Heterogeneity as a coordination device

A model of directed search with a finite number of buyers and sellers is considered, where sellers compete in direct mechanisms. Buyer heterogeneity and Nash equilibrium results in perfect sorting. The restriction to complementary inputs, that the match value function Q is supermodular, in addition coordinates the sellers strategies. In that case, equilibrium implements positive assortative matching, which is efficient and consistent with the stable (cooperative equilibrium) outcome. This provides a non-cooperative and decentralizedsolution for the Assignment Game. Conversely, if buyers are identical, no such coordination is possible, and there is a continuum of equilibria, one of which exhibits price posting, another yields competition in auctions.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

On the impact of fundamentals, liquidity and coordination on market stability

We develop a coordination game to model interactions betweenfundamentals and liquidity during unstable periods in financial markets.We then propose a flexible econometric framework for estimationof the model and analysis of its quantitative implications. The specificempirical application is carry trades in the yen dollar market, includingthe turmoil of 1998. We find a generally very deep market, withlow information disparities amongst agents. We observe occasionallyepisodes of market fragility, or turmoil with up by the escalator, downby the elevator patterns in prices. The key role of strategic behaviorin the econometric model is also confirmed.

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices

Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalentequilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibriumand is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players'choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act asan equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closelyrelated small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well asexperimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordinationdevices.

A first-principles analysis of the magnetism of CuII polynuclear coordination complexes: the case of [Cu4(bpy)4(aspartate)2(H2O)3](ClO4)4·2.5H2O

The magnetic structure of the [Cu4(bpy)4(aspartate)2(H2O)3](ClO4)4·2.5 H2Ocrystal - using fractional coordinates determined at room-temperature ¿ has beenanalysed in detail. This analysis has been carried out by extending our first principlesbottom-up theoretical approach, which was initially designed to study through-spacemagnetic interactions, to handle through-bond magnetic interactions. The only input datarequired by this approach are the values of the computed JAB exchange parameters for allthe unique pairs of spin-containing centres. The results allow the magnetic structure ofthe crystal, which presents two types of isolated tetranuclear CuII clusters, to be definedin quantitative terms. Each of these clusters presents ferro and antiferromagneticinteractions, the former being stronger, although outnumbered by the latter. Thecomputed magnetic susceptibility curve shows the same qualitative features as theexperimental data. However, there are small differences that are presumed to beassociated with the use of room-temperature crystal coordinates.

A first-principles analysis of the magnetism of CuII polynuclear coordination complexes: the case of [Cu4(bpy)4(aspartate)2(H2O)3](ClO4)4·2.5H2O

The magnetic structure of the [Cu4(bpy)4(aspartate)2(H2O)3](ClO4)4·2.5 H2Ocrystal - using fractional coordinates determined at room-temperature ¿ has beenanalysed in detail. This analysis has been carried out by extending our first principlesbottom-up theoretical approach, which was initially designed to study through-spacemagnetic interactions, to handle through-bond magnetic interactions. The only input datarequired by this approach are the values of the computed JAB exchange parameters for allthe unique pairs of spin-containing centres. The results allow the magnetic structure ofthe crystal, which presents two types of isolated tetranuclear CuII clusters, to be definedin quantitative terms. Each of these clusters presents ferro and antiferromagneticinteractions, the former being stronger, although outnumbered by the latter. Thecomputed magnetic susceptibility curve shows the same qualitative features as theexperimental data. However, there are small differences that are presumed to beassociated with the use of room-temperature crystal coordinates.

Reconfigurable Architecture To Estimate The Motion Of An Underwater Vehicle

This work proposes a parallel architecture for a motion estimation algorithm. It is well known that image processing requires a huge amount of computation, mainly at low level processing where the algorithms are dealing with a great numbers of data-pixel. One of the solutions to estimate motions involves detection of the correspondences between two images. Due to its regular processing scheme, parallel implementation of correspondence problem can be an adequate approach to reduce the computation time. This work introduces parallel and real-time implementation of such low-level tasks to be carried out from the moment that the current image is acquired by the camera until the pairs of point-matchings are detected

SiMR: A simulator for learning computer architecture

This paper presents SiMR, a simulator of the Rudimentary Machine designed to be used in a first course of computer architecture of Software Engineering and Computer Engineering programmes. The Rudimentary Machine contains all the basic elements in a RISC computer, and SiMR allows editing, assembling and executing programmes for this processor. SiMR is used at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya as one of the most important resources in the Virtual Computing Architecture and Organisation Laboratory, since students work at home with the simulator and reports containing their work are automatically generated to be evaluated by lecturers. The results obtained from a survey show that most of the students consider SiMR as a highly necessary or even an indispensable resource to learn the basic concepts about computer architecture.

Final architecture diploma projects in the analysis of the UPC buildings energy performance

A partir de maig de 2003, per iniciativa del Vicerectorat adjunt d’Edificacions de la UPC, el Centre Interdisciplinari de Tecnologia, Innovació i Educació per a la Sostenibilitat (CITIES) treballa en l’elaboració i la implantació del Pla d’Eficiència en el Consum de Recursos (PECR), amb l’objectiu d’establir polítiques i definir línees d’actuació per a l’estalvi i l’eficiència en el consum dels recursos energètics i d’ aigua en els edificis de la UPC.El PECR contempla, en una de les primeres fases, la realització d’avaluacions energètiques en les edificacions de la UPC per valorar l’estat actual dels edificis i poder establir uns indicadors del seu comportament energètic a partir dels quals establir els objectius d’estalvi i d’eficiència. Per fer aquestes avaluacions, es va crear una línea de projectes finals de carrera (PFC) per a estudiants de l’Escola Politècnica Superior de l’Edificació de Barcelona (EPSEB), sota la coordinació de professors tutors de diferents departaments y amb la col•laboració indispensable de totes les unitats de recolzament de la UPC.Aquesta publicació és la ponència presentada al IV Congrès "Sustainable City", a Tallinn, en el que es va presentar aquest projecte com a una eina de treball amb l'objectiu de reduir l'impacte ambiental dels edificis universitaris en les ciutats.

A Middleware architecture for Unmanned Aircraft Avionics

An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle is a non-piloted airplane designed to operate in dangerous and repetitive situations. With the advent of UAV's civil applications, UAVs are emerging as a valid option in commercial scenarios. If it must be economically viable, the same platform should implement avariety of missions with little reconguration time and overhead.This paper presents a middleware-based architecture specially suited to operate as a exible payload and mission controller in a UAV. The system is composed of low-costcomputing devices connected by network. The functionality is divided into reusable services distributed over a number ofnodes with a middleware managing their lifecycle and communication.Some research has been done in this area; yetit is mainly focused on the control domain and in its realtime operation. Our proposal differs in that we address the implementation of adaptable and reconfigurable unmannedmissions in low-cost and low-resources hardware.