Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

Financial intermediation in a model of growth through creative destruction

This paper presents an endogenous growth model in which the research activity is financed by intermediaries that are able to reduce the incidence of researcher's moral hazard. It is shown that financial activity is growth promoting because it increases research productivity. It is also found that a subsidy to the financial sector may have larger growth effects than a direct subsidy to research. Moreover, due to the presence of moral hazard, increasing the subsidy rate to R\&D may reduce the growth rate. I show that there exists a negative relation between the financing of innovation and the process of capital accumulation. Concerning welfare, the presence of two externalities of opposite sign steaming from financial activity may cause that the no-tax equilibrium provides an inefficient level of financial services. Thus, policies oriented to balance the effects of the two externalities will be welfare improving.

Work, risk and health: differences between immigrants and natives in Spain

We analyze the impact of working and contractual conditions, particularly exposure to job risks, on the probability of acquiring a disability. We postulate a model in which this impact is mediated by the choice of occupation, with a level of risk associated to it. We assume this choice is endogenous, and that it depends on preferences and opportunities in the labour market, both of which may differ between immigrants and natives. To test this hypothesis we use data from the Continuous Sample of Working Lives of the Spanish SS system. It contains individual, job and firm information of over a million workers, including a representative sample of immigrants. We find that risk exposure increases the probability of permanent disability by 5.3%; temporary employment also influences health. Migrant status -with differences among regions of origin- significantly affects both disability and the probability of being employed in a risky occupation. Most groups of immigrants work in riskier jobs, but have lower probability of becoming disabled. Nevertheless, our theoretical hypothesis that disability and risk are jointly determined is not valid for immigrants: i.e. for them working conditions is not a matter of choice in terms of health.

Two-sided learning in new keynesian models: dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank (two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economy have asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. We assume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct for different sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model of the economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs through a statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study the short-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularly with respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learning can generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behavior of the variables in the model in a signifficant way. Our simulations do not converge to a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source that invalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identify a novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communication can be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified

Hedgehog signaling governs the development of otic sensory epithelium and its associated innervation in zebrafish

The inner ear is responsible for the perception of motion and sound in vertebrates. Its functional unit, the sensory patch, contains mechanosensory hair cells innervated by sensory neurons from the statoacoustic ganglion (SAG) that project to the corresponding nuclei in the brainstem. How hair cells develop at specific positions, and how otic neurons are sorted to specifically innervate each endorgan and to convey the extracted information to the hindbrain is not completely understood. In this work, we study the generation of macular sensory patches and investigate the role of Hedgehog (Hh) signaling in the production of their neurosensory elements. Using zebrafish transgenic lines to visualize the dynamics of hair cell and neuron production, we show that the development of the anterior and posterior maculae is asynchronic, suggesting they are independently regulated. Tracing experiments demonstrate the SAG is topologically organized in two different neuronal subpopulations, which are spatially segregated and innervate specifically each macula. Functional experiments identify the Hh pathway as crucial in coordinating the production of hair cells in the posterior macula, and the formation of its specific innervation. Finally, gene expression analyses suggest that Hh influences the balance between different SAG neuronal subpopulations. These results lead to a model in which Hh orients functionally the development of inner ear towards an auditory fate in all vertebrate species.

Equilibrium asset prices and savings of heterogeneous agents in the presence of incomplete markets and portfolio constraints

We study the quantitative properties of a dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents face both idiosyncratic and aggregate income risk, state-dependent borrowing constraints that bind in some but not all periods and markets are incomplete. Optimal individual consumption-savings plans and equilibrium asset prices are computed under various assumptions about income uncertainty. Then we investigate whether our general equilibrium model with incomplete markets replicates two empirical observations: the high correlation between individual consumption and individual income, and the equity premium puzzle. We find that, when the driving processes are calibrated according to the data from wage income in different sectors of the US economy, the results move in the direction of explaining these observations, but the model falls short of explaining the observed correlations quantitatively. If the incomes of agents are assumed independent of each other, the observations can be explained quantitatively.

Speculation, risk premia and expectations in the yield curve

An affine asset pricing model in which traders have rational but heterogeneous expectations aboutfuture asset prices is developed. We use the framework to analyze the term structure of interestrates and to perform a novel three-way decomposition of bond yields into (i) average expectationsabout short rates (ii) common risk premia and (iii) a speculative component due to heterogeneousexpectations about the resale value of a bond. The speculative term is orthogonal to public informationin real time and therefore statistically distinct from common risk premia. Empirically wefind that the speculative component is quantitatively important accounting for up to a percentagepoint of yields, even in the low yield environment of the last decade. Furthermore, allowing for aspeculative component in bond yields results in estimates of historical risk premia that are morevolatile than suggested by standard Affine Gaussian term structure models which our frameworknests.

Two-sided learning in New Keynesian models: Dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank(two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economyhave asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. Weassume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct fordifferent sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model ofthe economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs througha statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study theshort-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularlywith respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learningcan generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behaviorof the variables in the model in a significant way. Our simulations do not convergeto a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source thatinvalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identifya novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communicationcan be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified.

Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot markets

It is widely accepted in the literature about the classicalCournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked,in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stableunique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolistsas industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instabilityis proved false.

A dynamic choice model of hybrid behavior in the attribute-space

This paper presents a dynamic choice model in the attributespace considering rational consumers that discount the future. In lightof the evidence of several state-dependence patterns, the model isfurther extended by considering a utility function that allows for thedifferent types of behavior described in the literature: pure inertia,pure variety seeking and hybrid. The model presents a stationaryconsumption pattern that can be inertial, where the consumer only buysone product, or a variety-seeking one, where the consumer buys severalproducts simultane-ously. Under the inverted-U marginal utilityassumption, the consumer behaves inertial among the existing brands forseveral periods, and eventually, once the stationary levels areapproached, the consumer turns to a variety-seeking behavior. An empiricalanalysis is run using a scanner database for fabric softener andsignificant evidence of hybrid behavior for most attributes is found,which supports the functional form considered in the theory.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Processes and consequences in business ethical dilemmas: The oil industry and climate changes

This paper proposes a framework to examine business ethical dilemmas andbusiness attitudes towards such dilemmas. Business ethical dilemmas canbe understood as reflecting a contradiction between a socially detrimentalprocess and a self-interested profitable consequence. This representationallows us to distinguish two forms of behavior differing by whetherpriority is put on consequences or on processes. We argue that theseforms imply very different business attitudes towards society:controversial or competitive for the former and aligned or cooperativefor the latter. These attitudes are then analyzed at the discursive level in order to address the question of good faith in businessargumentation, i.e. to which extent are these attitudes consistent withactual business behaviors. We argue that consequential attitudes mostlyinvolve communication and lobbying actions aiming at eluding the dilemma.Therefore, the question of good faith for consequential attitudes liesin the consistency between beliefs and discourse. On the other hand,procedural attitudes acknowledge the dilemma and claim a change of theprocess of behavior. They thus raise the question of the consistencybetween discourses and actual behavior. We apply this processes/consequencesframework to the case of the oil industry s climate change ethical dilemmawhich comes forth as a dilemma between emitting greenhouse gases and making more profits . And we examine the different attitudes of two oilcorporations-BP Amoco and ExxonMobil-towards the dilemma.

Relationship and transaction lending in a crisis

We study how relationship lending and transaction lending varyover the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationshipbanks gather information on their borrowers, which allows them toprovide loans for profitable firms during a crisis. Due to the servicesthey provide, operating costs of relationship-banks are higher thanthose of transaction-banks. In our model, where relationship-bankscompete with transaction-banks, a key result is that relationship-banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, butoffer continuation-lending at more favorable terms than transactionbanks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using detailed credit registerinformation for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers'default, we are able to study how relationship and transaction-banksresponded to the crisis and we test existing theories of relationshipbanking. Our empirical analysis confirms the basic prediction of themodel that relationship banks charged a higher spread before the crisis, offered more favorable continuation-lending terms in response tothe crisis, and suffered fewer defaults, thus confirming the informational advantage of relationship banking.

Accelerated tumor invasion under non-isotropic cell dispersal in glioblastomas

Glioblastomas are highly diffuse, malignant tumors that have so far evaded clinical treatment. The strongly invasive behavior of cells in these tumors makes them very resistant to treatment, and for this reason both experimental and theoretical efforts have been directed toward understanding the spatiotemporal pattern of tumor spreading. Although usual models assume a standard diffusion behavior, recent experiments with cell cultures indicate that cells tend to move in directions close to that of glioblastoma invasion, thus indicating that a biasedrandom walk model may be much more appropriate. Here we show analytically that, for realistic parameter values, the speeds predicted by biased dispersal are consistent with experimentally measured data. We also find that models beyond reaction–diffusion–advection equations are necessary to capture this substantial effect of biased dispersal on glioblastoma spread