Heterogeneity as a coordination device

A model of directed search with a finite number of buyers and sellers is considered, where sellers compete in direct mechanisms. Buyer heterogeneity and Nash equilibrium results in perfect sorting. The restriction to complementary inputs, that the match value function Q is supermodular, in addition coordinates the sellers strategies. In that case, equilibrium implements positive assortative matching, which is efficient and consistent with the stable (cooperative equilibrium) outcome. This provides a non-cooperative and decentralizedsolution for the Assignment Game. Conversely, if buyers are identical, no such coordination is possible, and there is a continuum of equilibria, one of which exhibits price posting, another yields competition in auctions.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

On the impact of fundamentals, liquidity and coordination on market stability

We develop a coordination game to model interactions betweenfundamentals and liquidity during unstable periods in financial markets.We then propose a flexible econometric framework for estimationof the model and analysis of its quantitative implications. The specificempirical application is carry trades in the yen dollar market, includingthe turmoil of 1998. We find a generally very deep market, withlow information disparities amongst agents. We observe occasionallyepisodes of market fragility, or turmoil with up by the escalator, downby the elevator patterns in prices. The key role of strategic behaviorin the econometric model is also confirmed.

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

A zero-delay sequential scheme for lossy coding of individual sequences

We consider adaptive sequential lossy coding of bounded individual sequences when the performance is measured by the sequentially accumulated mean squared distortion. Theencoder and the decoder are connected via a noiseless channel of capacity $R$ and both are assumed to have zero delay. No probabilistic assumptions are made on how the sequence to be encoded is generated. For any bounded sequence of length $n$, the distortion redundancy is defined as the normalized cumulative distortion of the sequential scheme minus the normalized cumulative distortion of the best scalarquantizer of rate $R$ which is matched to this particular sequence. We demonstrate the existence of a zero-delay sequential scheme which uses common randomization in the encoder and the decoder such that the normalized maximum distortion redundancy converges to zero at a rate $n^{-1/5}\log n$ as the length of the encoded sequence $n$ increases without bound.

On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices

Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalentequilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibriumand is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players'choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act asan equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closelyrelated small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well asexperimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordinationdevices.

A first-principles analysis of the magnetism of CuII polynuclear coordination complexes: the case of [Cu4(bpy)4(aspartate)2(H2O)3](ClO4)4·2.5H2O

The magnetic structure of the [Cu4(bpy)4(aspartate)2(H2O)3](ClO4)4·2.5 H2Ocrystal - using fractional coordinates determined at room-temperature ¿ has beenanalysed in detail. This analysis has been carried out by extending our first principlesbottom-up theoretical approach, which was initially designed to study through-spacemagnetic interactions, to handle through-bond magnetic interactions. The only input datarequired by this approach are the values of the computed JAB exchange parameters for allthe unique pairs of spin-containing centres. The results allow the magnetic structure ofthe crystal, which presents two types of isolated tetranuclear CuII clusters, to be definedin quantitative terms. Each of these clusters presents ferro and antiferromagneticinteractions, the former being stronger, although outnumbered by the latter. Thecomputed magnetic susceptibility curve shows the same qualitative features as theexperimental data. However, there are small differences that are presumed to beassociated with the use of room-temperature crystal coordinates.

A first-principles analysis of the magnetism of CuII polynuclear coordination complexes: the case of [Cu4(bpy)4(aspartate)2(H2O)3](ClO4)4·2.5H2O

The magnetic structure of the [Cu4(bpy)4(aspartate)2(H2O)3](ClO4)4·2.5 H2Ocrystal - using fractional coordinates determined at room-temperature ¿ has beenanalysed in detail. This analysis has been carried out by extending our first principlesbottom-up theoretical approach, which was initially designed to study through-spacemagnetic interactions, to handle through-bond magnetic interactions. The only input datarequired by this approach are the values of the computed JAB exchange parameters for allthe unique pairs of spin-containing centres. The results allow the magnetic structure ofthe crystal, which presents two types of isolated tetranuclear CuII clusters, to be definedin quantitative terms. Each of these clusters presents ferro and antiferromagneticinteractions, the former being stronger, although outnumbered by the latter. Thecomputed magnetic susceptibility curve shows the same qualitative features as theexperimental data. However, there are small differences that are presumed to beassociated with the use of room-temperature crystal coordinates.

Oscillations, phase-of-firing coding, and spike timing-dependent plasticity: an efficient learning scheme

Recent experiments have established that information can be encoded in the spike times of neurons relative to the phase of a background oscillation in the local field potential—a phenomenon referred to as “phase-of-firing coding” (PoFC). These firing phase preferences could result from combining an oscillation in the input current with a stimulus-dependent static component that would produce the variations in preferred phase, but it remains unclear whether these phases are an epiphenomenon or really affect neuronal interactions—only then could they have a functional role. Here we show that PoFC has a major impact on downstream learning and decoding with the now well established spike timing-dependent plasticity (STDP). To be precise, we demonstrate with simulations how a single neuron equipped with STDP robustly detects a pattern of input currents automatically encoded in the phases of a subset of its afferents, and repeating at random intervals. Remarkably, learning is possible even when only a small fraction of the afferents (~10%) exhibits PoFC. The ability of STDP to detect repeating patterns had been noted before in continuous activity, but it turns out that oscillations greatly facilitate learning. A benchmark with more conventional rate-based codes demonstrates the superiority of oscillations and PoFC for both STDP-based learning and the speed of decoding: the oscillation partially formats the input spike times, so that they mainly depend on the current input currents, and can be efficiently learned by STDP and then recognized in just one oscillation cycle. This suggests a major functional role for oscillatory brain activity that has been widely reported experimentally.

A novel semi-fragile forensic watermarking scheme for remote sensing images

Peer-reviewed