The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

The implicit theory of historical change in the work of Alan S. Milward

Alan S. Milward was an economic historian who developed an implicit theory ofhistorical change. His interpretation which was neither liberal nor Marxist positedthat social, political, and economic change, for it to be sustainable, had to be agradual process rather than one resulting from a sudden, cataclysmicrevolutionary event occurring in one sector of the economy or society. Benignchange depended much less on natural resource endowment or technologicaldevelopments than on the ability of state institutions to respond to changingpolitical demands from within each society. State bureaucracies were fundamentalto formulating those political demands and advising politicians of ways to meetthem. Since each society was different there was no single model of developmentto be adopted or which could be imposed successfully by one nation-state onothers, either through force or through foreign aid programs. Nor coulddevelopment be promoted simply by copying the model of a more successfuleconomy. Each nation-state had to find its own response to the political demandsarising from within its society. Integration occurred when a number of nation states shared similar political objectives which they could not meet individuallybut could meet collectively. It was not simply the result of their increasinginterdependence. It was how and whether nation-states responded to thesedomestic demands which determined the nature of historical change.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model thatcan explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility,unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote overunemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects ofinsurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration.Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their currentlocation, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent'sattachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UIreduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, thefraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The mainresult is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiplesteady-states-one 'European' steady-state featuring high unemployment,low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one'American' steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility andlow unemployment insurance.

La fraternidad de los cuerpos posthumanos. La ciencia ficción como territorio de reproducción y de resistencia del imaginario masculino tradicional

This paper analyses the representations of the body present in contemporary science-fiction literature and film. Using theoretical concepts by Althusser, Foucault and Haraway, the text establishes first a typology of cybernetic organisms in contemporary culture and reviews its presence and ideological implications in films like Robocop (1987), Johny Mnemonic (1995) or Matrix (1999). The paper argues for a self-conscience as political and historical subjects in order to avoid falling into a fallacious cyberandroginy that reinforces phallogocentric power structures.

A comparison of the processes of institutionalisation of political economy in Spain and Italy (1860-1900)

[spa] El estudio de los procesos a través de los cuales la economía política se ha transformado en una disciplina académica es un área de creciente interés en la historia del pensamiento económico. Dicho estudio se ha abordado a través del análisis de la importancia de la economía política en un conjunto de instituciones, consideradas clave en la expansión de la economía en las sociedades occidentales en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX y primeras décadas del XX: universidades, sociedades económicas, publicaciones periódicas de contenido económico y los parlamentos nacionales. Este papel presenta una comparación entre los desarrollos del proceso de institutionalización de la economía política en España e Italia, a través del estudio de la presencia de esta disciplina en las instituciones mencionadas para el periodo 1860-1900. El objetivo es medir la posible existencia de una vía común en la institucionalización de la economía política en ambos países, como un primer paso hacia la elaboración de un modelo supranacional de institucionalización de la economía en este periodo.

A comparison of the processes of institutionalisation of political economy in Spain and Italy (1860-1900)

[spa] El estudio de los procesos a través de los cuales la economía política se ha transformado en una disciplina académica es un área de creciente interés en la historia del pensamiento económico. Dicho estudio se ha abordado a través del análisis de la importancia de la economía política en un conjunto de instituciones, consideradas clave en la expansión de la economía en las sociedades occidentales en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX y primeras décadas del XX: universidades, sociedades económicas, publicaciones periódicas de contenido económico y los parlamentos nacionales. Este papel presenta una comparación entre los desarrollos del proceso de institutionalización de la economía política en España e Italia, a través del estudio de la presencia de esta disciplina en las instituciones mencionadas para el periodo 1860-1900. El objetivo es medir la posible existencia de una vía común en la institucionalización de la economía política en ambos países, como un primer paso hacia la elaboración de un modelo supranacional de institucionalización de la economía en este periodo.

La fraternidad de los cuerpos posthumanos. La ciencia ficción como territorio de reproducción y de resistencia del imaginario masculino tradicional

This paper analyses the representations of the body present in contemporary science-fiction literature and film. Using theoretical concepts by Althusser, Foucault and Haraway, the text establishes first a typology of cybernetic organisms in contemporary culture and reviews its presence and ideological implications in films like Robocop (1987), Johny Mnemonic (1995) or Matrix (1999). The paper argues for a self-conscience as political and historical subjects in order to avoid falling into a fallacious cyberandroginy that reinforces phallogocentric power structures.

Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.

Mundo común, feminismo y mitología

[spa]Desde la década de 1970 el feminismo ha significado una de las profundizaciones críticas m.s productivas del legado del pensamiento político de la modernidad. El presente artículo atiende al cuestionamiento de las modernas nociones de libertad y comunidad políticas que Linda Zerilli ha llevado a cabo en su lectura de Hannah Arendt y de Ludwig Wittgenstein. A partir de ah. y de la reciente querella en torno al diformismo sexual, se muestra la necesidad de repensar la relación entre teoría y praxis más allá de la concepción moderna, presente en buena parte de la teoría feminista contemporánea. [eng]Since the 1970s feminism has signified one of the most productive critical reconsiderations of modern political thought legacy. This article examines the questioning ofmodern notions of political freedom and political community that Linda Zerilli has undertaken in her reading of Hannah Arendt and Ludwig Wittgenstein. On this basis and on criticism of sexual dimorphism, the article shows the need to rethink the relationship between theory and praxis beyond itsmodern conception, a feature present in much of contemporary feminist theory.