El Sistema electoral a Austràlia: convivència en la complexitat democràtica

L’objectiu d’aquestes pàgines és descriure el desenvolupament del sistema electoral a Austràlia des de la perspectiva que comporta tant la seva complexitat com flexibilitat. Una complexitat a què s’ha acostumat el ciutadà australià fruit de la naturalesa federal del país. En comptes que les modificacions en les regles del joc democràtic facin perillar la credibilitat del poder polític, Austràlia sempre ha conservat una ferma evolució política a partir dels eixos de buscar la millor representació ciutadana. Aquesta diversitat i sofisticació constant no han portat a la ciutadania a una desinhibició de les regles democràtiques, sinó que s’ha combinat amb una participació electoral obligada dels ciutadans que els implica directament amb el seu sistema polític.

Cosa: arqueologia de un enclave comercial mediterráneo. Campaña de 2006

En el marco del proyecto “La ciutat romana de Cosa: arqueologia d’un enclau comercial mediterrani” , autorizado y apoyado por la Soprintendenza Archeologica por la Toscana, entre los dias 4 y 22 de septiembre de 2006 se ha realizado la segunda campaña de intervenciones arqueológicas en la ciudad romana de Cosa (Ansedonia, prov. Grosseto, Itàlia), colonia latina fundada en el 273 aC a unos 120 km. al norte de Roma. De acuerdo a los resultados obtenidos en la campanya del 2005 (localización/verificación de los límites precisos de la ínsula O-P/4-5 mediante la aplicación de técnicas de prospección geofísica completadas con la limpieza, registro y documentación arqueológica de las estructuras localizadas ) los trabajos del 2006 se han orientado hacia la identificación de la organización interna de la dicha ínsula tomando como referente el criptopórtico situado en el extremo N.E., el cual parece constituir el límite de una estructura singular (privada o pública ) estratégicamente ubicada en relación al fórum i a la Via Sacra. El trabajo de campo ha consistido en un intenso decapage con la finalidad de delimitar unidades de habitación complejas funcionalmente definidas y así la articulación existente entre ellas; en este sentido se ha podido documentar evidencias del espacio porticado superpuesto al criptopórtico así como, paralelamente a la calle 5 y en dirección a la Via Sacra, parte de habitaciones algunas de las cuales conservaban restos del pavimiento original, en un caso de mosaico. Paralelamente, se ha realizado el análisis en laboratorio de los materiales recuperados los cuales, aún procediendo de nivel superficial, empiezan a proporcionar datos sobre los diferentes momentos de ocupación de la zona, básicamente tardorepublicanos y augustales.

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

El largo ciclo electoral de Plataforma per Catalunya: del ámbito local a la implantación nacional (2003-2011)

El partido anti-inmigración Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC) ha experimentado un progresivo crecimiento en la franja temporal que va desde su primera participación electoral en 2003 hasta las municipales de 2011. En dicho periodo temporal ha pasado de ser una formación presente exclusivamente en el ámbito local, y con un apoyo fuertemente concentrado en ciertos municipios de Cataluña, a recibir votos y tener secciones locales consolidadas en gran parte del territorio catalán. El texto trata de ofrecer claves interpretativas para entender tanto los éxitos como las debilidades de PxC a lo largo del ciclo electoral 2003-2011. Partiendo de la base de que actualmente existe en España una demanda electoral suficiente para el éxito de una formación como PxC, este trabajo se centra en el análisis de la estrategia política y electoral desarrollada por el partido para aprovechar dicha demanda, y en su interacción con el contexto social y político de la Cataluña de la primera década del siglo XXI.

An Inquiry into the use of illegal electoral practices and effects of political violence

This article investigates whether vote-buying and the instigation of violence in the disputed 2007 Kenyan elections were strategically motivated, and whether those affected by electoral violence changed their views towards ethno-politics and the use of violence. To answer these questions, a panel survey conducted before and after the elections is combined with external indicators of electoral violence. We find that political parties targeted vote-buying towards specific groups to weaken the support of their political rivals and to mobilize their own supporters. Furthermore, parties instigated violence strategically in areas where they were less likely to win. Although the victims of violence would prefer that parties are no longer allowed to organize in ethnic or religious lines, they are more likely to identify in ethnic terms, support the use of violence and avoid relying on the police to resolve disputes. The overall findings suggest an increased risk of electoral-violence reoccurring.

Electoral competition through issue selection

Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters' true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with "better" policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their "historical issues" or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less.

Uncertainty, electoral Incentives and political myopia

In this paper, we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised facts and with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better ...scal discipline in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

La campaña institucional “rumanos en Europa”, como fenómeno integrador ante la inmigración en España e Italia

La inmigración rumana en España e Italia ha constituido un fenómeno único, tanto por su magnitud como por el corto espacio de tiempo en el que se ha producido. Sin embargo, existe una evidente percepción negativa de los españoles e italianos hacia los rumanos, que se debe en una medida considerable al discurso mediático. Dadas las situaciones, el Gobierno rumano llevó a cabo una campaña institucional, para corregir la imagen generalizada hacia los ciudadanos rumanos, que tuvo dos propósitos: la integración y la aceptación. El presente trabajo representa un proyecto de investigación de los efectos de dicha campaña entre los inmigrantes rumanos y las comunidades autóctonas de los dos países: Italia y España. El diseño de la investigación se centra en dos ciudades con un número elevado de inmigrantes rumanos, como son Barcelona y Milano. Se utiliza el análisis cualitativo, representado por los grupos de discusión, para indagar las opiniones, los sentimientos de afinidad, indiferencia o rechazo del público objeto hacia la campaña.

Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations. In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

Associationism and electoral participation: A multilevel study of 2000 Spanish general election

This work presents an application of the multilevel analysis techniques tothe study of the abstention in the 2000 Spanish general election. Theinterest of the study is both, substantive and methodological. From thesubstantive point of view the article intends to explain the causes ofabstention and analyze the impact of associationism on it. From themethodological point of view it is intended to analyze the interaction betweenindividual and context with a modelisation that takes into account thehierarchical structure of data. The multilevel study of this paper validatesthe one level results obtained in previous analysis of the abstention andshows that only a fraction of the differences in abstention are explained bythe individual characteristics of the electors. Another important fraction ofthese differences is due to the political and social characteristics of thecontext. Relating to associationism, the data suggest that individualparticipation in associations decrease the probability of abstention. However,better indicators are needed in order to catch more properly the effect ofassociationism in electoral behaviour.

An agenda-setting model of electoral competition

This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of thepublic agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition competein elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience toan issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal, alternative to the status-quo.Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters concerns and those with broadagreement on some alternative policy proposal. Each party expects a higher probabilityof victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in the voters decision. But remarkably,the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may notbe given salience during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survivein spite of its bad policy performance if there is no sufficiently broad agreement on apolicy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the model with the case of theUnited States presidential election in 2004.

It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.