48 resultados para Exclusive Jurisdiction
Resumo:
L'articulació política del pla de Barcelona en l'època medieval es va basar en l'existència de dos territoris: d'una banda, una gran àrea que va coincidir amb la plana entre les desembocadures del Llobregat i del Besòs, on les autoritats locals exerciren alguna funció de control judicial. D'altra banda, un territori molt més petit, anomenat Hort i Vinyet (Parròquia de Sants i Sarrià Sant Martí Provençals), on la jurisdicció civil i penal del Consell de Cent era absoluta. L'objectiu d'aquest treball és mostrar, en primer lloc, que el territori anomenat Hort i Vinyet no existia i, d'altra banda, que l'extens territori no era subjecte a la jurisdicció municipal
Resumo:
The aim of this study limit is to analyze the different learning software tools for groups in need of attention special and disability that exist in the market so exclusive and cost recorded consulting and licensing, and compare them with the tools repository of Open Source Software Community without loss of performance and efficiency. Our engineering knowledge should always help the most in need.
Resumo:
Objectiu: provar que, enfront de l’aparició de sibilàncies, l’alletament matern es comporta com a un factor protector i l’alletament artificial com a un factor inductor. Material i mètodes: assaig clínic controlat, randomitzat, a doble cec amb grup control i seguiment de 8 anys, de la submostra espanyola, en el seu 5è any de seguiment, del treball multicèntric europeu EU CHILDHOOD OBESITY PROGRAMME (QLK1-2001-00389). La població es va dividir en 3 grups: nadons alimentats amb lactància artificial amb baix contingut proteic, nadons alimentats amb lactància artificial amb alt contingut proteic i un grup control de nadons alimentats amb llet materna. Per avaluar l’aparició de sibilàncies i la seva evolució en el temps es van realitzar entrevistes als pares a mesura que la població assolia els 6 anys de vida sobre qüestions referides als 3 i als 6 anys i s’havien de realitzar entrevistes als 8 anys de vida sobre qüestions referdies a aquesta mateixa edat. Per comprovar la repercussió en la funció pulmonar i valorar la base atòpica, es tenia previst realitzar, als 8 anys, espirometria, prik test amb aeroalergens, determinació de IgE sèrica total i quantificació dels eosinòfils en sang perifèrica. S’han valorat possibles factors de confusió com antecedents familiars de malalties de base al•lèrgica, nivell socioeconòmic familiar, factors, ambient epidemiològic i s’ha estudiat altra morbiditat associada com episodis de febre, vòmits, diarrea, dermatitis atòpica, refredat de vies respiratòries altes i prescripció mèdica d’antibiòtics. Resultats: només un 20’8% van rebre alletament matern. No s’han trobat diferències estadísticament significatives entre la història d’episodis de sibilàncies i el tipus d’alletament rebut. Tampoc s’han trobat diferències estadísticament significatives entre l’alimentació rebuda i la història de dermatitis atòpica. La llet artificial es va associar, amb significació estadística, a una major prescripció d’antibiòtics i una major incidència de patir diarrees i, sense significació estadística, es va associar a un augment del risc de patir RVA. La lactància materna es va associar amb significació estadística a una menor prescripció d’antibiòtics. La presència de germans grans i un baix nivell d’educació de la mare van contribuir a augmentar la morbiditat durant el primer any de vida. El consum d’alcohol durant l’embaràs es va associar a més episodis de vòmits i el consum de tabac a més episodis de diarrea. Conclusions: l’alletament artificial no predisposa a patir més episodis de sibilàncies ni de dermatitis atòpica. La lactància materna exclusiva durant almenys 3 mesos disminueix el risc de diarrees en els primers 6 mesos de vida i retarda l’aparició d’infeccions aparentment bacterianes que requereixen tractament antibiòtic. L’alletament matern exclusiu durant un mínim de tres mesos no comporta una substancial disminució de la morbiditat durant els primers 12 mesos de vida.
Resumo:
With this final master thesis we are going to contribute to the Asterisk open source project. Asterisk is an open source project that started with the main objective of develop an IP telephony platform, completely based on Software (so not hardware dependent) and under an open license like GPL. This project was started on 1999 by the software engineer Mark Spencer at Digium. The main motivation of that open source project was that the telecommunications sector is lack of open solutions, and most of the available solutions are based on proprietary standards, which are close and not compatible between them. Behind the Asterisk project there is a company, Digum, which is the project leading since the project was originated in its laboratories. This company has some of its employees fully dedicated to contribute to the Asterisk project, and also provide the whole infrastructure required by the open source project. But the business of Digium isn't based on licensing of products due to the open source nature of Asterisk, but it's based on offering services around Asteriskand designing and selling some hardware components to be used with Asterisk. The Asterisk project has grown up a lot since its birth, offering in its latest versions advanced functionalities for managing calls and compatibility with some hardware that previously was exclusive of proprietary solutions. Due to that, Asterisk is becoming a serious alternative to all these proprietaries solutions because it has reached a level of maturity that makes it very stable. In addition, as it is open source, it can be fully customized to a givenrequirement, which could be impossible with the proprietaries solutions. Due to the bigness that is reaching the project, every day there are more companies which develop value added software for telephony platforms, that are seriously evaluating the option of make their software fully compatible withAsterisk platforms. All these factors make Asterisk being a consolidated project but in constant evolution, trying to offer all those functionalities offered by proprietaries solutions. This final master thesis will be divided mainly in two blocks totally complementaries. In the first block we will analyze Asterisk as an open source project and Asterisk as a telephony platform (PBX). As a result of this analysis we will generate a document, written in English because it is Asterisk project's official language, which could be used by future contributors as an starting point on joining Asterisk. On the second block we will proceed with a development contribution to the Asterisk project. We will have several options in the form that we do the contribution, such as solving bugs, developing new functionalities or start an Asterisk satellite project. The type of contribution will depend on the needs of the project on that moment.
Resumo:
Pensar globalmente, actuar localmente” es un slogan imprescindible en el discurso político de nuestros días. Pues bien, la práctica política, en materia de Unión Europea, de los dos gobiernos del Partido Popular, presididos por José María Aznar (1996-2004), nos permite acuñar un slogan de signo bien diferente: “pensar localmente, actuar en Europa”. En efecto, si algo caracteriza a estos ocho años de práctica política de José María Aznar es haber convertido sus preocupaciones domésticas en factor exclusivo de su estrategia europea, con independencia del contexto de cada momento y de la necesidad de encajar objetivos nacionales con objetivos europeos. De ahí que sea lógico que la campaña electoral que ha precedido a las elecciones generales del 14 de marzo no haya recogido ninguno de los temas que dominan en la agenda de la UE en el momento actual. Ni la ampliación, ni la Constitución, ni tampoco el proceso de conformación de un núcleo duro tienen cabida en el debate político españo
Resumo:
“Thinking globally, acting locally" is an essential slogan in the current political discourse. Yet, in view of the policies on the European Union carried out by the two governments of the People’s Party (PP) headed by José María Aznar between 1996 and 2004, we could coin a quite different slogan: "thinking locally, acting in Europe". Indeed, José María Aznar’s policy-making during the last eight years has been characterised by turning his domestic concerns into the ‘exclusive factor’ of his European strategy, regardless of the context and the need for fitting in national objectives with Europeans’. Hence, it was natural that the electoral campaign preceding the general elections held on Sunday, 14 March, did not deal with any of the topics prevailing in the EU’s current agenda. Neither enlargement nor the Constitution, nor the process of shaping a core group within the EU, seem to have room in Spain’s political debate...
Resumo:
La etnografía de la comunidad mixe de Salto de la Tuxpana y del grave conflicto que se produjo entre 2005 y 2007 es el punto de partida del presente artículo. La investigación realizada arrojó como resultado más destacado el descubrimiento de un violento cacicazgo, legitimado ideológicamente en la autonomía comunitaria, la identidad étnica y el reclamo de una jurisdicción propia, y asentado firmemente sobre tres mecanismos de control social: protección a través de la Policía Comunitaria Armada, acceso a la tierra y acceso a los programas de «desarrollo». El caciquismo se define como el régimen político personalista, basado en estructuras clientelares, que monopoliza y controla recursos y votos. También se propone la hipótesis de que la mayor parte de la violencia desplegada por los caciques es el resultado del proceso de reproducción social del mismo sistema político, cuando se genera una faccionalización simétrica de la comunidad, después de un periodo de estabilidad complementaria.
Resumo:
La finalitat d'aquest projecte és aprofundir en el procés d'integració socioeducativa de la joventut migrada a Catalunya, específicament, dels i les joves entre 14 i 18 anys. Entre els resultats destaquem que els ioves tenen un concepte força tancat i excloent del concepte de ciutadania com a estatus , i un baix grau, de coneixement de la diversitat cultural, especialment els joves autòctons, tot i que tenen una actitud de reconeixement i acceptació, favorable a la convivència intercultural, tant al centre educatiu com al seu barri. No obstant, tenen una visió de la diversitat cultural i del fet migratori en clau de coexistència, sense el reconeixement que suposaria un pas més cap a la convivència. La immigració és vista com un col•lectiu vulnerable, amb un baix nivell econòmic i cultural i que també és percebut com un problema i, fins i tot, com a causant de les dificultutats que actualment pateix i travessa el conjunt de la societat. Els joves tendeixen a relacionar-se amb el seu grup cultural, i responen de forma passiva en la comprensió i actuació davant dels problemes i assumptes públics. Entre els elements que valoren per sentir-se ciutadà té una especial importància la llengua. Eis joves que fa més de 10 anys que viuen a Catalunya són els que tendeixen a tenir un sentiment de pertinença cívica amb el lloc de residència. De fet, com mes temps porten els joves estrangers vivint al lloc d’acollida, perden importància elements d’identificació cultural del país d’origen, però la religió, les celebracions populars, l’art i la tendència a formar parella són elements identitaris del lloc d’origen, més estables. Es demana una intervenció urgent en diversos nivells i destinades a diferents agents. Destaquem: la importància d’una acollida afectiva i efectiva; potenciar espais de trobada; treballar els prejudicis; transversalitzar l’educació intercultural; potenciació de l’aprenentatge de la llengua catalana; formació del professorat en competències interculturals.
Resumo:
Given that firms develop their activities in a network of multiple players, interfirm rivalry is not only a matter of direct competitors, but also of indirect competition. In spite of this, the literature on competitive dynamics tends to focus on analyzing rivalry as an exclusive function of the competitive relationship between a focal firm and its direct rivals. In this article, we extend competitive dynamics literature by considering how focal firms are affected by the relationships of their rivals with third-party firms. Specifically, we study the effect that the multimarket contacts of rivals produces on the performance of the focal firm. Additionally, we incorporate the idea that there are different strategic options for operating in an industry that affect the intensity of multimarket contact externalities. Our results show that multimarket contact among firms causes externalities that indirectly affect firms that are not directly involved in this competitive relationship. We find that multimarket contact externalities differ between and within strategic groups.
Resumo:
Education and health policy are two of the public policies, which in Spain have been assigned to the Autonomous Communities (AC). This transfer of powers could be considered a proof for the strong “self-rule” of the AC, which in turn shows that Spain could be classified as a federal state. In the following analysis the authors in some parts disagree with that conclusion, showing that considering the education area Spain is “heavy at the top”. Due to the state’s exclusive power to regulate the basic conditions guaranteeing the equality of all Spanish citizens, the important and final decisions are taken at the center through the framework legislation. The AC play a minor role in the legislation process, they have to adopt the center decisions. De-centralization and extension of the framework legislation are highly connected: The central state reacted with strong framework legislation to the stages of the educational decentralization process. In addition, the concentration of important framing powers within the central state does not make educational reforms more infrequent. However, such reforms are the results of a competition between the parties, and not between the AC or between the AC and the central state
Resumo:
Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.
Resumo:
We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.
Resumo:
We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.
Resumo:
We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.
Resumo:
This paper characterizes the innovation strategy of manufacturing firms andexamines the relation between the innovation strategy and importantindustry-, firm- and innovation-specific characteristics using Belgiandata from the Eurostat Community Innovation Survey. In addition to importantsize effects explaining innovation, we find that high perceived risks andcosts and low appropriability of innovations do not discourage innovation,but rather determine how the innovation sourcing strategy is chosen. Withrespect to the determinants of the decision of the innovative firm toproduce technology itself (Make) or to source technology externally (Buy),we find that small firms are more likely restrict their innovation strategyto an exclusive make or buy strategy, while large firms are more likely tocombine both internal and external knowledge acquisition in their innovationstrategy. An interesting result that highlights the complementary nature ofthe Make and Buy decisions, is that, controlled for firm size, companies forwhich internal information is an important source for innovation are morelikely to combine internal and external sources of technology. We find thisto be evidence of the fact that in-house R&D generates the necessaryabsorptive capacity to profit from external knowledge acquisition. Also theeffectiveness of different mechanisms to appropriate the benefits ofinnovations and the internal organizational resistance against change areimportant determinants of the firm's technology sourcing strategy.