Fiscal sustainability across government tiers

This paper analyses how fiscal adjustment comes about when both central and sub-national governments are involved in consolidation. We test sustainability of public debt with a fiscal rule for both the federal and regional government. Results for the German Länder show that lower tier governments bear a relatively smaller part of the burden of debt consolidation, if they consolidate at all. Most of the fiscal adjustment occurs via central government debt. In contrast, both the US federal and state levels contribute to consolidation of public finances.

La responsabilidad fiscal de los administradores

En el presente trabajo se lleva a cabo una descripción general del régimen de responsabilidad de los administradores societarios en el Derecho tributario español. Desde la delimitación del concepto general de responsabilidad tributaria y de las posiciones jurídicas subjetivas de responsabilidad -solidaria y subsidiaria- contempladas en la Ley General Tributaria se abordan los supuestos específicamente referidos a los administradores para terminar con una exposición de tres procedimientos de derivación de responsabilidad que pueden, también, terminar afectando a quienes participan del gobierno de entidades societarias.

El Régimen de amortización fiscal del Fondo de Comercio Financiero Internacional: su tratamiento jurídico como Ayuda de Estado. Problemas jurídicos planteados

El Dret Financer-Tributari d’un estat membre es doblega a les directrius i als objectius d’harmonització contemplats al bloc normatiu comunitari de la Unió Europea. La incidència i l’impacte del Dret Comunitari sobre la sobirania fiscal dels seus integrants és evident, sotmetent i delimitant determinantment les mesures fiscals a finalitats extrafiscals. Un clar exemple d’aquest fenomen el constitueix la qualificació del règim espanyol d’amortització fiscal del Fons de Comerç Financer Internacional (previst a l’article 12.5 del TRLIS) com ajut d’Estat per part de la Comissió Europea. L’anàlisi jurídic que aborda aquest treball sobre l’evolució i Decisió final d’aquest expedient d’ajut d’Estat en particular, permet concloure que, l’existència, d’una banda, d’una concepció genèrica i indeterminada de la institució d’ ajut d’Estat i, de l’altre, d’un soft law comunitari que dóna contingut a l’esmentada institució i que ha estat evacuat per el propi organisme encarregat de decidir sobre aquests expedients (la Comissió Europea), esbossen un instrument discrecional d’harmonització fiscal negativa en seu de la imposició directa al marc de la Unió Europea. En efecte, la presència de la regla d’unanimitat en la presa de decisions en matèria tributaria des de els organismes comunitaris i l’absència d’una norma d’harmonització comunitària en seu d’imposició directa, propicien una notable inseguretat jurídica a l’hora de dissenyar beneficis fiscals per part dels legisladors d’un Estat. Mesures fiscals, que en cas de ser qualificades contràries a l’ordenament comunitari per part de la Comissió Europea, com al cas que ens ocuparà aquí, despleguen conseqüències especialment greus per als operadors econòmics que s’han beneficiat d’aquesta i que distorsionen la seva voluntat a la presa de decisions a posteriori i amb efectes retroactius. És necessari als efectes de dotar una major seguretat jurídica al sistema comunitari d’imposició directa, la substitució de la regla d’unanimitat per la de majories simples o qualificades, la voluntat de cedir parcel•les de sobirania fiscal per part dels Estats membre i Reglaments, per tal d’evitar d’arrel el fenomen de la desharmonització en aquest àmbit, així com l’ús abusiu d’instruments arbitraris d’harmonització fiscal negativa.

Economic growth and inequality: the role of fiscal policies

This paper analyses the impact of different instruments of fiscal policy on economic growth as well as on income inequality, using an unbalanced panel of 43 upper-middle and high income countries for the period 1972-2006. We consider and estimate two individual equations explaining growth and inequality in order to assess the incidence of different fiscal policies. Firstly, our approach considers imposing orthogonal assumptions between growth and inequality in both equations, and secondly, it allows growth to be included in the inequality equation, and inequality to be included in the growth equation. The empirical results suggest that an increase in the size of government measured through current expenditures and direct taxes diminishes economic growth while reducing inequality, being public investment the only fiscal policy that may break this trade-off between efficiency and equity, since increases in this item reduces inequality without harming output. Therefore, the results reflect that the trade-off between efficiency and equity that governments often confront when designing their fiscal policies may be avoided.

Fiscal foresight and the effects of government spending

We study the effects of government spending by using a structural, large dimensional, dynamic factor model. We find that the government spending shock is non-fundamental for the variables commonly used in the structural VAR literature, so that its impulse response functions cannot be consistently estimated by means of a VAR. Government spending raises both consumption and investment, with no evidence of crowding out. The impact multiplier is 1.7 and the long run multiplier is 0.6.

Fiscal policy, foresight and the trade balance in the U.S.

This paper investigates the effects of fiscal policy on the trade balance using a structural factor model. A fiscal policy shock worsens the trade balance and produces an appreciation of the domestic currency but the effects are quantitatively small. The findings match the theoretical predictions of the standard Mundell-Fleming model, although fiscal policy should not be considered one of the main causes of the large US external deficit. My conclusions differ from those reached using VAR models since the fiscal shock, possibly due to fiscal foresight, is nonfundamental for the variables typically used in open economy VARs.

Crisis y transformación fiscal del Estado español

Análisis del origen, evolución y perspectivas del modelo de financiación autonómica español, de corte federal, en el marco de la crisis del Estado

Regulatory federalism in network industries

Report for the scientific sojourn at the UC Berkeley, USA, from march until july 2008. This document starts by surveying the literature on economic federalism and relating it to network industries. The insights and some new developments (which focus on the role of interjurisdictional externalities, multiple objectives and investment incentives) are used to analyze regulatory arrangements in telecommunications and energy in the EU and the US. In the long history of vertically integrated monopolies in telecommunications and energy, there was a historical trend to move regulation up in the vertical structure of government, at least form the local level to the state or nation-state level. This move alleviated the pressure on regulators to renege on the commitment not to expropriate sunk investments, although it did not eliminate the practice of taxation by regulation that was the result of multiple interest group action. Although central or federal policy making is more focused and especialized and makes it difficult for more interest groups to organize, it is not clear that under all conditions central powers will not be associated with underinvestment. When technology makes the introduction of competition in some segments possible, the possibilities for organizing the institutional architechture of regulation expand. The central level may focus on structural regulation and the location of behavioral regulation of the remaining monopolists may be resolved in a cooperative way or concentrated at the level where the relevant spillovers are internalized.

La construcció del sistema fiscal municipal a Barcelona, segles XIII-XIV

A l’article es pretén traçar una primera cronologia de l’evolució de les competències fiscals del municipi barceloní fins a la consolidació d’un veritable sistema fiscal. Més que conclusions definitives, el treball vol establir unes primeres hipòtesis dins d’una investigació pròpia en curs sobre la fiscalitat reial a la ciutat de Barcelona que, fins al moment, s’havia centrat sobretot en l’anàlisi del patrimoni reial

Do Fiscal and Political Decentralization Raise Students’ Performance? A Cross-Country Analysis

The low quality of education is a persistent problem in many developed countries. Parallel to in the last decades exists a tendency towards decentralization in many developed and developing countries. Using micro data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) referred to 22 countries, we test whether there exists an impact of fiscal and political decentralization on student performance in the areas of mathematics, reading skills and science. We observe that fiscal decentralization exerts an unequivocal positive effect on students’ outcomes in all areas, while the effect of political decentralization is more ambiguous. On the one hand, the capacity of the subnational governments to rule on its region has a positive effect on students’ performance in mathematics. On the other hand, the capacity to influence the country as a whole has a negative impact on mathematics achievement. As a general result, we observe that students’ performance in Mathematics is more sensible to these exogenous variations than in Sciences and reading skills. Keywords: School outcomes, PISA, fiscal decentralization, political decentralization JEL codes: H11, H77, I21

Sobre el pacto fiscal y el sistema de concierto

En este trabajo se argumenta que la propuesta de Pacto Fiscal defendida por el actual Gobierno catalán es inviable constitucional y políticamente y desaconsejable en términos de racionalidad económica y administrativa. Esta reivindicación sólo servirá para excitar sentimientos de agravio dentro de Cataluña y de rechazo fuera de ella, alimentando así un sentimiento de confrontación que, aunque podría ser beneficioso electoralmente para algunos partidos nacionalistas catalanes, no serviría a los intereses de ninguna de las partes.

Fiscal foresight, forecast revisions and the effects of government spending in the open economy

This paper investigates the effects of government spending on the real exchange rate and the trade balance in the US using a new VAR identification procedure based on spending forecast revisions. I find that the real exchange rate appreciates and the trade balance deteriorates after a government spending shock, although the effects are quantitatively small. The findings broadly match the theoretical predictions of the standard Mundell-Fleming model and differ substantially from those existing in literature. Differences are attributable to the fact that, because of fiscal foresight, the government spending is non-fundamental for the variables typically used in open economy VARs. Here, on the contrary, the estimated shock is fundamental.

¿Cisne negro o pollo del montón? El déficit fiscal catalán en perspectiva

En esta nota se cuestiona la tesis de que el déficit fiscal de Catalunya es mucho mayor que el que registran otras regiones con niveles similares de renta relativa en los países de nuestro entorno. Cataluña encaja perfectamente en el patrón de redistribución territorial que se observa en Estados Unidos cuando abstraemos del tamaño de la Administración Central y trabajamos con el gasto que ''vuelve'' a cada territorio por euro o dolar de impuestos soportados. Esto hace muy difícil pensar que el saldo fiscal catalán pueda ser muy inferior al que presentan las regiones ricas de los países de Europa continental, que generalmente cuentan con sectores públicos mayores y mucho más redistributivos que el norteamericano.

Rational Partisan Theory with fiscal policy and an independent central bank

The empirical evidence testing the validity of the rational partisan theory (RPT) has been mixed. In this article, we argue that the inclusion of other macroeconomic policies and the presence of an independent central bank can partly contribute to explain this inconclusiveness. This article expands Alesina s (1987) RPT model to include an extra policy and an independent central bank. With these extensions, the implications of RPT are altered signi ficantly. In particular, when the central bank is more concerned about output than public spending (an assumption made by many papers in this literature), then the direct relationship between in flation and output derived in Alesina (1987) never holds. Keywords: central bank, conservativeness, political uncertainty. JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

When federalism is not enough? Paths to cooperation in Federal democracies

This paper explores an overlooked issue in the literature on federations and federalism: the relationship between federalism and democracy. Starting from the assumption that federalism per se is not enough to guarantee cooperative intergovernmental dynamics between different levels of governments, this article analyzes how democracy reinforces cooperative intergovernmental relations under a federal design. Drawing from empirical evidence of federations in the making – Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa and Spain – this article shows that in countries where the federal design was built under democratization, namely Brazil, Spain and South Africa, intergovernmental dynamics evolved under an increasingly cooperative mode of interaction.