General preferences for consumption goods in the random matching model of commodity money

This paper generalizes the original random matching model of money byKiyotaki and Wright (1989) (KW) in two aspects: first, the economy ischaracterized by an arbitrary distribution of agents who specialize in producing aparticular consumption good; and second, these agents have preferences suchthat they want to consume any good with some probability. The resultsdepend crucially on the size of the fraction of producers of each goodand the probability with which different agents want to consume eachgood. KW and other related models are shown to be parameterizations ofthis more general one.

Are Americans' musical preferences more omnivores today?

Although we found a general trend favouring the omnivorousness thesis, as soon as we adjusted it to a set of structural factors and consumers tastes it was clear that this was caused by elitist inclusive omnivores who had increased the scope of their tastes. In general, younger cohorts were becoming less omnivorous, nevertheless, they were also becoming more educated and had greater to higher levels of inc ome, making the youth moreomnivorous. As expected, upscale consumers set limits on their popular taste: musicalgenres, whose audiences had educational levels below the mean profile were less preferredby upscale respondents. In spite of this, as time passed, some popular brows gained socialstatus.

Voting with preferences over margins of victory

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative.The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.

Social preferences and skill segregation

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals dependnot only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of otherpersons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study theallocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. Weshow that even small deviations from purely selfish preferences leadsto widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers ofdifferent abilities tend to work in di¤erent firms, as long as theycare somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are close .

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

The gain-loss asymmetry and single-self preferences

Kahneman and Tversky asserted a fundamental asymmetry between gains and losses, namely a reflection effect which occurs when an individual prefers a sure gain of $ pz to anuncertain gain of $ z with probability p, while preferring an uncertain loss of $z with probability p to a certain loss of $ pz.We focus on this class of choices (actuarially fair), and explore the extent to which thereflection effect, understood as occurring at a range of wealth levels, is compatible with single-self preferences.We decompose the reflection effect into two components, a probability switch effect,which is compatible with single-self preferences, and a translation effect, which is not. To argue the first point, we analyze two classes of single-self, nonexpected utility preferences, which we label homothetic and weakly homothetic. In both cases, we characterize the switch effect as well as the dependence of risk attitudes on wealth.We also discuss two types of utility functions of a form reminiscent of expected utility but with distorted probabilities. Type I always distorts the probability of the worst outcome downwards, yielding attraction to small risks for all probabilities. Type II distorts low probabilities upwards, and high probabilities downwards, implying risk aversion when the probability of the worst outcome is low. By combining homothetic or weak homothetic preferences with Type I or Type II distortion functions, we present four explicit examples: All four display a switch effect and, hence, a form of reflection effect consistent a single self preferences.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Biased quantitative measurement of interval ordered homothetic preferences

We represent interval ordered homothetic preferences with a quantitative homothetic utility function and a multiplicative bias. When preferences are weakly ordered (i.e. when indifference is transitive), such a bias equals 1. When indifference is intransitive, the biasing factor is a positive function smaller than 1 and measures a threshold of indifference. We show that the bias is constant if and only if preferences are semiordered, and we identify conditions ensuring a linear utility function. We illustrate our approach with indifference sets on a two dimensional commodity space.

Eliciting consumers preferences using stated preference discrete choice models: Contingent ranking versus choice experiment

The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to carry out a theoreticalreview of the most recent stated preference techniques used foreliciting consumers preferences and, secondly, to compare the empiricalresults of two dierent stated preference discrete choice approaches.They dier in the measurement scale for the dependent variable and,therefore, in the estimation method, despite both using a multinomiallogit. One of the approaches uses a complete ranking of full-profiles(contingent ranking), that is, individuals must rank a set ofalternatives from the most to the least preferred, and the other usesa first-choice rule in which individuals must select the most preferredoption from a choice set (choice experiment). From the results werealize how important the measurement scale for the dependent variablebecomes and, to what extent, procedure invariance is satisfied.

Endogeneous matching in university-industry collaboration: Theory and empirical evidence from the UK

We develop a two-sided matching model to analyze collaboration between heterogeneousacademics and firms. We predict a positive assortative matching in terms of both scientificability and affinity for type of research, but negative assortative in terms of ability on one sideand affinity in the other. In addition, the most able and most applied academics and the mostable and most basic firms shall collaborate rather than stay independent. Our predictionsreceive strong support from the analysis of the teams of academics and firms that proposeresearch projects to the UK's Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.

Eliciting preferences for collectively financed health programmes : the "willingness to assign" approach

Improving public involvement in health system decision making stands as a primary goal in health systems reform. However, still limited evidence is found on how best to elicit preferences for health care programs. This paper examines a contingent choice technique to elicit preferences among health programs so called, willingness to assign (WTAS): Moreover, we elicited contingents rankings as well as the willingness to pay extra taxes for comparative purposes. We argue that WTAS reveals relative ( monetary-based) values of a set of competing public programmes under a hypothetical healthcare budget assessment. Experimental evidence is reported from a delibertive empirical study valuing ten health programmes in the context of the Catalan Health Services. Evidence from a our experimental study reveals that perferences are internally more consistent and slightly less affected by "preference reversals" as compared to values revealed from the willingness to pay (WTP) extra taxes approach. Consistent with prior studies, we find that the deliberative approach helped to avoid possible misunderstandings. Interestingly, although programmes promoting health received the higher relative valuation, those promoting other health benefits also ranked highly

Eliciting preferences for collectively financed health programmes : the "willingness to assign" approach

Improving public involvement in health system decision making stands as a primary goal in health systems reform. However, still limited evidence is found on how best to elicit preferences for health care programs. This paper examines a contingent choice technique to elicit preferences among health programs so called, willingness to assign (WTAS): Moreover, we elicited contingents rankings as well as the willingness to pay extra taxes for comparative purposes. We argue that WTAS reveals relative ( monetary-based) values of a set of competing public programmes under a hypothetical healthcare budget assessment. Experimental evidence is reported from a delibertive empirical study valuing ten health programmes in the context of the Catalan Health Services. Evidence from a our experimental study reveals that perferences are internally more consistent and slightly less affected by "preference reversals" as compared to values revealed from the willingness to pay (WTP) extra taxes approach. Consistent with prior studies, we find that the deliberative approach helped to avoid possible misunderstandings. Interestingly, although programmes promoting health received the higher relative valuation, those promoting other health benefits also ranked highly

Substrate and depth preferences of macroinvertebrates along a transect in a Pyrenean high mountain lake (Estanh Redo, NE Spain)

Se estudia la composiciÛn y estructura de la comunidad de macroinvertebrados a lo largo de un transecto en profundidad en el lago Redó (Pirineos). Este estudio se enmarca dentro del proyecto de ámbito europeo MOLAR (Mountain Lake Research). Un equipo de buceadores muestreo dos tipos de substrato, piedras y fondos blandos, cada 2 m desde los 2 a los 20 m de profundidad. En la parte m·s profunda del lago las muestras se tomaron con draga Ekman (tres rÈplicas). Todas las muestras se tomaron el mismo día, el 15 de Julio de 1997. Los resultados, mediante un análisis de autocorrelación de Mantel, muestran que no existe un gradiente continuo en la sustituciÛn de unas especies por otras en la comunidad sobre substrato rocoso, sino que se distinguen dos discontinuidades claras, una a los 4 metros y otra a los 14 metros. La primera separa las especies propias de la zona litoral respecto a las de la zona sublitoral, mientras que la segunda coincide con la parte inferior de la termoclina, una zona siempre mas frÌa, con menos luz y con mayor acumulación de material fino sobre los sustratos duros a la vez que desaparece la cobertura algal que cubrÌa las piedras hasta esta profundidad. Respecto al sustrato existen especies que claramente prefieren el sustrato blando (oligoquetos, o los quironÛmidos Micropsectra radialis y Pseudodiamesa nivosa), mientras que otras eran más abundantes o exclusivas de los sustratos duros (Radix peregra, Plectrocnemia laetabilis, Psectrocladius octomaculatus). Estos resultados seran muy útiles para la interpretaciÛn de los datos paleolimnolÛgicos de los cores que actualmente se est·n estudiando en el lago.

Social Preferences and Transport Policy: The case of US speed limits

This article, in reviewing the longrunning US debate on speed limits, illustrates how a different valuation of the trade-off between private mobility needs and safety concerns can shape transport policies. It is argued that the regulatory decentralization debate, together with the speed limit in force in each state, obey the social preferences and valuation given to this tradeoff. Such a view is consistent with evidence that higher speed limits are to be found in states with greater private mobility needs, even though their fatality rates might be among the highest in the country. By contrast, lower speed limits and supporters of a low national speed limit are to be found in states that show a greater concern for safety outcomes and which are less dependent on private mobility. By reviewing these events and examining the role played by the main actors and analyzing their motivations, the article identifies important lessons for similar future discussions on transport policy.

Reliable entertainment: Spanish consumers' preferences regarding a film's country of origin

This article contributes to the study of cinema audiences in Europe by analyzing theactual behavior of Spanish moviegoers and their level of satisfaction. We modeledmoviegoers’ choice of film by country of origin (U.S.A., Spain, and other countries)according to a set of determinants: (1) consumers’ interpretation of several sources of information, (2) motivations and (3) choice rules. We found three clear consumerstereotypes related to each type of film: (1) U.S.A. films were preferred by almost everyone (especially families and younger audiences); (2) Spanish films had audiences composed of middle-age and middle-class moviegoers; and (3) European productions were preferred by a social or intellectual elite. U.S.A. films dominate the Spanish market for the reason that they provide most of what moviegoers prefer, namely, familiar, reliable entertainment in Spanish; three characteristics that are not satisfied by Spanish and European films. Additionally, we discuss the implications for the European cultural policy