All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

¿Elecciones en 2009? Avances y obstáculos de la construcción de paz en Costa de Marfil

Tres meses de conflicto armado en Côte d'Ivoire en 2002 acabaron con la división del país en dos regiones, separadas por una línea de separación controlada por las francesas Forces Licorne. El proceso de paz se alargó en el tiempo y se caracterizó por una falta de confianza mutua y por la inmovilidad política. Estos hechos desembocaron en una situación de impasse y en la permanencia de Laurent Gbagbo en la presidencia del país. Además, los diferentes acuerdos políticos no ayudaron al proceso de construcción de paz, ya que no trataban algunos de los problemas principales del país, como la propiedad de las tierras y la identidad. Este documento de trabajo aspira, en primer lugar, a analizar los hechos principales y las causas que originaron el conflicto desde el golpe de estado de 2002. En segundo lugar, el documento analiza el proceso de paz y señala los elementos clave del Acuerdo de Paz de Ouagadougou (2007): la creación de una estructura de fuerzas armadas nueva y única, así como la identificación de la población y la convocatoria de elecciones. El objetivo principal es proporcionar una herramienta de trabajo al Institut Català Internacional per la Pau (ICIP) para enviar una futura comisión de observación electoral a este país africano.

Eleccions al 2009? Avenços i obstacles de la construcció de pau a Costa d'Ivori

Tres mesos de conflicte armat a Côte d’Ivoire durant el 2002 acabaren amb la divisió del país en dues regions, separades per una línia d’interposició controlada per les franceses Forces Licorne. El procés de pau es perllongà en el temps i es caracteritzà per una manca de confiança mútua i per una immobilitat política. Aquests fets desembocaren en una situació d’impasse i en la permanència de Laurent Gbagbo a la presidència del país. A més, els diferents acords polítics no ajudaren el procés de construcció de pau, ja que no encaraven alguns dels problemes principals del país, com ara la propietat de les terres i els assumptes d’identitat. Aquest document de treball aspira, en primer lloc, a analitzar els fets principals i les causes que originaren el conflicte des del cop d’estat del 2002. En segon lloc, el document analitza el procés de pau i assenyala els elements clau de l’Acord de Pau d’Ouagadougou (2007): la creació d’una estructura de forces armades nova i única, així com la identificació de la població i la realització d’un procés electoral. L’objectiu principal és proporcionar una eina de treball a l’Institut Català Internacional per la Pau (ICIP) per enviar una missió d’observació electoral a aquest país africà el novembre de 2009.

Élections en 2009? Progrès et obstacles dans la construction de la paix en Côte d'Ivoire

Trois mois de conflit armé en Côte d’Ivoire pendant l’année 2002 finirent par provoquer la division du pays en deux régions, séparées par une ligne d’interposition contrôlée par les Forces Licorne françaises. Le processus de paix se prolongea dans le temps, caractérisé par un manque de confiance mutuelle et une immobilité politique. Ces faits ont débouché sur une situation d’impasse et la permanence de Laurent Gbagbo à la présidence du pays. De plus, les différents accords politiques n’aidèrent pas le processus de construction de la paix, puisqu’ils n’abordaient pas certains problèmes principaux du pays, comme par exemple la propriété des terres et les sujets concernant l’identité. Ce document de travail aspire, tout d’abord, à analyser les faits principaux et les causes qui provoquèrent le conflit à partir du coup d’état de 2002. En deuxième lieu, le document analyse le processus de paix et signale les éléments clé de l’Accord de Paix d’Ouagadougou (2007): la création d’une nouvelle et unique structure des forces armées, ainsi que l’identification de la population et la réalisation d’un processus électoral. L’objectif principal est de fournir un outil de travail à l’Institut Catalan International pour la Paix (ICIP) afin d’envoyer une mission d’observation électorale dans ce pays africain.

Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit

We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants' efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies. JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)

A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting

In this paper, I provide a formal justi…cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi…fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.

Primaries the unifying force

We present a formal model of intra-party politics to explain candidate selection within parties. We think of parties as heterogeneous groups of individuals who aim to implement a set of policies but who differ in their priorities. When party heterogeneity is too large, parties are in danger of splitting into smaller yet more homogeneous groups. In this context we argue that primaries can have a unifying role if the party elite cannot commit to policy concessions. Our model shows how alignment in the preferred policies of various factions within a party, the relative weight of each of these factions and the electoral system interact to create incentives for the adoption of primary elections. We discuss the existing empirical literature in the light of our theoretical predictions to provide a new, structured perspective on the adoption of primary elections.

The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a continuous policy space

This paper characterizes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections with a continuous policy space, where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non-policy advantage over the other candidate. We assume that voters have quadratic preferences over policies and that their ideal points are drawn from a uniform distribution over the unit interval. In our equilibrium the advantaged candidate chooses the expected median voter with probability one and the disadvantaged candidate uses a mixed strategy that is symmetric around it. We show that this equilibrium exists if the number of voters is large enough relative to the size of the advantage.

El futur de les democràcies a Bolívia i Equador

Segons L'índex de Desenvolupament Democràtic d'Amèrica Llatina (IDD-Lat 2004) tot i que a la zona hi ha símbols democràtics com eleccions periòdiques, alternança en el poder per part dels partits polítics, divisió de poders, en alguns dels països llatinoamericans també s'hi ha trobat signes de debilitat del sistema democràtic.

The Strategic Adaptation of Party Organizations to New Information and Communication Technologies : A Study of Catalan and Spanish Parties

Aquest document se centra en els casos dels dos principals partits espanyols (PP i PSOE) i catalans (PSC i CDC) en el període immediatament després de les eleccions generals espanyoles de maig de 2008, quan aquests celebraren els seus congressos. En general, es poden distingir tres tipus d'actors: en primer lloc, els ciberactivistes que tracten d'obtenir el reconeixement formal de la seva activitat en els seus partits. Així com, els líders del partit que poden intentar promoure la presència del partit en el ciberespai, però que també poden romandre indecisos perquè no és clar l'impacte electoral a la xarxa del ciberactivisme. Finalment, alguns militants tradicionals (off-line) solen ser reticents al reconeixement del ciberactivisme perquè amenaça les recompenses previstes dins del partit. Aquest article mostra com els nostres partits varen respondre al desafiament del ciberactivisme i arriba a la conclusió que la seva situació electoral, mediada per la seva ideologia, estructura organitzativa i el tipus de militància, poden ajudar-nos a comprendre el grau diferent d'institucionalització en l'organització del partit.

Les últimes eleccions del franquisme: la minielecció d'alcaldes de 1976

Article sobre les últimes eleccions del franquisme a la província de Girona

Disseny i implementació de la base de dades: Sistema de votació ciutadana a nivell Europeu a través d'Internet

La Unió Europea necessita i per tant ens encarrega, un disseny de base de dades per tald'emmagatzemar la informació de futures eleccions ciutadanes a través d'Internet.