En respuesta a la ONU : ¿Es el fútbol un indicador del progreso y desarrollo en la esfera internacional?

[spa] El objetivo de este trabajo es corroborar la afirmación de la ONU de que el deporte es una herramienta poderosa para el progreso y el desarrollo. En este contexto, examinamos si el fútbol puede considerarse un indicador de desarrollo a nivel internacional. Un modelo empírico econométrico se diseña con el fin de analizar el desarrollo en términos de PIB per cápita, así como en términos del Índice de Desarrollo Humano. Se utiliza información transversal y temporal. Los resultados sugieren que la clasificación de la FIFA de selecciones nacionales puede ser utilizada para complementar nuestra comprensión del desarrollo multidimensional, en particular, en aquellos países donde la disponibilidad de información no es tan buena como los investigadores desearían.

En respuesta a la ONU : ¿Es el fútbol un indicador del progreso y desarrollo en la esfera internacional?

[spa] El objetivo de este trabajo es corroborar la afirmación de la ONU de que el deporte es una herramienta poderosa para el progreso y el desarrollo. En este contexto, examinamos si el fútbol puede considerarse un indicador de desarrollo a nivel internacional. Un modelo empírico econométrico se diseña con el fin de analizar el desarrollo en términos de PIB per cápita, así como en términos del Índice de Desarrollo Humano. Se utiliza información transversal y temporal. Los resultados sugieren que la clasificación de la FIFA de selecciones nacionales puede ser utilizada para complementar nuestra comprensión del desarrollo multidimensional, en particular, en aquellos países donde la disponibilidad de información no es tan buena como los investigadores desearían.

En respuesta a la ONU : ¿Es el fútbol un indicador del progreso y desarrollo en la esfera internacional?

[spa] El objetivo de este trabajo es corroborar la afirmación de la ONU de que el deporte es una herramienta poderosa para el progreso y el desarrollo. En este contexto, examinamos si el fútbol puede considerarse un indicador de desarrollo a nivel internacional. Un modelo empírico econométrico se diseña con el fin de analizar el desarrollo en términos de PIB per cápita, así como en términos del Índice de Desarrollo Humano. Se utiliza información transversal y temporal. Los resultados sugieren que la clasificación de la FIFA de selecciones nacionales puede ser utilizada para complementar nuestra comprensión del desarrollo multidimensional, en particular, en aquellos países donde la disponibilidad de información no es tan buena como los investigadores desearían.

Geography of talent and regional differences in Spain

Tentative empirical evidence suggests that the agglomeration of talent contributes to regional development. However, given that talented people are not evenly distributed across regions, this paper seeks to determine how the concentration of talent affects patterns of regional development. Here, we empirically evaluate the effects of the distribution of talent on regional differences by means of a detailed analysis of the 17 Autonomous Communities of Spain between 1996 and 2004. We hypothesise that regions specialising in strategic sectors that are creative and which can be assumed to enjoy rapid growth in productivity will experience faster rates of development and, in turn, that this concentration of talent will have a positive impact on the region’s economic performance. Thus, we believe that this mechanism can explain the marked regional imbalances in Spain. Our findings confirm that regional differences, measured in terms of GDP per capita and by, - industrial and service- oriented production, are influenced by the Communities’ talent bases as determined by, educational attainment and employment in assumed to be strategic for regional development, inasmuch as these sectors provide economic specialization.

Economic and social convergence in Colombia

GDP has usually been used as a proxy for human well-being. Nevertheless, other social aspects should also be considered, such as life expectancy, infant mortality, educational enrolment and crime issues. With this paper we investigate not only economic convergence but also social convergence between regions in a developing country, Colombia, in the period 1975-2005. We consider several techniques in our analysis: sigma convergence, stochastic kernel estimations, and also several empirical models to find out the beta convergence parameter (cross section and panel estimates, with and without spatial dependence). The main results confirm that we can talk about convergence in Colombia in key social variables, although not in the classic economic variable, GDP per capita. We have also found that spatial autocorrelation reinforces convergence processes through deepening market and social factors, while isolation condemns regions to nonconvergence.

New Estimates of Regional GDP in Spain, 1860-1930

This paper presents a new regional database on GDP in Spain for the years 1860, 1900, 1914 and 1930. Following Geary and Stark (2002), country level GDP estimates are allocated across Spanish provinces. The results are then compared with previous estimates. Further, this new evidence is used to analyze the evolution of regional inequality and convergence in the long run. According to the distribution dynamics approach suggested by Quah (1993, 1996) persistence appears as a main feature in the regional distribution of output. Therefore, in the long run no evidence of regional convergence in the Spanish economy is found.

New Estimates of Regional GDP in Spain, 1860-1930

This paper presents a new regional database on GDP in Spain for the years 1860, 1900, 1914 and 1930. Following Geary and Stark (2002), country level GDP estimates are allocated across Spanish provinces. The results are then compared with previous estimates. Further, this new evidence is used to analyze the evolution of regional inequality and convergence in the long run. According to the distribution dynamics approach suggested by Quah (1993, 1996) persistence appears as a main feature in the regional distribution of output. Therefore, in the long run no evidence of regional convergence in the Spanish economy is found.

GDP and life expectancy in Italy and Spain over the long-run (1861-2008): insights from a timeseries approach

The article presents and discusses long-run series of per capita GDP and life expectancy for Italy and Spain (1861-2008). After refining the available estimates in order to make them comparable and with the avail of the most up-to-date researches, the main changes in the international economy and in technological and sociobiological regimes are used as analytical frameworks to re-assess the performances of the two countries; then structural breaks are searched for and Granger causality between the two variables is investigated. The long-run convergence notwithstanding, significant cyclical differences between the two countries can be detected: Spain began to modernize later in GDP, with higher volatility in life expectancy until recent decades; by contrast, Italy showed a more stable pattern of life expectancy, following early breaks in per capita GDP, but also a negative GDP break in the last decades. Our series confirm that, whereas at the early stages of development differences in GDP tend to mirror those in life expectancy, this is no longer true at later stages of development, when, if any, there seems to be a negative correlation between GDP and life expectancy: this finding is in line with the thesis of a non-monotonic relation between life expectancy and GDP and is supported by tests of Granger causality.

Inequality in CO2 emissions across countries and its relationship with income inequality: a distributive approach

This paper analyses the inequality in CO2 emissions across countries (and groups of countries) and the relationship of this inequality with income inequality across countries for the period (1971-1999). The research employs the tools that are usually applied in income distribution analysis. The methodology used here gives qualitative and quantitative information on some of the features of the inequalities across countries that are considered most relevant for the design and discussion of policies aimed at mitigating climate change. The paper studies the relationship between CO2 emissions and GDP and shows that income inequality across countries has been followed by an important inequality in the distribution of emissions. This inequality has diminished mildly, although the inequality in emissions across countries ordered in the increasing value of income (inequality between rich and poor countries) has diminished less than the “simple” inequality in emissions. Lastly, the paper shows that the inequality in CO2 emissions is mostly explained by the inequality between groups with different per capita income level. The importance of the inequality within groups of similar per capita income is much lower and has diminished during the period, especially in the low-middle income group.

Ecological Footprint Inequality across countries: the role of environment intensity, income and interaction effects

Recently, White (2007) analysed the international inequalities in Ecological Footprints per capita (EF hereafter) based on a two-factor decomposition of an index from the Atkinson family (Atkinson (1970)). Specifically, this paper evaluated the separate role of environment intensity (EF/GDP) and average income as explanatory factors for these global inequalities. However, in addition to other comments on their appeal, this decomposition suffers from the serious limitation of the omission of the role exerted by probable factorial correlation (York et al. (2005)). This paper proposes, by way of an alternative, a decomposition of a conceptually similar index like Theil’s (Theil, 1967) which, in effect, permits clear decomposition in terms of the role of both factors plus an inter-factor correlation, in line with Duro and Padilla (2006). This decomposition might, in turn, be extended to group inequality components (Shorrocks, 1980), an analysis that cannot be conducted in the case of the Atkinson indices. The proposed methodology is implemented empirically with the aim of analysing the international inequalities in EF per capita for the 1980-2007 period and, amongst other results, we find that, indeed, the interactive component explains, to a significant extent, the apparent pattern of stability observed in overall international inequalities.

Ecological Footprint Inequality across countries: the role of environment intensity, income and interaction effects

Recently, White (2007) analysed the international inequalities in Ecological Footprints per capita (EF hereafter) based on a two-factor decomposition of an index from the Atkinson family (Atkinson (1970)). Specifically, this paper evaluated the separate role of environment intensity (EF/GDP) and average income as explanatory factors for these global inequalities. However, in addition to other comments on their appeal, this decomposition suffers from the serious limitation of the omission of the role exerted by probable factorial correlation (York et al. (2005)). This paper proposes, by way of an alternative, a decomposition of a conceptually similar index like Theil’s (Theil, 1967) which, in effect, permits clear decomposition in terms of the role of both factors plus an inter-factor correlation, in line with Duro and Padilla (2006). This decomposition might, in turn, be extended to group inequality components (Shorrocks, 1980), an analysis that cannot be conducted in the case of the Atkinson indices. The proposed methodology is implemented empirically with the aim of analysing the international inequalities in EF per capita for the 1980-2007 period and, amongst other results, we find that, indeed, the interactive component explains, to a significant extent, the apparent pattern of stability observed in overall international inequalities. Key words: ecological footprint; international environmental distribution; inequality decomposition

Testing I(1) against I(d) alternatives in the presence of deteministic components

This paper discusses the role of deterministic components in the DGP and in the auxiliary regression model which underlies the implementation of the Fractional Dickey-Fuller (FDF) test for I(1) against I(d) processes with d ∈ [0, 1). This is an important test in many economic applications because I(d) processess with d & 1 are mean-reverting although, when 0.5 ≤ d & 1,, like I(1) processes, they are nonstationary. We show how simple is the implementation of the FDF in these situations, and argue that it has better properties than LM tests. A simple testing strategy entailing only asymptotically normally distributed tests is also proposed. Finally, an empirical application is provided where the FDF test allowing for deterministic components is used to test for long-memory in the per capita GDP of several OECD countries, an issue that has important consequences to discriminate between growth theories, and on which there is some controversy.

Growing at the production frontier. European aggregate growth, 1870-1914

The view of a 1870-1913 expanding European economy providing increasing welfare to everybody has been challenged by many, then and now. We focus on the amazing growth that was experienced, its diffusion and its sources, in the context of the permanent competition among European nation states. During 1870-193 the globalized European economy reached a silver age . GDP growth was quite rapid (2.15% per annum) and diffused all over Europe. Even discounting the high rates of population growth (1.06%), per capita growth was left at a respectable 1.08%. Income per capita was rising in every country, and the rates of improvement were quite similar. This was a major achievement after two generations of highly localized growth, both geographically and socially. Growth was based on the increased use of labour and capital, but a good part of growth (73 per cent for the weighted average of the best documented European countries) came out of total factor productivity efficiency gains resulting from not well specified ultimate sources of growth. This proportion suggests that the European economy was growing at full capacity at its production frontier. It would have been very difficult to improve its performance. Within Europe, convergence was limited, and it only was in motion after 1900. What happened was more the end of the era of big divergence rather than an era of convergence.

Productivity and the welfare of nations

We show that the welfare of a representative consumer can be related to observable aggregatedata. To a first order, the change in welfare is summarized by (the present value of) the Solowproductivity residual and by the growth rate of the capital stock per capita. We also show thatproductivity and the capital stock suffice to calculate differences in welfare across countries, withboth variables computed as log level deviations from a reference country. These results hold forarbitrary production technology, regardless of the degree of product market competition, and applyto open economies as well if TFP is constructed using absorption rather than GDP as the measureof output. They require that TFP be constructed using prices and quantities as perceived byconsumers. Thus, factor shares need to be calculated using after-tax wages and rental rates, andwill typically sum to less than one. We apply these results to calculate welfare gaps and growthrates in a sample of developed countries for which high-quality TFP and capital data are available.We find that under realistic scenarios the United Kingdom and Spain had the highest growth ratesof welfare over our sample period of 1985-2005, but the United States had the highest level ofwelfare.

Oil price shocks, income and democracy

We examine the effect of oil price fluctuations ondemocratic institutions over the 1960-2007 period. We also exploitthe very persistent response of income to oil price fluctuations tostudy the effect of persistent (oil price-driven) income shocks ondemocracy. Our results indicate that countries with greater net oilexports over GDP see improvements in democratic institutionsfollowing upturns in international oil prices. We estimate that a 1percentage point increase in per capita GDP growth due to apositive oil price shock increases the Polity democracy score byaround 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentagepoints in the long run. The effect on the probability of a democratictransition is around 0.4 percentage points.