Intermediate asymptotics beyond homogeneity and self-similarity: long time behavior for [formula]

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Consumers' behavior and the Bertrand paradox: an ACE approach

We analyze the classical Bertrand model when consumers exhibit some strategic behavior in deciding from which seller they will buy. We use two related but different tools. Both consider a probabilistic learning (or evolutionary) mechanism, and in the two of them consumers' behavior in uences the competition between the sellers. The results obtained show that, in general, developing some sort of loyalty is a good strategy for the buyers as it works in their best interest. First, we consider a learning procedure described by a deterministic dynamic system and, using strong simplifying assumptions, we can produce a description of the process behavior. Second, we use nite automata to represent the strategies played by the agents and an adaptive process based on genetic algorithms to simulate the stochastic process of learning. By doing so we can relax some of the strong assumptions used in the rst approach and still obtain the same basic results. It is suggested that the limitations of the rst approach (analytical) provide a good motivation for the second approach (Agent-Based). Indeed, although both approaches address the same problem, the use of Agent-Based computational techniques allows us to relax hypothesis and overcome the limitations of the analytical approach.

The behavior of money velocity in low and high inflation countries

This paper presents a general equilibrium model of money demand where the velocity of money changes in response to endogenous fluctuations in the interest rate. The parameter space can be divided into two subsets: one where velocity is constant as in standard cash-in-advance models, and another one where velocity fluctuates as in Baumol (1952). The model provides an explanation of why, for a sample of 79 countries, the correlation between the velocity of money and the inflation rate appears to be low, unlike common wisdom would suggest. The reason is the diverse transaction technologies available in different economies.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.

On the choice of an exchange rate regime: target zones revisited

From the classical gold standard up to the current ERM2 arrangement of the European Union, target zones have been a widely used exchange regime in contemporary history. This paper presents a benchmark model that rationalizes the choice of target zones over the rest of regimes: the fixed rate, the free float and the managed float. It is shown that the monetary authority may gain efficiency by reducing volatility of both the exchange rate and the interest rate at the same time. Furthermore, the model is consistent with some known stylized facts in the empirical literature that previous models were not able to produce, namely, the positive relation between the exchange rate and the interest rate differential, the degree of non-linearity of the function linking the exchage rate to fundamentals and the shape of the exchange rate stochastic distribution.

Constrained school choice

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is clear evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston Mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures impede students to submit a preference list that contains all their acceptable schools. Therefore, any desirable property of the mechanisms is likely toget distorted. We study the non trivial preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number (quota) of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guaranteestability. This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston Mechanism which yields stable Nash equilibrium outcomes, independently of the quota. Hence, the transition to any of the two mechanisms is likely to come with a higher risk that students seek legal actionas lower priority students may occupy more preferred schools.

Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance

Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We then compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments. We also analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution.

Testing of stair climbing point-of-choice prompts in Barcelona at an outdoor set of stairs and scalators on the Montjuïc site

Regular stair climbing has well-documented health dividends, such as increased fitness and strength, weight loss and reduced body fat, improved lipid profiles and reduced risk of osteoporosis. The general absence of barriers to participation makes stair climbing an ideal physical activity (PA) for health promotion. Studies in the US and the UK have consistently shown that interventions to increase the accumulation of lifestyle PA by climbing stairs rather than using the escalators are effective. However, there are no previous in Catalonia. This project tested one message for their ability to prompt travelers on the Montjuïc site to choose the stairs rather than the escalator when climbing up the Monjuïc hill. One standard message, " Take the stairs! 7 minutes of stair climbing a day protects your heart" provided a comparison with previous research done in the UK. Translated into Catalan and Spanish, it was presented on a poster positioned at the point of choice between the stairs and the escalator. The study used a quasi-experimental, interrupted time series design. Travelers, during several and specific hours on two days of the week, were coded for stair or escalator use, gender, age, ethnic status, presence of accompanying children or bags by one observer. Overall, the intervention resulted in a 81% increase in stair climbing. In the follow-up period without messages, stair climbing dropped out to baseline levels. This preliminary study showed a significant effect on stair use. However, caution is needed since results are based on a small sample and, only a low percentage of the sample took the stairs at baseline or the intervention phase . Future research on stair use in Catalonia should focus on using bigger samples, different sites (metro stations, airports, shopping centers, etc) , different messages and techniques to promote stair climbing.

Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: an experimental study

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.

Frames and games

Decision-makers are sometimes influenced by the way in which choice situations are presented to them or "framed" This can be seen as an important challenge to the social sciences, since strong and pervasive framing effects would make it difficult to study human behavior in a synthetic or theoretic manner. We present results from experiments with dilemma games designed to shed light on the effects of several frame variations. We study, among others, the particular public bad frame used by Andreoni (1995) and two more naturalistic frames involving stories. Our results show that none of the frame manipulations have a significant effect on average behavior, but we do find some effects on extreme behavior. We also find that incentives do matter where frames do not matter.

Contractive probability metrics and asymptotic behavior of dissipative kinetic equations

The present notes are intended to present a detailed review of the existing results in dissipative kinetic theory which make use of the contraction properties of two main families of probability metrics: optimal mass transport and Fourier-based metrics. The first part of the notes is devoted to a self-consistent summary and presentation of the properties of both probability metrics, including new aspects on the relationships between them and other metrics of wide use in probability theory. These results are of independent interest with potential use in other contexts in Partial Differential Equations and Probability Theory. The second part of the notes makes a different presentation of the asymptotic behavior of Inelastic Maxwell Models than the one presented in the literature and it shows a new example of application: particle's bath heating. We show how starting from the contraction properties in probability metrics, one can deduce the existence, uniqueness and asymptotic stability in classical spaces. A global strategy with this aim is set up and applied in two dissipative models.

Freedom of choice as control over outcomes

As interactions between individuals are introduced into the freedom of choice literature by the mean of game forms, new issues appear. In particular, in this paper it is argued that individuals face uncertainty with respect to outcomes as they lose the control they implicitely exert over options in the opportunity set framework. A criterion is proposed as to compare alternative game forms in terms of the control they offer to individuals. The CardMin criterion suggests that any game form should be judged on the basis of the strategy offering the lowest number of pairwise different outcomes. An axiomatic characterization is provided in the case of two individuals.

The Spread of free-riding behavior in a social network

We study a model where agents, located in a social network, decide whether to exert effort or not in experimenting with a new technology (or acquiring a new skill, innovating, etc.). We assume that agents have strong incentives to free ride on their neighbors' effort decisions. In the static version of the model efforts are chosen simultaneously. In equilibrium, agents exerting effort are never connected with each other and all other agents are connected with at least one agent exerting effort. We propose a mean-field dynamics in which agents choose in each period the best response to the last period's decisions of their neighbors. We characterize the equilibrium of such a dynamics and show how the pattern of free riders in the network depends on properties of the connectivity distribution.

Constrained school choice: an experimental study

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools play an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.