Upgrading or polarization? occupational change in Britain, Germany, Spain and Switzerland, 1990-2008

This paper analyzes the pattern of occupational change in four Western European countries over the last two decades: what kind of jobs have been expanding -- high-paid jobs, low-paid jobs or both? By addressing this issue, we also examine what theoretical account is consistent with the observed pattern of change: skill-biased technical change, skill supply evolution or wage-setting institutions? Our empirical findings show a picture of massive occupational upgrading that closely matches educational expansion. In all four countries, by far the strongest employment growth occurred at the top of the occupational hierarchy, among managers and professionals. Yet in parallel, in Britain and Switzerland, as well as in Germany and Spain after 1996 and 2002 respectively, relative employment declined more strongly in the middling occupations (among clerks and production workers) than at the bottom (among interpersonal service workers). This slightly polarized pattern of occupational upgrading is consistent with the "routinization" hypothesis that technology is a better substitute for average-paid jobs in production and the office that for low-paid jobs in interpersonal services. However, we find large cross-country differences in the employment evolution at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, among low-paid services workers: sizeable growth in Britain and Spain, but stagnation in Germany and Switzerland. This results points towards the possibility that wage-setting institutions filter the pattern of occupational change.

The Impact of Trade on Technology and Skill Upgrading Evidence from Argentina

In the last 20 years, wage inequality has increased in many developing countries. Most research on this topic focuses on two alternative causes: trade or skill-biased technical change. Several empirical studies in both developed and developing countries document increases in skill intensity within all sectors, favoring the technological change explanation over trade. Instead, I present and test a model where bilateral trade liberalization increases exporting revenues inducing more firms to enter the export market and to adopt skilled-biased new technologies. I find that the increase in the relative demand of skilled labor does not come from labor reallocation across sectors or firms but from skill upgrading within firms. Firms that upgrade technology faster also upgrade skill faster. Finally, firms entering the export market after liberalization become more skill and technology-intensive than non exporters.

Improving social measurements: the experience of the ESS first rounds in Spain

With the two aims of monitoring social change and improving social measurement, the European Social Survey is now closing its third round. This paper shows how the accumulated experience of the two first rounds has been used to validate the questionnaire, better adapt the sampling design to the country characteristics and efficiently commit fieldwork in Spain. For example, the dynamic character of the population nowadays makes necessary to estimated design effects at each round from the data of the previous round. The paper also demonstrates how, starting with a response rate of 52% at first round, a 66% response rate is achieved at the third round thanks to an extensive quality control conducted by the polling agency and the ESS national team and based on a detailed analysis of the non-response cases and the incidences reported by the interviewed in the contact form.

Cyclical Skill-Biased Technological Change

Over the past two decades, technological progress has been biased towards making skilled labor more productive. The evidence for this finding is based on the persistent parallel increase in the skill premium and the supply of skilled workers. What are the implications of skill-biased technological change for the business cycle? To answer this question, we use the CPS outgoing rotation groups to construct quarterly series for the price and quantity of skill. The unconditional correlation of the skill premium with the cycle is zero. However, using a structural VAR with long run restrictions, we find that technology shocks substantially increase the premium. Investment-specific technology shocks are not skill-biased and our findings suggest that capital and skill are (mildly) substitutable in aggregate production.

Productivity and the welfare of nations

We show that the welfare of a representative consumer can be related to observable aggregatedata. To a first order, the change in welfare is summarized by (the present value of) the Solowproductivity residual and by the growth rate of the capital stock per capita. We also show thatproductivity and the capital stock suffice to calculate differences in welfare across countries, withboth variables computed as log level deviations from a reference country. These results hold forarbitrary production technology, regardless of the degree of product market competition, and applyto open economies as well if TFP is constructed using absorption rather than GDP as the measureof output. They require that TFP be constructed using prices and quantities as perceived byconsumers. Thus, factor shares need to be calculated using after-tax wages and rental rates, andwill typically sum to less than one. We apply these results to calculate welfare gaps and growthrates in a sample of developed countries for which high-quality TFP and capital data are available.We find that under realistic scenarios the United Kingdom and Spain had the highest growth ratesof welfare over our sample period of 1985-2005, but the United States had the highest level ofwelfare.

Globalization, technology and inequality

What are the effects of international integration on inequality, both between and within countries? The growing evidence that technology is the main determinant of wage and income differences may seem to imply that the forces of globalization only play a secondary role. Such a conclusion is however premature, in that it neglects the effect of international integration on technology itself. This opuscle summarizes recent and ongoing research studying how two important aspects of globalization, trade in goods and offshoring of production, shape the distribution of income when technological progress is endogenous. It discusses the theoretical foundations and the empirical support for various mechanisms through which international integration may change the incentive to develop and adopt new technologies and how this affects wages and the return to skill around the world.

Improving social measurements: The experience of the ESS first rounds in Spain

With the two aims of monitoring social change and improving social measurement, the European Social Survey is now closing its third round. This paper shows how the accumulated experience of the two first rounds has been used to validate the questionnaire, better adapt the sampling design to the country characteristics and efficiently commit fieldwork in Spain. For example, the dynamic character of the population nowadays makes necessary to estimated design effects at each round from the data of the previous round. The paper also demonstrates how, starting with a response rate of 52% at first round, a 66% response rate is achieved at the third round thanks to an extensive quality control conducted by the polling agency and the ESS national team and based on a detailed analysis of the non-response cases and the incidences reported by the interviewed in the contact form.

Horizontal innovation in the theory of growth and development

We analyze recent contributions to growth theory based on the model of expanding variety of Romer (1990). In the first part, we present different versions of the benchmark linear model with imperfect competition. These include the labequipment model, labor-for-intermediates and directed technical change . We review applications of the expanding variety framework to the analysis of international technology diffusion, trade, cross-country productivity differences, financial development and fluctuations. In many such applications, a key role is played by complementarities in the process of innovation.

Why England? Demand, growth and inequality during the Industrial Revolution

Why was England first? And why Europe? We present a probabilistic model that builds on big-push models by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), combined with hierarchical preferences. The interaction of exogenous demographic factors (in particular the English low-pressure variant of the European marriage pattern)and redistributive institutions such as the old Poor Law combined to make an Industrial Revolution more likely. Essentially, industrialization is the result of having a critical mass of consumers that is rich enough to afford (potentially) mass-produced goods. Our model is then calibrated to match the main characteristics of the English economy in 1750 and the observed transition until 1850.This allows us to address explicitly one of the key features of the British IndustrialRevolution unearthed by economic historians over the last three decades the slowness of productivity and output change. In our calibration, we find that the probability of Britain industrializing is 5 times larger than France s. Contrary to the recent argument by Pomeranz, China in the 18th century had essentially no chance to industrialize at all. This difference is decomposed into a demographic and a policy component, with the former being far more important than the latter.

Skill-biased technological change and the business cycle

Over the past two decades, technological progress in the United States hasbeen biased towards skilled labor. What does this imply for business cycles?We construct a quarterly skill premium from the CPS and use it to identifyskill-biased technology shocks in a VAR with long-run restrictions. Hours fallin response to skill-biased technology shocks, indicating that at least part of thetechnology-induced fall in total hours is due to a compositional shift in labordemand. Skill-biased technology shocks have no effect on the relative price ofinvestment, suggesting that capital and skill are not complementary in aggregateproduction.

Are changes in education important for the wage premium and unemployment?

A generalized rise in unemployment rates for both college and high-schoolgraduates, a widening education wage premium, and a sharp increase incollege education participation are characteristic features of thetransformations of the U.S. labor market between 1970 and 1990. This paperinvestigates the interactions between these changes in the labor marketand in educational attainment. First, it develops an equilibrium searchand matching model of the labor market where education is endogenouslydetermined. Second, calibrated versions of the model are used to studyquantitatively whether either a skill-biased change in technology or amismatch shock can explain the above facts. The skill-biased shock accountsfor a considerable part of the changes but fails to produce the increasein unemployment for the educated labor force. The mismatch shock explainsinstead much of the change in the four variables, including the wage premium.

Technological change and the wealth of nations

We discuss a unified theory of directed technological change and technologyadoption that can shed light on the causes of persistent productivity differencesacross countries. In our model, new technologies are designed in advanced countries and diffuse endogenously to less developed countries. Our framework is richenough to highlight three broad reasons for productivity differences: inappropriatetechnologies, policy-induced barriers to technology adoption, and within-countrymisallocations across sectors due to policy distortions. We also discuss the effectsof two aspects of globalization, trade in goods and migration, on the wealth ofnations through their impact on the direction of technical progress. By doing so,we illustrate some of the equalizing and unequalizing forces of globalization.

Growth accounting in items of turbulence and death: efficiency, technology, capital accumulation and human capital 1929-1950

We employ a non-parametrical approach to growth accounting (Data Envelopment Analysis,DEA) to disentangle the proximate sources of labour productivity growth in 41 nationsbetween 1929 and 1950 by decomposing productivity growth into four components:technological change; efficiency catch-up (movements towards the production frontier),capital accumulation and human capital accumulation. We show that efficiency catch-upgenerally explains productivity growth, whereas technological change and factoraccumulation were limited and distorted by the effects of war. War clearly hamperedefficiency. Moreover, an unbalanced ratio of human capital to physical capital (a gap to thetechnological leader) was crucial for efficiency catching-up.

Banking as an emerging technology: Hoare's Bank, 1702-1742

London s financial market underwent dramatic change after 1700. More limitedthan Paris or Amsterdam in the seventeenth century, London became the leadingfinancial centre in Europe in the eighteenth century. There is an extensive andgrowing literature on the causes of this change, but comparatively little on thechange itself. This article provides detailed information on the operation of theLondon financial market around 1700 by describing the operations of a nascentLondon bank.

Complementarity between technology make and buy in innovation strategies: Evidence from Belgiam manufacturing firms

This paper characterizes the innovation strategy of manufacturing firms andexamines the relation between the innovation strategy and importantindustry-, firm- and innovation-specific characteristics using Belgiandata from the Eurostat Community Innovation Survey. In addition to importantsize effects explaining innovation, we find that high perceived risks andcosts and low appropriability of innovations do not discourage innovation,but rather determine how the innovation sourcing strategy is chosen. Withrespect to the determinants of the decision of the innovative firm toproduce technology itself (Make) or to source technology externally (Buy),we find that small firms are more likely restrict their innovation strategyto an exclusive make or buy strategy, while large firms are more likely tocombine both internal and external knowledge acquisition in their innovationstrategy. An interesting result that highlights the complementary nature ofthe Make and Buy decisions, is that, controlled for firm size, companies forwhich internal information is an important source for innovation are morelikely to combine internal and external sources of technology. We find thisto be evidence of the fact that in-house R&D generates the necessaryabsorptive capacity to profit from external knowledge acquisition. Also theeffectiveness of different mechanisms to appropriate the benefits ofinnovations and the internal organizational resistance against change areimportant determinants of the firm's technology sourcing strategy.