The Measurement of social polarization in a multi-group context

Polarization indices presented up to now have only focused their attention on the distribution of income/wealth. However, in many circumstances income is not the only relevant dimension that might be the cause of social conflict, so it is very important to have a social polarization index able to cope with alternative dimensions. In this paper we present an axiomatic characterization of one of such indices: it has been obtained as an extension of the (income) polarization measure introduced in Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) to a wider domain. It turns out that the axiomatic structure introduced in that paper alone is not appropriate to obtain a fully satisfactory characterization of our measure, so additional axioms are proposed. As a byproduct, we present an alternative axiomatization of the aforementioned income polarization measure.

Tree automorphisms and quasi-isometries of Thompson's group F

We prove that automorphisms of the infinite binary rooted tree T2 do not yield quasi-isometries of Thompson's group F, except for the map which reverses orientation on the unit interval, a natural outer automorphism of F. This map, together with the identity map, forms a subgroup of Aut(T2) consisting of 2-adic automorphisms, following standard terminology used in the study of branch groups. However, for more general p, we show that the analgous groups of p-adic tree automorphisms do not give rise to quasiisometries of F(p).

Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the

Dynamics in Thompson's group F

We describe an explicit relationship between strand diagrams and piecewise-linear functions for elements of Thompson’s group F. Using this correspondence, we investigate the dynamics of elements of F, and we show that conjugacy of one-bump functions can be described by a Mather-type invariant.

The loop group and the cobar construction

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Singular integrals on Ahlfors-David regular subsets of the Heisenberg group

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Information Dispersion and Equilibrium Multiplicity

This paper studies the implications of correlation of private signals about the liquidation value of a risky asset in a variation of a standard noisy rational expectations model in which traders receive endowment shocks which are private information and have a common component. We …nd that a necessary condition to generate multiple linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibria is the existence of several sources of information dispersion. In this context equilibrium multiplicity tends to occur when information is more dispersed. A necessary condition to have strategic complementarity in information acquisition is to have mul- tiple equilibria. When the equilibrium is unique there is strategic substi- tutability in information acquisition, corroborating the result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). JEL Classi…cation: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Multiplicity of equilibria, strategic complementarity, asym- metric information.

An irreducibility criterion for group representations, with arithmetic applications

We prove a criterion for the irreducibility of an integral group representation p over the fraction field of a noetherian domain R in terms of suitably defined reductions of p at prime ideals of R. As applications, we give irreducibility results for universal deformations of residual representations, with a special attention to universal deformations of residual Galois representations associated with modular forms of weight at least 2.

Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results

We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of them and whose ranges consist of two alternatives, in terms of two types of basic properties.

Price policies and Price dispersion in the private healthcare insurance industry: The Catalan case

We present an overlapping generations model that explains price dispersion among Catalonian healthcare insurance firms. The model shows that firms with different premium policies can coexist. Furthermore, if interest rates are low, firms that apply equal premium to all insureds can charge higher average prices than insurers that set premiums according to the risk of insured. Economic theory, health insurance, health economics.

New delay-dependent stability criteria for uncertain neutral systems with mixed time-varying delays and nonlinear perturbations

The problem of stability analysis for a class of neutral systems with mixed time-varying neutral, discrete and distributed delays and nonlinear parameter perturbations is addressed. By introducing a novel Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional and combining the descriptor model transformation, the Leibniz-Newton formula, some free-weighting matrices, and a suitable change of variables, new sufficient conditions are established for the stability of the considered system, which are neutral-delay-dependent, discrete-delay-range dependent, and distributeddelay-dependent. The conditions are presented in terms of linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) and can be efficiently solved using convex programming techniques. Two numerical examples are given to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed method

Sistema de votació electrònica sobre corbes el·líptques amb mescla de vots mitjançant Random Group Full Checking

L'objectiu del treball és dissenyar i implementar un sistema de simulació de votació electrònica, emprant una adaptació sobre corbes el·líptiques del criptosistema ElGamal, per tal d'estudiar-ne la viabilitat, centrant l'atenció en temes de seguretat, especialment en el procés de mescla de vots per tal de desvincular un vot de la persona que l'ha emès.

Anisotropic dispersion, space competition, and the slowdown of the Neolithic transition

The front speed of the Neolithic (farmer) spread in Europe decreased as it reached Northern latitudes, where the Mesolithic (huntergatherer) population density was higher. Here, we describe a reaction diffusion model with (i) an anisotropic dispersion kernel depending on the Mesolithicpopulation density gradient and (ii) a modified population growth equation. Both effects are related to the space available for the Neolithic population. The model is able to explain the slowdown of the Neolithic front as observed from archaeological data