34 resultados para Competitive Dialogue


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We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

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In this paper we propose a metaheuristic to solve a new version of the Maximum CaptureProblem. In the original MCP, market capture is obtained by lower traveling distances or lowertraveling time, in this new version not only the traveling time but also the waiting time willaffect the market share. This problem is hard to solve using standard optimization techniques.Metaheuristics are shown to offer accurate results within acceptable computing times.

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We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituencysets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity iscarried out by an external provider, and its realization is supervisedby a bureaucrat. While bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of theconstituency, they can decide to be corrupt and allow providers todeliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe.Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity levels weighingoff the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibilityfor the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impacton equilibrium corruption of the degree of decentralization of corruption.To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings:1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individualutility (competitive corruption); 2) An illegal syndicate oversee thecorruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way asto maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). Weshow that, since average corruption payoff is increasing in the activitylevels set by the constituency, and since the latter responds to highlevels of corruption by reducing required activity levels, in equilibriumthe illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total numberof corrupt transactions, so that corruption is lower when it is organizedthan when it is competitive.

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This paper presents a classical Cournot oligopoly model with some peculiar features: it is non--quasi--competitive as price under N-poly is greater than monopoly price; Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique with each new entry; the successive equilibria after new entries are stable under the adjustment mechanism that assumes that actual output of each seller is adjusted proportionally to the difference between actual output and profit maximizing output. Moreover, the model tends to perfect competition as N goes to infinity, reaching the monopoly price again.

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Most facility location decision models ignore the fact that for a facility to survive it needs a minimum demand level to cover costs. In this paper we present a decision model for a firm thatwishes to enter a spatial market where there are several competitors already located. This market is such that for each outlet there is a demand threshold level that has to be achievedin order to survive. The firm wishes to know where to locate itsoutlets so as to maximize its market share taking into account the threshold level. It may happen that due to this new entrance, some competitors will not be able to meet the threshold and therefore will disappear. A formulation is presented together with a heuristic solution method and computational experience.

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[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

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We consider the evaporation of periodic arrays of initially equal droplets in two-dimensional systems with open (absorbing) boundaries. Our study is based on the numerical solution of the Cahn-Hilliard equation. We show that due to cooperative effects the droplets which are further from the boundary may evaporate earlier than those in the boundary¿s vicinity. The time evolution of the overall amount of matter in the system is also studied.

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It is now well accepted that cellular responses to materials in a biological medium reflect greatly the adsorbed biomolecular layer, rather than the material itself. Here, we study by molecular dynamics simulations the competitive protein adsorption on a surface (Vroman effect), i.e. the non-monotonic behavior of the amount of protein adsorbed on a surface in contact with plasma as functions of contact time and plasma concentration. We find a complex behavior, with regimes during which small and large proteins are not necessarily competing between them, but are both competing with others in solution ("cooperative" adsorption). We show how the Vroman effect can be understood, controlled and inverted.

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[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

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We consider the evaporation of periodic arrays of initially equal droplets in two-dimensional systems with open (absorbing) boundaries. Our study is based on the numerical solution of the Cahn-Hilliard equation. We show that due to cooperative effects the droplets which are further from the boundary may evaporate earlier than those in the boundary¿s vicinity. The time evolution of the overall amount of matter in the system is also studied.

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This handbook describes the peer review methodology that was applied at the GODIAC project fi eld studies1. The peer review evaluation method as initiated by Otto Adang in the Netherlands and further developed in a European football context (Adang & Brown, 2008) involves experienced police offi cers cooperating with researchers to perform observational fi eld studies to identify good practices and learning points for public order management. The handbook builds on the GODIAC seminars and workshops, for the fi eld study members, which took place in September 2010, January 2012 and January 2013. The handbook has been discussed in the project group and in the steering committee. It is primarily written for the GODIAC fi eld study members as background material for understanding the fi eld study process and for clarifying the different responsibilities that enable active participation in the fi eld study. The handbook has been developed during the project period and incorporates learning points and developments of the peer review method. The handbook aims at promoting the use of fi eld studies for evaluation of policing major events.

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The volume is divided into two parts; the fi rst deals with issues related to the police, and the second addresses issues related to demonstrators and protesters. We hope that this volume will provide further insight into issues associated with policing at major events and shed light on the complexity of the organisations, motives, and strategies in play whenever protester groups are involved.

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This report summarises the fi eld study results of the project ’Good practice for dialogue and communication as strategic principles for policing political manifestations in Europe’ (GODIAC).1 The overall idea was to integrate operative police work, research and training within the fi eld and to build international and institutional networks, ensuring and recognising the responsibilities of the organisers. The purpose of the GODIAC project was to contribute to the development of a European approach to policing political manifestations.

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It is now well accepted that cellular responses to materials in a biological medium reflect greatly the adsorbed biomolecular layer, rather than the material itself. Here, we study by molecular dynamics simulations the competitive protein adsorption on a surface (Vroman effect), i.e. the non-monotonic behavior of the amount of protein adsorbed on a surface in contact with plasma as functions of contact time and plasma concentration. We find a complex behavior, with regimes during which small and large proteins are not necessarily competing between them, but are both competing with others in solution ("cooperative" adsorption). We show how the Vroman effect can be understood, controlled and inverted.