Did the cooperative start life as a Joint-Stock company? business law and cooperatives in Spain, 1869–1931

Studies of Spanish cooperatives date their spread from the Law on Agrarian Syndicates of 1906. But the first legislative appearance of cooperatives is an 1869 measure that permitted general incorporation for lending companies. The 1931 general law on cooperatives, which was the first act permitting the formation of cooperatives in any activity, reflects the gradual disappearance of the cooperative’s "business" characteristics. In this paper we trace the Spanish cooperative’s legal roots in business law and its connections to broader questions of the freedom of association, the formation of joint-stock enterprises, and the liability of investors in business and cooperative entities. Our account underscores the similarities of the organizational problems approach by cooperatives and business firms, while at the same time respecting the distinctive purposes cooperatives served.

Cooperative learning in the ESL classroom

This research explores the advantages and disadvantages of collaborative learning departing from two different methodological studies. In the first one, we will go deep into the reflections about group work of a student-teacher in her first experiences during a two months practicum in Sabadell's Emily Bronte. In the second one, we will analyze in a more empirical way the interaction that takes place among a trio of students engaged in a question-answering task about a text based on a three minutes vignette recorded on January 2010

Expectativas, actitudes y normas percibidas respecto al uso del preservativo por los jóvenes de Mozambique = Expectations, attitudes and perceived norms regarding condom use in Mozambique young people

Objetivos: Conocer la prevalencia del uso auto informado del preservativo en la última relación sexual, así como algunas actitudes, creencias y percepciones sobre su uso para la prevención de la transmisión del VIH por vía heterosexual, en jóvenes de las ciudades de Nampula, Bemba y Lichinga, en Mozambique. Diseño: Estudio transversal de encuesta. Participantes: Seiscientos treinta y dos estudiantes de secundaria (56,8% varones), con edades comprendidas entre 15 y 24 años, seleccionados mediante un muestreo aleatorio estratificado proporcional. El porcentaje de participación es del 79%. Mediciones principales: Mediante un cuestionario, se evalúan en una escala de 0 a 10 las actitudes hacia el uso del preservativo, expectativas de resultados y de autoeficacia y aceptación percibida sobre su utilización. Asimismo se evalúa el uso auto informado del preservativo en la última relación sexual. Resultados: Sólo un 47,4% (IC 0,95 = 42,0:52,8) de los jóvenes sexualmente activos utilizó el preservativo en la última relación sexual. En general las mujeres tienen una actitud más favorable respecto a su uso y creen más en su eficacia que los hombres, pero lo utilizan menos y se sienten poco capaces de pedir su uso al varón, principalmente si se trata de su actual pareja. La autoeficacia percibida para utilizar o pedir el uso del preservativo aumenta en el caso de una pareja ocasional tanto en hombres como en mujeres. Conclusiones: Se requieren acciones institucionales y sociales que promocionen el uso del preservativo entre los jóvenes de Mozambique. Los programas preventivos deberían insistir en el cambio de actitudes y creencias, y enfatizar los beneficios que se derivan de su uso adecuado y sistemático desde la primera relación coital

The Effect of occupational sex-composition on earnings: job-specialisation, sex-role attitudes and the division of domestic-labour in Spain

Important theoretical controversies remain unresolved in the literatire on occupational sex-segregation and the gender wage-gap. A useful way of summarising these controversies is viewing them as a debate between - cultural -socialisation. The paper discusses these theories in detail and carries out a preliminary test of the relative explanatory performance of some of their most consequential predictions. This is done by drawing on the Spanish sample of the second wave of the European Social Survey, ESS. The empirical analysis of ESS data illustrates the notable analytical pay-offs that can stem from using rich individual-level indicators, but also exemplifies the statistical llimitations generated by small sample size and high rates of non-response. Empirical results should, therefore, be taken as preliminary. They seem to suggest that the effect of occupational sex-segregation on wages could be explicable by workers' sex-role attitutes, their relative input in domestic production and the job-specific human capital requirements of their jobs. Of these three factors, job-specialisation seeems clearly the most important one.

Predictors of political orientation among US-born Mexican Americans: cultural identification, acculturation attitudes and socioeconomic status

With each passing election, U.S. political campaigns have renewed their efforts in courting the “Latino vote,” yet the Latino population is not a culturally homogenous voting bloc. This study examined how cultural identifications and acculturation attitudes in U.S. born Mexican Americans interacted with socioeconomic status (SES) to predict political orientation. Individuals who held stronger Mexican identity and supported biculturalism as an acculturation strategy had a more liberal orientation, while belonging to a higher SES group and holding stronger assimilation attitudes predicted a less liberal orientation. Mexican cultural identification interacted with SES such that those who held a weaker Mexican identity, but came from a higher social class were less liberal and more moderate in their political orientation. Weak Mexican identification and higher SES also predicted weaker endorsement of bicultural acculturation attitudes, which in turn, mediated the differences in political orientation. The acceptance of one’s ethnic identity and endorsement of bicultural attitudes predicted a more liberal political orientation. In light of these findings, political candidates should be cautious in how they pander to Latino constituents—referencing the groups’ ethnic culture or customs may distance constituents who are not strongly identified with their ethnic culture.

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

(Re-) Shaping hatred: Anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany, 1890-2006

In this paper, we assess the determinants of long-run persistence of localculture, and examine the success of policy interventions designed to change attitudes.We analyze anti-Semitic attitudes drawing on individual-level survey results fromGermany s social value survey in 1996 and 2006. On average, we find that historicalvoting patterns for anti-Semitic parties between 1890 and 1933 are powerfulpredictors of anti-Jewish attitudes today. There is evidence that transmission takesplace both vertically (parent to child) and horizontally (among peers). Policy modifiedGerman views on Jews in important ways: The cohort that grew up under the Naziregime shows significantly higher levels of anti-Semitism. After 1945, the victoriousAllies implemented denazification programs in their zones of occupation. We usedifferences in these policies between the occupying powers as a source of identifyingvariation. The US and French zones today still show high anti-Semitism, reflecting anambitious botched attempt at denazification. In contrast, the British and Soviet zones,register much lower levels of Jew-hatred.

Married to intolerance: Attitudes towards intermarriage in Germany, 1900-2006

Marriage is amongst the biggest decisions in life. In general, there is a tendency towards assortative matching people marry others who are relatively similar to themselves. Intermarriage between different social, religious and ethnic groups in most societies is relatively rare (Blossfeld and Timm 2003). Where it occurs, it is associated with more rapid assimilation (Meng and Gregory 2005). The frequency of intermarriage can therefore serve as a useful indicator of tolerant attitudes towards a minority, and of the desire to integrate (Bisin, Topa, and Verdier 2004).In this paper, we analyze under which conditions intermarriage can be used as an indicator of tolerance, and whether such tolerant attitudes persisted in Germany during the last century. We combine information on individual-level attitudes from the German social survey (GESIS) with historical data on marriage patterns.

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

En aquest treball presentem dues caracteritzacions de dos valors diferents en el marc dels jocs coalicionals amb cooperació restringida. Les restriccions són introduïdes com una seqüència finita de particions del conjunt del jugadors, de manera que cada una d'elles eés més grollera que l'anterior, formant així una estructura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

En aquest treball presentem dues caracteritzacions de dos valors diferents en el marc dels jocs coalicionals amb cooperació restringida. Les restriccions són introduïdes com una seqüència finita de particions del conjunt del jugadors, de manera que cada una d'elles eés més grollera que l'anterior, formant així una estructura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.