Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Do the Wealthy Risk More Money? An Experimental Comparison

Are poor people more or less likely to take money risks than wealthy folks? We find that risk attraction is more prevalent among the wealthy when the amounts of money at risk are small (not surprising, since ten dollars is a smaller amount for a wealthy person than for a poor one), but, interestingly, for the larger amounts of money at risk the fraction of the nonwealthy displaying risk attraction exceeds that of the wealthy. We also replicate our previous finding that many people display risk attraction for small money amounts, but risk aversion for large ones. We argue that preferences yielding risk attraction for small money amounts, together with risk aversion for larger amounts, at all levels of wealth, while contradicting the expected utility hypothesis, may be well-defined, independently of reference points, on the choice space.

Testing for convergence clubs in income per-capita: A predictive density approach

The paper proposes a technique to jointly test for groupings of unknown size in the cross sectional dimension of a panel and estimates the parameters of each group, and applies it to identifying convergence clubs in income per-capita. The approach uses the predictive density of the data, conditional on the parameters of the model. The steady state distribution of European regional data clusters around four poles of attraction with different economic features. The distribution of incomeper-capita of OECD countries has two poles of attraction and each grouphas clearly identifiable economic characteristics.

Organisational values as "attractors of chaos": An emerging cultural change to manage organisational complexity

Business organisations are excellent representations of what in physics and mathematics are designated "chaotic" systems. Because a culture of innovation will be vital for organisational survival in the 21st century, the present paper proposes that viewing organisations in terms of "complexity theory" may assist leaders in fine-tuning managerial philosophies that provide orderly management emphasizing stability within a culture of organised chaos, for it is on the "boundary of chaos" that the greatest creativity occurs. It is argued that 21st century companies, as chaotic social systems, will no longer be effectively managed by rigid objectives (MBO) nor by instructions (MBI). Their capacity for self-organisation will be derived essentially from how their members accept a shared set of values or principles for action (MBV). Complexity theory deals with systems that show complex structures in time or space, often hiding simple deterministic rules. This theory holds that once these rules are found, it is possible to make effective predictions and even to control the apparent complexity. The state of chaos that self-organises, thanks to the appearance of the "strange attractor", is the ideal basis for creativity and innovation in the company. In this self-organised state of chaos, members are not confined to narrow roles, and gradually develop their capacity for differentiation and relationships, growing continuously toward their maximum potential contribution to the efficiency of the organisation. In this way, values act as organisers or "attractors" of disorder, which in the theory of chaos are equations represented by unusually regular geometric configurations that predict the long-term behaviour of complex systems. In business organisations (as in all kinds of social systems) the starting principles end up as the final principles in the long term. An attractor is a model representation of the behavioral results of a system. The attractor is not a force of attraction or a goal-oriented presence in the system; it simply depicts where the system is headed based on its rules of motion. Thus, in a culture that cultivates or shares values of autonomy, responsibility, independence, innovation, creativity, and proaction, the risk of short-term chaos is mitigated by an overall long-term sense of direction. A more suitable approach to manage the internal and external complexities that organisations are currently confronting is to alter their dominant culture under the principles of MBV.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

The gain-loss asymmetry and single-self preferences

Kahneman and Tversky asserted a fundamental asymmetry between gains and losses, namely a reflection effect which occurs when an individual prefers a sure gain of $ pz to anuncertain gain of $ z with probability p, while preferring an uncertain loss of $z with probability p to a certain loss of $ pz.We focus on this class of choices (actuarially fair), and explore the extent to which thereflection effect, understood as occurring at a range of wealth levels, is compatible with single-self preferences.We decompose the reflection effect into two components, a probability switch effect,which is compatible with single-self preferences, and a translation effect, which is not. To argue the first point, we analyze two classes of single-self, nonexpected utility preferences, which we label homothetic and weakly homothetic. In both cases, we characterize the switch effect as well as the dependence of risk attitudes on wealth.We also discuss two types of utility functions of a form reminiscent of expected utility but with distorted probabilities. Type I always distorts the probability of the worst outcome downwards, yielding attraction to small risks for all probabilities. Type II distorts low probabilities upwards, and high probabilities downwards, implying risk aversion when the probability of the worst outcome is low. By combining homothetic or weak homothetic preferences with Type I or Type II distortion functions, we present four explicit examples: All four display a switch effect and, hence, a form of reflection effect consistent a single self preferences.

Are agent-based simulations robust? The wholesale electricity trading case

Agent-based computational economics is becoming widely used in practice. This paperexplores the consistency of some of its standard techniques. We focus in particular on prevailingwholesale electricity trading simulation methods. We include different supply and demandrepresentations and propose the Experience-Weighted Attractions method to include severalbehavioural algorithms. We compare the results across assumptions and to economic theorypredictions. The match is good under best-response and reinforcement learning but not underfictitious play. The simulations perform well under flat and upward-slopping supply bidding,and also for plausible demand elasticity assumptions. Learning is influenced by the number ofbids per plant and the initial conditions. The overall conclusion is that agent-based simulationassumptions are far from innocuous. We link their performance to underlying features, andidentify those that are better suited to model wholesale electricity markets.

Do the eealthy risk more money? An experimental comparison

Are poor people more or less likely to take money risks than wealthy folks?We find that risk attraction is more prevalent among the wealthy when theamounts of money at risk are small (not surprising, since ten dollars is asmaller amount for a wealthy person than for a poor one), but, interestingly,for the larger amounts of money at risk the fraction of the nonwealthydisplaying risk attraction exceeds that of the wealthy.We also replicate our previous finding that many people display riskattraction for small money amounts, but risk aversion for large ones. Weargue that preferences yielding risk attraction for small money amounts,together with risk aversion for larger amounts, at all levels of wealth, while contradicting the expected utility hypothesis, may be well-defined,independently of reference points, on the choice space.

Reflections on gains and losses: A 2x2x7 experiment

We test whether risk attitudes change when losses instead of gains areinvolved. The study of gain-loss asymmetries has been largely confinedto reflected choices, where all the money amounts of a positiveprospect are multiplied by minus one. We define the decomposition reflection = translation + probability switch, and experimentally findboth a translation effect (risk attraction becomes more frequent whengains are translated into losses) and a probability switch effect (riskattraction becomes more frequent when the probability of the best outcomedecreases). Surprisingly, the switch effect is somewhat stronger than thetranslation effect, negating a conventional reflection effect when onestarts with choices between gains with a low probability of the bestoutcome. We conclude by arguing that, while both the translation effectand the switch effect contradict the expected utility hypothesis, thetranslation effect implies a deeper violation of standard preference theory.

A territorial model of commuting in Catalonia, 1986-1996

Commuting consists in the fact that an important fraction of workers in developed countries do not reside close to their workplaces but at long distances from them, so they have to travel to their jobs and then back home daily. Although most workers hold a job in the same municipality where they live or in a neighbouring one, an important fraction of workers face long daily trips to get to their workplace and then back home.Even if we divide Catalonia (Spain) in small aggregations of municipalities, trying to make them as close to local labour markets as possible, we will find out that some of them have a positive commuting balance, attracting many workers from other areas and providing local jobs for almost all their resident workers. On the other side, other zones seem to be mostly residential, so an important fraction of their resident workers hold jobs in different local labour markets. Which variables influence an area¿s role as an attraction pole or a residential zone? In previous papers (Artís et al, 1998a, 2000; Romaní, 1999) we have brought out the main individual variables that influence commuting by analysing a sample of Catalan workers and their commuting decisions. In this paper we perform an analysis of the territorial variables that influence commuting, using data for aggregate commuting flows in Catalonia from the 1991 and 1996 Spanish Population Censuses.These variables influence commuting in two different ways: a zone with a dense, welldeveloped economical structure will have a high density of jobs. Work demand cannot be fulfilled with resident workers, so it spills over local boundaries. On the other side, this economical activity has a series of side-effects like pollution, congestion or high land prices which make these areas less desirable to live in. Workers who can afford it may prefer to live in less populated, less congested zones, where they can find cheaper land, larger homes and a better quality of life. The penalty of this decision is an increased commuting time. Our aim in this paper is to highlight the influence of local economical structure and amenities endowment in the workplace-residence location decision. A place-to-place logit commuting models is estimated for 1991 and 1996 in order to find the economical and amenities variables with higher influence in commuting decisions. From these models, we can outline a first approximation to the evolution of these variables in the 1986-1996 period. Data have been obtained from aggregate flow travel-matrix from the 1986, 1991 and 1996 Spanish Population Censuses

Were Spanish migrants attracted by industrial agglomerations?: an analysis for the interwar years in the light of the new economic geography

In this paper we examine whether access to markets had a significant influence onmigration choices of Spanish internal migrants in the inter-war years. We perform astructural contrast of a New Economic Geography model that focus on the forwardlinkage that links workers location choice with the geography of industrial production,one of the centripetal forces that drive agglomeration in the NEG models. The resultshighlight the presence of this forward linkage in the Spanish economy of the inter-warperiod. That is, we prove the existence of a direct relation between workers¿ localizationdecisions and the market potential of the host regions. In addition, the direct estimationof the values associated with key parameters in the NEG model allows us to simulatethe migratory flows derived from different scenarios of the relative size of regions andthe distances between them. We show that in Spain the power of attraction of theagglomerations grew as they increased in size, but the high elasticity estimated for themigration costs reduced the intensity of the migratory flows. This could help to explainthe apparently low intensity of internal migrations in Spain until its upsurge during the1920s. This also explains the geography of migrations in Spain during this period,which hardly affected the regions furthest from the large industrial agglomerations (i.e.,regions such as Andalusia, Estremadura and Castile-La Mancha) but had an intenseeffect on the provinces nearest to the principal centres of industrial development.

A territorial model of commuting in Catalonia, 1986-1996

Commuting consists in the fact that an important fraction of workers in developed countries do not reside close to their workplaces but at long distances from them, so they have to travel to their jobs and then back home daily. Although most workers hold a job in the same municipality where they live or in a neighbouring one, an important fraction of workers face long daily trips to get to their workplace and then back home.Even if we divide Catalonia (Spain) in small aggregations of municipalities, trying to make them as close to local labour markets as possible, we will find out that some of them have a positive commuting balance, attracting many workers from other areas and providing local jobs for almost all their resident workers. On the other side, other zones seem to be mostly residential, so an important fraction of their resident workers hold jobs in different local labour markets. Which variables influence an area¿s role as an attraction pole or a residential zone? In previous papers (Artís et al, 1998a, 2000; Romaní, 1999) we have brought out the main individual variables that influence commuting by analysing a sample of Catalan workers and their commuting decisions. In this paper we perform an analysis of the territorial variables that influence commuting, using data for aggregate commuting flows in Catalonia from the 1991 and 1996 Spanish Population Censuses.These variables influence commuting in two different ways: a zone with a dense, welldeveloped economical structure will have a high density of jobs. Work demand cannot be fulfilled with resident workers, so it spills over local boundaries. On the other side, this economical activity has a series of side-effects like pollution, congestion or high land prices which make these areas less desirable to live in. Workers who can afford it may prefer to live in less populated, less congested zones, where they can find cheaper land, larger homes and a better quality of life. The penalty of this decision is an increased commuting time. Our aim in this paper is to highlight the influence of local economical structure and amenities endowment in the workplace-residence location decision. A place-to-place logit commuting models is estimated for 1991 and 1996 in order to find the economical and amenities variables with higher influence in commuting decisions. From these models, we can outline a first approximation to the evolution of these variables in the 1986-1996 period. Data have been obtained from aggregate flow travel-matrix from the 1986, 1991 and 1996 Spanish Population Censuses

Pairing in two-dimensional boson-fermion mixtures

The possibilities of pairing in two-dimensional boson-fermion mixtures are carefully analyzed. It is shown that the boson-induced attraction between two identical fermions dominates the p wave pairing at low density. For a given fermion density, the pairing gap becomes maximal at a certain optimal boson concentration. The conditions for observing pairing in current experiments are discussed.

Defect dynamics in viscous fingering

We study the dynamics of Staffman-Taylor fingering in terms of topological defects of the flow field. The defects are created and/or annihilated at the interface. The route towards the single-finger steady state is characterized by a detailed mechanism for defect annihilation. For small viscosity contrast this mechanism is impeded, and creation of new defects leads the system away from a single-finger solution. Strong evidence for a drastic reduction of the basin of attraction of the Saffman-Taylor finger is presented.

Surface tension and dynamics of fingering patterns

We study the minimal class of exact solutions of the Saffman-Taylor problem with zero surface tension, which contains the physical fixed points of the regularized (nonzero surface tension) problem. New fixed points are found and the basin of attraction of the Saffman-Taylor finger is determined within that class. Specific features of the physics of finger competition are identified and quantitatively defined, which are absent in the zero surface tension case. This has dramatic consequences for the long-time asymptotics, revealing a fundamental role of surface tension in the dynamics of the problem. A multifinger extension of microscopic solvability theory is proposed to elucidate the interplay between finger widths, screening and surface tension.