldwide distribution of income. We compute world poverty rates byintegrating the density function below the poverty lines. The $1/daypoverty rate has fallen from 20% to 5% over the last twenty five years.The $2/day rate has fallen from 44% to 18%. There are between 300 and500 million less poor people in 1998 than there were in the 70s.We estimate global income inequality using seven different popularindexes: the Gini coefficient, the variance of log-income, two ofAtkinson s indexes, the Mean Logarithmic Deviation, the Theil indexand the coefficient of variation. All indexes show a reduction in globalincome inequality between 1980 and 1998. We also find that most globaldisparities can be accounted for by across-country, not within-country,inequalities. Within-country disparities have increased slightly duringthe sample period, but not nearly enough to offset the substantialreduction in across-country disparities. The across-country reductionsin inequality are driven mainly, but not fully, by the large growth rateof the incomes of the 1.2 billion Chinese citizens. Unless Africa startsgrowing in the near future, we project that income inequalities willstart rising again. If Africa does not start growing, then China, India,the OECD and the rest of middle-income and rich countries diverge awayfrom it, and global inequality will rise. Thus, the aggregate GDP growthof the African continent should be the priority of anyone concerned withincreasing global income inequality.

Inequality over the business cycle: Estimating income risk using micro-data on consumption

We use CEX repeated cross-section data on consumption and income, to evaluate the nature of increased income inequality in the 1980s and 90s. We decompose unexpected changes in family income into transitory and permanent, and idiosyncratic and aggregate components, and estimate the contribution of each component to total inequality. The model we use is a linearized incomplete markets model, enriched to incorporate risk-sharing while maintaining tractability. Our estimates suggest that taking risk sharing into account is important for the model fit; that the increase in inequality in the 1980s was mainly permanent; and that inequality is driven almost entirely by idiosyncratic income risk. In addition we find no evidence for cyclical behavior of consumption risk, casting doubt on Constantinides and Duffie s (1995) explanation for the equity premium puzzle.

Heterogeneous life-cycle profiles, income risk and consumption inequality

Was the increase in income inequality in the US due to permanent shocks or merely to an increase in the variance of transitory shocks? The implications for consumption and welfare depend crucially on the answer to this question. We use CEX repeated cross-section data on consumption and income to decompose idiosyncratic changes in income into predictable life-cycle changes, transitory and permanent shocks and estimate the contribution of each to total inequality. Our model fits the joint evolution of consumption and income inequality well and delivers two main results. First, we find that permanent changes in income explain all of the increase in inequality in the 1980s and 90s. Second, we reconcile this finding with the fact that consumption inequality did not increase much over this period. Our results support the view that many permanent changes in income are predictable for consumers, even if they look unpredictable to the econometrician, consistent withmodels of heterogeneous income profiles.

Education, growth and income inequality

Estimates of the e¤ect of education on GDP (the social return to education)have been hard to reconcile with micro evidence on the private return. We present a simple explanation that combines two ideas: imperfect substitution between worker types and endogenous skill biased technological progress. When types of workers are imperfect substitutes, the supply of human capital is negatively related to its return, and a higher education level compresses wage di¤erentials. We use cross-country panel data on income inequality to estimate the private return and GDP data to estimate the social return. The results show that the private return falls by 2 percentage points when the average education level increases by a year, which is consistent with Katz and Murphy's [1992] estimate of the elasticity of substitution between worker types. We find no evidence for dynamics in the private return, and certainly not for a reversal of the negative e¤ect as described in Acemoglu [2002]. The short run social return equals the private return.