With a bang, not a whimper: Pricking Germany's "stock market bubble" in 1927 and the slide into depression

In May 1927, the German central bank intervenedindirectly to reduce lending to equity investors.The crash that followed ended the only stockmarket boom during Germany s relative stabilization 1924-28. This paper examines thefactors that lead to the intervention as well asits consequences. We argue that genuine concernabout the exuberant level of the stock market,in addition to worries about an inflow offoreign funds, tipped the scales in favour ofintervention. The evidence strongly suggeststhat the German central bank under HjalmarSchacht was wrong to be concerned aboutstockprices-there was no bubble. Also, theReichsbank was mistaken in its belief thata fall in the market would reduce theimportance of short-term foreign borrowing,and help to ease conditions in the money market.The misguided intervention had important realeffects. Investment suffered, helping to tipGermany into depression.

Betting on Hitler: The value of political connections in Nazi Germany

This paper examines the value of connections between German industry andthe Nazi movement in early 1933. Drawing on previously unused contemporarysources about management and supervisory board composition and stock returns,we find that one out of seven firms, and a large proportion of the biggest companies,had substantive links with the National Socialist German Workers Party. Firmssupporting the Nazi movement experienced unusually high returns, outperformingunconnected ones by 5% to 8% between January and March 1933. These resultsare not driven by sectoral composition and are robust to alternative estimatorsand definitions of affiliation.

Inflationary expectations during Germany's great slump

Was the German slump inevitable? This paper argues that -despite thespeed and depth of Germany's deflation in the early 1930s - fear ofinflation is evident in the bond, foreign exchange, and commodity marketsat certain critical junctures of the Great Depression. Therefore, policyoptions were more limited than many subsequent critics of Brüning'spolicies have been prepared to admit. Using a rational expectationsframework, we find strong evidence from the bondmarket to suggest fearof inflation. Futures prices also reveal that market participants werebetting on price increases. These findings are discussed in the contextof reparations and related to the need for a regime shift to overcomethe crisis.

El Comportament humà en situacions de crisi: resultats del projecte de recerca europeo BESECU

Les aportacions que es presenten en aquest llibre mostren els resultats de la investigació sobre el comportament humà en situacions d’emergència que s’ha dut a terme en el marc del projecte de recerca europeu BeSeCu. El projecte Be- SeCu —acrònim de Behaviour, Security and Culture (Comportament, Seguretat i Cultura)— forma part de la línia d’investigació i coneixement en matèria de seguretat del Setè Programa Marc de la Unió Europea. Concretament, el projecte es centra en una de les necessitats bàsiques establertes per la política europea en matèria de seguretat, com és la de conèixer en profunditat la realitat de les emergències a través de les persones que les han patit o dels professionals que hi treballen diàriament. Per assolir aquest objectiu, el projecte ha investigat les diferències i similituds del comportament humà en diferents situacions d’emergència i en diversos països europeus per tal de millorar els processos d’evacuació i protecció en aspectes com ara la comunicació, les indicacions i els procediments d’intervenció dels agents actuants. Les situacions d’emergències s’han investigat mitjançant dos actors clau, és a dir des de l’òptica de persones que han estat víctimes d’una situació d’emergència i des de l’òptica dels professionals dels serveis d’emergència. El grup principal d’estudi dels serveis d’emergència ha estat els cossos de bombers. La investigació del comportament humà, tant de víctimes com dels serveis d’emergència (cossos de bombers), s’ha centrat en cinc tipus diferents d’emergències: incendis d’habitatge, incendis en edificis públics, atemptats terroristes, terratrèmols i inundacions. El projecte estava format per un consorci d’institucions en què participaven un grup multidisciplinari de psicòlegs, sociòlegs, criminòlegs, enginyers i professionals de les emergències que treballen en escoles de bombers i policies, serveis d’emergència, centres de recerca i investigació i universitats de set països europeus: • Alemanya: Ernst-Moritz-Arndt Universität Greifswald, Department of Health and Prevention, Institute of Psychology (coordinació del projecte); • Alemanya: Hamburg Fire and Emergency Service Academy; • Espanya: Institut de Seguretat Pública de Catalunya, Unitat de Recerca de l’Escola de Policia i de l’Escola de Bombers; • Anglaterra: University of Greenwich, Fire Safety Engineering Group; • Itàlia: Università di Bologna, Gruppo di Ricerca in Psicologia dell’Emergenza; • República Txeca: Prague Psychiatric Centre; • Suècia: Man-Technology-Organisation; • Turquia: Association of Emergency Ambulance Physicians.

Against the mainstream: Nazi privatization in 1930s Germany

The Great Depression spurred State ownership in Western capitalist countries. Germany was no exception; the last governments of the Weimar Republic took over firms in diverse sectors. Later, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership and public services to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in the Western capitalist countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. Privatization in Nazi Germany was also unique in transferring to private hands the delivery f public services previously provided by government. The firms and the services transferred to private ownership belonged to diverse sectors. Privatization was part of an intentional policy with multiple objectives and was not ideologically driven. As in many recent privatizations, particularly within the European Union, strong financial restrictions were a central motivation. In addition, privatization was used as a political tool to enhance support for the government and for the Nazi Party.

Against the mainstream: Nazi privatization in 1930s Germany

The Great Depression spurred State ownership in Western capitalist countries. Germany was no exception; the last governments of the Weimar Republic took over firms in diverse sectors. Later, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership and public services to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in the Western capitalist countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. Privatization in Nazi Germany was also unique in transferring to private hands the delivery f public services previously provided by government. The firms and the services transferred to private ownership belonged to diverse sectors. Privatization was part of an intentional policy with multiple objectives and was not ideologically driven. As in many recent privatizations, particularly within the European Union, strong financial restrictions were a central motivation. In addition, privatization was used as a political tool to enhance support for the government and for the Nazi Party.

Application of European accounting standards to the public healthcare sector: a comparative study on the application of the European System of Accounts ESA-95 to healthcare centres in the United Kingdom, France and Germany

This report aims to analyse how European accounting standards (European System of Accounts ESA-95) are interpreted and applied to the public healthcare sector, from the standpoint of comparative law. Specifically, the study focuses on the application of ESA-95 to healthcare centres in the United Kingdom, France and Germany, with the aim of reaching useful conclusions for the Public Companies and Consortia (EPIC, for their initials in Catalan) in the Catalan Public Healthcare System.

Entre Catalunya i Polònia: Witold Gombrowicz i Gabriel Ferrater: correspondència inèdita (1965-1967)

En el present treball, he intentat respondre la pregunta sobre per què Gabriel Ferrater es va interessar tant per l’obra de Witold Gombrowicz. Segurament, havia conegut la seva literatura en una traducció francesa i més possible encara alemanya, ja que el traductor va estar treballant a Hamburg per l’editorial Rowohlt Verlag com a lector. Devia assabentar-se de l’èxit de les obres de Gombrowicz a França i Alemanya i potser va decidir que era l’hora d’introduir-lo al mercat espanyol. Com comenta Janet Rodney, en el correu electrònic adjunt als apèndixs del treball, potser Ferrater veia algunes semblances entre ell mateix i Gombrowicz. Tots dos tenien problemes per publicar la seva obra sencera als seus països d’origen i, tot i que Gombrowicz ja feia molt de temps que no vivia a Polònia, sempre havia conservat el desig de poder ser publicat, sense censura, al seu país natal. Potser també tots dos escriptors compartien el sentiment d’inferioritat de les seves cultures respecte les de l’Europa Occidental. Tots dos intentaven mostrar en la seva obra literària l’existència d’una realitat potser oculta però tan legítima com les altres, com la “realitat oficial” en la que havien de viure