Electoral competition through issue selection

Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters' true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with "better" policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their "historical issues" or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less.

Immigració i desafecció política a l'espai local: la instrumentalització política de la immigració a Catalunya i Gran Bretanya

El projecte ha tingut com a objectiu principal abordar la instrumentalització política de la immigració per part de partits polítics de nova extrema dreta. Aquest fenomen, que ha adquirit una gran rellevància a gran part dels països europeus, està adquirint una creixent rellevància en els casos britànic i català a partir de, entre altres coses, l'emergència electoral dels partits Plataforma per Catalunya i British National Party. En aquest sentit, el projecte ha tractat de desenvolupar una recerca que produís un conjunt de dades i coneixements que permetessin abordar de forma fonamentada un fenomen “nou” en el context català i que, fins al moment, ha rebut escassa atenció per part del món acadèmic. Dins d’aquest objectiu cal destacar el fet que la àmplia experiència de l’equip investigador britànic en l’anàlisi de la nova extrema dreta ha permès que els investigadors catalans poguessin desenvolupar la seva recerca recolzant-se i dialogant en la seva contrapart britànica. Els resultats de la recerca són certament novedosos i representaran una important contribució al coneixement d’aquest fenomen. Així, en el marc de la recerca s’han desenvolupat una sèrie d’entrevistes a membres i a votants de PxC, així com una enquesta a votants i una anàlisi agregada sobre el vot al partit. En aquest sentit, cal destacar que és la primera vegada que s’aconsegueixen aquest tipus de dades. Un fet que està fent, i farà, que la seva explotació i divulgació adquireixi una gran rellevància tant en el món acadèmic com en el de les administracions públiques. Finalment, convé ressaltar que el projecte també ha servit per consolidar la relació entre els equips d’investigació britànic i català i per impulsar la inserció de l’equip català en les xarxes europees d’investigació sobre aquesta matèria.

Contextual effects on political behavior

In her post-doctoral research stay, Aina Gallego has conducted several research projects with the overarching theme of identifying the effects of contexts on political behavior. She has examined the effects of institutions, the economic situation, or local contexts on outcomes such as voter turnout, vote choice, and positions on salient issues. As detailed below, this work has been published in several journal articles in leading Political Science journals such as Comparative Political Studies, Political Behavior, and Electoral Studies (see attached documents). She has a forthcoming book with Cambridge University Press, the most prestigious book press in Political Science.She has also published book chapters and has several working papers. In addition to conducting her research, Aina has received extensive training in both substantive areas and research methods. She has participated fully in the Department’s academic life by attending seminars and engaging in research projects with other members of the Department.

Corruption in representative democracy

A parliament with n members, distributed among two parties, decides whether to accept or reject a certain proposal. Each member of the parliament votes in favour or against. If there are at least t members in favour, the proposal is accepted; otherwise it is rejected. A non-member of the parliament, the briber, is interested in having the proposal accepted. To this end, he is willing to bribe members to induce them to vote in favour. It is compared a parliament with party discipline, where members vote according to the party line, and a parliament without party discipline, where members vote according to their own opinion. The paper determines, for given values of n and t , the average number of members that the briber has to bribe in each case (with the average taken with respect to all the possible allocations of members between parties and their votes, and also with respect to those allocations inducing the briber to bribe). The results show that a parliament with parties with party discipline is more costly for the briber to be bribed.

Predictors of political orientation among US-born Mexican Americans: cultural identification, acculturation attitudes and socioeconomic status

With each passing election, U.S. political campaigns have renewed their efforts in courting the “Latino vote,” yet the Latino population is not a culturally homogenous voting bloc. This study examined how cultural identifications and acculturation attitudes in U.S. born Mexican Americans interacted with socioeconomic status (SES) to predict political orientation. Individuals who held stronger Mexican identity and supported biculturalism as an acculturation strategy had a more liberal orientation, while belonging to a higher SES group and holding stronger assimilation attitudes predicted a less liberal orientation. Mexican cultural identification interacted with SES such that those who held a weaker Mexican identity, but came from a higher social class were less liberal and more moderate in their political orientation. Weak Mexican identification and higher SES also predicted weaker endorsement of bicultural acculturation attitudes, which in turn, mediated the differences in political orientation. The acceptance of one’s ethnic identity and endorsement of bicultural attitudes predicted a more liberal political orientation. In light of these findings, political candidates should be cautious in how they pander to Latino constituents—referencing the groups’ ethnic culture or customs may distance constituents who are not strongly identified with their ethnic culture.

Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations. In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England

We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by usingthe voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Memberswith more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom,which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information notavailable to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they mayexaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimalcommittee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, butneeds to manage career concerns.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

Voting after the bombing: Can terrorist attacks change the outcome of democratic elections?

Economists have recently turned their attention to the effects of terrorism. One much debated effect of terrorist attacks is its impact on the results of democratic elections. We use the electoral consequences of the terrorist attacks of the 11-M in Madrid to analyze this issue. We consider this particular experiment since the attack took place only three days before the 2004 Congressional Election, which allows the use of credible identification criteria. In particular, we use the advance voting by Spanish residents abroad, who cast their vote before the terrorist attack, to identify the effect of the bombing. We exploit this macabre natural experiment to run a difference-in-differences estimation using data on three consecutive Congressional elections. Our empirical results indicate that a terrorist attack can have a large impact on the outcome of democratic elections.

Catalan government popularity. An example of economic effects on sub-national government support

The aim of this essay is to deal with economic voting in contexts ofmultilevel governance and to be a contribution to the debate on attribution of responsibilities in popularity functions literature. We use aggregate and individual data from Catalonia in order to analyse the relation between the state of the economy and the support for a sub-state government. The empirical analysis shows that the responsibility hypothesis works in regional governments without explicit macroeconomic competencies. We have also considered the evaluations of government performance on certain specific policies in order to clarify and determine the factors that drive Catalan government support. The article considers the implications of the findings for future attempts to model party support in a context of the European Union.

Voting with preferences over margins of victory

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative.The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.

The survival of the welfare state

This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfectequilibria in a politico-economic model with repeated voting, whereagents vote over distortionary income redistribution. The key featureof the theory is that the future constituency of redistributive policiesdepends positively on the current level of redistribution, since thisaffects both private investments and the future distribution of voters.Agents vote rationally and fullly anticipate the effects of their politicalchoice on both private incentives and future voting outcomes. The modelfeatures multiple equilibria. In "pro-welfare" equilibria, both welfarestate policies and their effects on distribution persist forever. In"anti-welfare equilibria", even a majority of beneficiaries ofredistributive policies vote strategically so as to induce the formationof a future majority that will vote for zero redistribution.

Immigration and the survival of the welfare state

This paper analyzes the political sustainability of the welfare state in a model where immigration policy is also endogenous. In the model, the skills of the native population are affected by immigration and skill accumulation. Moreover, immigrants affect future policies, once they gain the right to vote. The main finding is that the long-run survival of redistributive policies is linked to an immigration policy specifying both skill and quantity restrictions. In particular, in steady state the unskilled majority admits a limited inflow of unskilled immigrants in order to offset growth in the fraction of skilled voters and maintain a high degree of income redistribution.Interestingly, equilibrium immigration policy shifts from unrestricted skilled immigration,when the country is skill-scarce, to restricted unskilled immigration, as the fraction of native skilled workers increases. The analysis also suggests a new set of variables that may help explain international differences in immigration restrictions.

Resistance to reform: Reconsidering the role of individual-specific uncertainty

Individual-specific uncertainty may increase the chances of reform beingenacted and sustained. Reform may be more likely to be enacted because amajority of agents might end up losing little from reform and a minoritygaining a lot. Under certainty, reform would therefore be rejected, butit may be enacted with uncertainty because those who end up losing believethat they might be among the winners. Reform may be more likely to besustained because, in a realistic setting, reform will increase theincentives of agents to move into those economic activities that benefit.Agents who respond to these incentives will vote to sustain reform infuture elections, even if they would have rejected reform under certainty.These points are made using the trade-model of Fernandez and Rodrik (AER,1991).