Large-system analysis of a CDMA dynamic channel under a Markovian input process

We study the minimum mean square error (MMSE) and the multiuser efficiency η of large dynamic multiple access communication systems in which optimal multiuser detection is performed at the receiver as the number and the identities of active users is allowed to change at each transmission time. The system dynamics are ruled by a Markov model describing the evolution of the channel occupancy and a large-system analysis is performed when the number of observations grow large. Starting on the equivalent scalar channel and the fixed-point equation tying multiuser efficiency and MMSE, we extend it to the case of a dynamic channel, and derive lower and upper bounds for the MMSE (and, thus, for η as well) holding true in the limit of large signal–to–noise ratios and increasingly large observation time T.

Bit loading for MIMO with statistical channel information at the transmitter and ZF receivers

For single-user MIMO communication with uncoded and coded QAM signals, we propose bit and power loading schemes that rely only on channel distribution information at the transmitter. To that end, we develop the relationship between the average bit error probability at the output of a ZF linear receiver and the bit rates and powers allocated at the transmitter. This relationship, and the fact that a ZF receiver decouples the MIMO parallel channels, allow leveraging bit loading algorithms already existing in the literature. We solve dual bit rate maximization and power minimization problems and present performance resultsthat illustrate the gains of the proposed scheme with respect toa non-optimized transmission.

Endogenous Credit Cycles and Financial Dampening in an Adverse Selection Economy

We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Credit card debt puzzles

Most US credit card holders revolve high-interest debt, often combined with substantial (i) asset accumulation by retirement, and (ii) low-rate liquid assets. Hyperbolic discounting can resolve only the former puzzle (Laibson et al., 2003). Bertaut and Haliassos (2002) proposed an 'accountant-shopper'framework for the latter. The current paper builds, solves, and simulates a fully-specified accountant-shopper model, to show that this framework canactually generate both types of co-existence, as well as target credit card utilization rates consistent with Gross and Souleles (2002). The benchmark model is compared to setups without self-control problems, with alternative mechanisms, and with impatient but fully rational shoppers.

The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

Macroprudential policy, countercyclical bank capital buffers and credit supply: Evidence from the Spanish dynamic provisioning experiments

We analyze the impact of countercyclical capital buffers held by banks on the supplyof credit to firms and their subsequent performance. Spain introduced dynamicprovisioning unrelated to specific bank loan losses in 2000 and modified its formulaparameters in 2005 and 2008. In each case, individual banks were impacteddifferently. The resultant bank-specific shocks to capital buffers, coupled withcomprehensive bank-, firm-, loan-, and loan application-level data, allow us toidentify its impact on the supply of credit and on real activity. Our estimates showthat countercyclical dynamic provisioning smooths cycles in the supply of credit andin bad times upholds firm financing and performance.

Credit lines: The other side of corporate liquidity

In this paper we offer the first large sample evidence on the availability and usage ofcredit lines in U.S. public corporations and use it to re-examine the existing findings oncorporate liquidity. We show that the availability of credit lines is widespread and thataverage undrawn credit is of the same order of magnitude as cash holdings. We test thetrade-off theory of liquidity according to which firms target an optimum level of liquidity,computed as the sum of cash and undrawn credit lines. We provide support for the existenceof a liquidity target, but also show that the reasons why firms hold cash and credit linesare very different. While the precautionary motive explains well cash holdings, the optimumlevel of credit lines appears to be driven by the restrictions imposed by the credit line itself,in terms of stated purpose and covenants. In support to these findings, credit line drawdownsare associated with capital expenditures, acquisitions, and working capital.

Endogenous credit cycles

I develop an overlapping-generations framework in which changes in lending standards generateendogenous cycles. In my economy, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about thequality of their projects need to borrow funds. Intermediaries screen entrepreneurs both throughthe amount of investment undertaken and through the level of entrepreneurial net worth.I show that endogenous regime switches in financial contracts from pooling to separatingand vice-versa may generate fluctuations even in the absence of exogenous shocks. Whenthe economy is in the pooling (separating) regime, lending standards seem lax ( tight ) andinvestment is high (low). Differently from the existing literature, my model does not requireentrepreneurial net worth to be counter cyclycal or inconsequential for determining aggregateinvestment.

Boundedly rational credit cycles

We propose an evolutionary model of a credit market. We show that theeconomy exhibits credit cycles. The model predicts dynamics which are consistent with some evidence about the Great Depression. Real shocks triggerepisodes of credit--crunch which are observed in the process of adjustmenttowards the post shock equilibrium.

Credit constraints in general equilibrium: Experimental results

Our work attempts to investigate the influence of credit tightness orexpansion on activity and relative prices in a multimarket set-up. We report on somedouble- auction, two-market experiments where subjects had to satisfy an inequalityinvolving the use of credit. The experiments display two regimes, characterizedby high and low credit availability. The critical value of credit at the commonboundary of the two regimes has a compelling interpretation as the maximal credituse at the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the abstract economy naturally associatedto our experimental environment. Our main results are that changes in theavailability of credit: (a): have minor and unsystematic effects on quantitiesand relative prices in the high-credit regime, (b): have substantial effects, bothon quantities and relative prices, in the low-credit regime.

Interbank liquidity crunch and the firm credit crunch: Evidence from the 2007-2009 crisis

We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the Europeaninterbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find thatbanks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease theircredit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger forfirms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannotcompensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, theimpact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks.Finally, there are no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity, but higherhoarding of liquidity.