Is it redistribution or centralization? On the determinants of government investment in infrastructure

The dilemma efficiency versus equity, together with political partisan interests, has received increasing attention to explain the territorial allocation of investments. However, centralization intended to introduce or reinforce hierarchization in the political system has not been object as of now of empirical analysis. Our main contribution to the literature is providing evidence that meta-political objectives related to the ordering of political power and administration influence regional investment. In this way, we find evidence that network mode’s (roads and railways) investment programs are influenced by the centralization strategy of investing near to the political capital, while investment effort in no-network modes (airports and ports) appears to be positively related to distance. Since investment in surface transportation infrastructures is much higher than that in airports and ports, and taken into account that regions surrounding the political capital are poorer than the average, we suggest that centralization rather than redistribution has been the driver for the concentration of public investment on these regions.

Fiscal foresight and the effects of government spending

We study the effects of government spending by using a structural, large dimensional, dynamic factor model. We find that the government spending shock is non-fundamental for the variables commonly used in the structural VAR literature, so that its impulse response functions cannot be consistently estimated by means of a VAR. Government spending raises both consumption and investment, with no evidence of crowding out. The impact multiplier is 1.7 and the long run multiplier is 0.6.

Tax evasion, technology shocks, and the cyclicality of government revenues

This paper analyzes the behavior of the tax revenue to output ratio over the business cycle. In order to replicate the empirical evidence, we develop a simple model combining the standard Ak growth model with the tax evasion phenomenon. When individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding fine. Under the empirically plausible assumptions that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exhibits a sufficiently small value and that productivity shocks are serially correlated, we show that the elasticity of government revenue with respect to output is larger than one, which agrees with the empirical evidence. This result holds even if the tax system displays flat tax rates. We extend the previous setup to generate larger fiscal deficits when the economy experiences a recession.

La responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Pública Urbanística

En la memoria del trabajo se detallan las tareas realizadas durante los cuatro años en los que he sido beneficiaria de la beca FI, que me permitió incorporarme en el área de Derecho Administrativo de la Universidad de Girona, bajo la dirección del Dr. Joan M. Trayter Jiménez, para la elaboración del proyecto de investigación "La responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Púbica Urbanística", que una vez terminado dará lugar a la Tesis Doctoral. Durante el primer año realizé y superé los cursos del programa de Doctorado “Globalización y Derecho: el Derecho Europeo como referencia”; que me permitió obtener la renovación de la Beca FI, para la elaboración y defensa en el año posterior de la tesina titulada "La responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Pública por cambio de la ordenación territorial o urbanística”; con la consiguiente obtención del Diploma de Estudios Avanzados en Derecho. En líneas generales, puedo destacar -además de la investigación en la elaboración de la Tesis-, la realización de dos estancias de investigación en la University of Oxford, bajo la tutorización del Prof. Paul Craig, del St. John's College; gracias a la concesión de una beca por parte del "Institut d'Estudis Autonòmics de Catalunya" y otra, por la Generalitat de Catalunya, dirigida a estancias de investigación en el extrangero. También diversas publicaciones traducidas en la participación en dos libros, un artículo, una recensión y una comunicación; así como la asistencia a distintos Congresos de Derecho Administrativo y seminarios, la realización de distintos cursos entre ellos un Posgrado de Derecho Urbanístico en la UdG y la docencia realizada. Asimismo he devenido miembro de los proyectos de investigación del grupo de investigación del Área; importantes por formar parte del Plan Nacional I+D, financiados por el Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia.

E-Government and Online Government-Citizen Interaction

En l'última dècada, les administracions públiques han fet un esforç especial per desenvolupar portals d'administració i oferir serveis en línia. L'objectiu d'aquest article és crear un marc teòric i analític per a investigar els efectes dels nous canals d'interacció basats en la tecnologia entre els governs i els ciutadans en l'estructura organitzativa i les dinàmiques de les administracions públiques i, finalment, en el lliurament de serveis. També assenyala possibles enfocaments metodològics que podrien resultar útils en la recerca futura sobre aquest tema.

E-government and Public Services : a Case Study of the Inter-administrative Portal CAT365. Research report (sythesis document)

Aquest estudi analitza els usos de les TIC a l'administració autonòmica catalana. De forma més específica, l'estudi se centra en la interacció entre l'ús d'un vessant concret de les TIC, la xarxa Internet, per part de l'administració pública, i determinats aspectes centrals d'aquest tipus d'institucions: la seva organització i estructura internes, la provisió de serveis públics o la relació amb altres agents socials. Hem analitzat, doncs, el fenomen del govern electrònic en el marc particular de la Generalitat de Catalunya, estudiant-ne el grau de desenvolupament i penetració, les seves característiques més remarcables i els problemes més importants que s'hi plantegen. El projecte de recerca es concreta en un estudi de cas sobre un projecte d'innovació específic però de gran abast, que es trobava en el moment de realització de l'estudi en la seva primera fase d'implementació: el projecte Administració Oberta de Catalunya (AOC). Concretament ens hem centrat en el vessant d'aquesta iniciativa pública que es concretava en la creació d'un portal interadministratiu a Internet, el portal www.cat365.net, destinat a proveir electrònicament serveis públics de totes les administracions que operen a Catalunya. L'estudi analitza les transformacions internes de l'administració que s'hi poden trobar associades i els elements que les condicionen, tant positivament com negativa. Igualment, intentem analitzem el que aquestes transformacions poden suposar per a la relació entre els ciutadans i les institucions públiques.

The Effects of government spending on the distribution of consumption

We study the effects of government spending on the distribution of consumption. We find a substantial degree of heterogeneity: consumption increases at the bottom and falls at the top of the distribution, implying a significant temporary reduction of consumption inequality. The effects of the shock display correlations of around -0.7/-0.9 with the percentage of stockholders within the decile. We interpret the results as in line and yielding support to models of limited participation where, while the Ricardian equivalence holds for rich households, for poor household, with no access to capital markets, the Keynesian multiplier is at work.

Fiscal foresight, forecast revisions and the effects of government spending in the open economy

This paper investigates the effects of government spending on the real exchange rate and the trade balance in the US using a new VAR identification procedure based on spending forecast revisions. I find that the real exchange rate appreciates and the trade balance deteriorates after a government spending shock, although the effects are quantitatively small. The findings broadly match the theoretical predictions of the standard Mundell-Fleming model and differ substantially from those existing in literature. Differences are attributable to the fact that, because of fiscal foresight, the government spending is non-fundamental for the variables typically used in open economy VARs. Here, on the contrary, the estimated shock is fundamental.

Government and the distribution of skills

Individuals' life chances in the future will very much depend on how we invest in our children now. An optimal human capital model would combine a high mean with minimal variance of skills. It is well-established that early childhood learning is key to adult success. The impact of social origins on child outcomes remains strong, and the new role of women poses additional challenges to our conventional nurturing approach to child development. This paper focuses on skill development in the early years, examining how we might best combine family inputs and public policy to invest optimally in our future human capital. I emphasize three issues: one, the uneven capacity of parents to invest in children; two, the impact of mothers' employment on child outcomes; and three, the potential benefits of early pre-school programmes. I conclude that mothers' intra-family bargaining power is decisive for family investments and that universal child care is key if our goal is to arrive at a strong mean with minimal variance.

Policy Making in Divided Government. A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline.

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Government Spending and Re-election

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent political parties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our research design exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around several population cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We find that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a 20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentage points in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. We also find positive effects of the government spending on education outcomes and earnings, which we interpret as indirect evidence of public service improvements. Together, our results provide evidence that electoral rewards encourage incumbents to spend part of additional revenues on public services valued by voters, a finding in line with agency models of electoral accountability.

Fiat Money, Intrinsic Properties, and Government Transaction Policy

Why do people coordinate on the use of valueless pieces of paper as generally accepted money? A possible answer is that these objects have intrinsic properties that make them better candidates to be used as media of exchange. Another answer stresses the fact that unconvertible fiat money will not easily appear unless there is a centralized institution that favors its use. The main objective of the paper is to analyze these questions. In order to do this, we take a model of commodity money in which fiat money does not play any significant role and modify it to examine under which circumstances fiat money might come to circulate as medium of exchange. Some of the results obtained from the model differ in a rather substantial way from previous related literature.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

Does direct democracy reduce the size of government? New evidence from historical data, 1890-2000

Using historical data for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to 2000, we estimate the causal effect of direct democracy on government spending. The main innovation in this paper is that we use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity of institutions. We find that the budget referendum and lower costs to launch a voter initiative are effective tools in reducing canton level spending. However, we find no evidence that the budget referendum results in more decentralized government or a larger local government. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that a mandatory budget referendum reduces the size of canton spending between 13 and 19 percent. A 1 percent lower signature requirement for the initiative reduces canton spending by up to 2 percent.