Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

En aquest treball presentem dues caracteritzacions de dos valors diferents en el marc dels jocs coalicionals amb cooperació restringida. Les restriccions són introduïdes com una seqüència finita de particions del conjunt del jugadors, de manera que cada una d'elles eés més grollera que l'anterior, formant així una estructura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

En aquest treball presentem dues caracteritzacions de dos valors diferents en el marc dels jocs coalicionals amb cooperació restringida. Les restriccions són introduïdes com una seqüència finita de particions del conjunt del jugadors, de manera que cada una d'elles eés més grollera que l'anterior, formant així una estructura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Fully Distributed Cooperative Spectrum Sensing for Cognitive Radio Networks

Cognitive radio networks (CRN) sense spectrum occupancy and manage themselves to operate in unused bands without disturbing licensed users. The detection capability of a radio system can be enhanced if the sensing process is performed jointly by a group of nodes so that the effects of wireless fading and shadowing can be minimized. However, taking a collaborative approach poses new security threats to the system as nodes can report false sensing data to force a wrong decision. Providing security to the sensing process is also complex, as it usually involves introducing limitations to the CRN applications. The most common limitation is the need for a static trusted node that is able to authenticate and merge the reports of all CRN nodes. This paper overcomes this limitation by presenting a protocol that is suitable for fully distributed scenarios, where there is no static trusted node.

A Secure and Anonymous Cooperative Sensing Protocol for Cognitive Radio Networks

Spectrum is an essential resource for the provision of mobile services. In order to control and delimit its use, governmental agencies set up regulatory policies. Unfortunately, such policies have led to a deficiency of spectrum as only few frequency bands are left unlicensed, and these are used for the majority of new emerging wireless applications. One promising way to alleviate the spectrum shortage problem is adopting a spectrum sharing paradigm in which frequency bands are used opportunistically. Cognitive radio is the key technology to enable this shift of paradigm.Cognitive radio networks are self-organized systems in which devices cooperate to use those spectrum ranges that are not occupied by licensed users. They carry out spectrum sensing in order to detect vacant channels that can be used for communication. Even though spectrum sensing is an active area of research, an important issue remains unsolved: the secure authentication of sensing reports. Not providing security enables the input of false data in the system thus empowering false results. This paper presents a distributed protocol based on wireless physical layer security, symmetric cryptography and one-way functions that allows determining a final sensing decision from multiple sources in a quick and secure way, as well as it preserves users¿ privacy.

A Secure Cooperative Sensing Protocol for Cognitive Radio Networks

Cognitive radio networks sense spectrum occupancyand manage themselves to operate in unused bands without disturbing licensed users. Spectrum sensing is more accurate if jointly performed by several reliable nodes. Even though cooperative sensing is an active area of research, the secureauthentication of local sensing reports remains unsolved, thus empowering false results. This paper presents a distributed protocol based on digital signatures and hash functions, and ananalysis of its security features. The system allows determining a final sensing decision from multiple sources in a quick and secure way.

Hybrid turbo FEC/ARQ systems and distributed space-time coding for cooperative transmission

Cooperative transmission can be seen as a "virtual" MIMO system, where themultiple transmit antennas are in fact implemented distributed by the antennas both at the source and the relay terminal. Depending on the system design, diversity/multiplexing gainsare achievable. This design involves the definition of the type of retransmission (incrementalredundancy, repetition coding), the design of the distributed space-time codes, the errorcorrecting scheme, the operation of the relay (decode&forward or amplify&forward) and thenumber of antennas at each terminal. Proposed schemes are evaluated in different conditionsin combination with forward error correcting codes (FEC), both for linear and near-optimum(sphere decoder) receivers, for its possible implementation in downlink high speed packetservices of cellular networks. Results show the benefits of coded cooperation over directtransmission in terms of increased throughput. It is shown that multiplexing gains areobserved even if the mobile station features a single antenna, provided that cell wide reuse of the relay radio resource is possible.