Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank

We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidityneeds as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure(gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bankis insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking industry to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure ofone bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. Weanalyze the coordinating role of the Central Bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification ofthe Too-big-to-fail-policy.

Bank versus venture capital

Why do some start-up firms raise funds from banks andothers from venture capitalists? To answer this question,I develop a model of start-up financing when intellectualproperty rights are not well protected. The upside of VCfinancing is that the VC understands the business betterthan a bank. The downside, however, is that the VC maysteal the idea and use it himself. The results of themodel are consistent with empirical regularities onstart-up financing. The model implies that thecharacteristics of the firms financing from venturecapitalists are low-collateral, high-growth and high-profitability. The model also suggests that thetighter protection of intellectual property rightscontributes to the recent dramatic growth of the USventure capital industry.

Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility forbanking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated bythe Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macroand microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems areclassified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that theinflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries wherethe Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides,although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them,they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to moresophisticated liabilities as a funding source.The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries.We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulationand supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independentEuropean System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to theESCB.

Banking as an emerging technology: Hoare's Bank, 1702-1742

London s financial market underwent dramatic change after 1700. More limitedthan Paris or Amsterdam in the seventeenth century, London became the leadingfinancial centre in Europe in the eighteenth century. There is an extensive andgrowing literature on the causes of this change, but comparatively little on thechange itself. This article provides detailed information on the operation of theLondon financial market around 1700 by describing the operations of a nascentLondon bank.

Private borrowing during the financial revolution: Hoare’s Bank and its customers, 1702-1724

The financial revolution improved the British government s ability to borrow, andthus its ability to wage war. North andWeingast argued that it also permitted privateparties to borrow more cheaply and widely.We test these inferences with evidencefrom a London bank.We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the earlyeighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, thegovernment reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of privateclients that could be served profitably.

Post crisis challenges to bank regulation

The current crisis has swept aside not only the whole of the US investment banking industry butalso the consensual perception of banking risks, contagion and their implication for bankingregulation. As everyone agrees now, risks where mispriced, they accumulated in neuralgic pointsof the financial system, and where amplified by procyclical regulation as well as by the instabilityand fragility of financial institutions.The use of ratings as carved in stone and lack of adequate procedure to swiftly deal withsystemic institutions bankruptcy (whether too-big-to-fail, too complex to fail or too-many to fail).The current paper will not deal with the description and analysis of the crisis, already covered inother contributions to this issue will address the critical choice regulatory authorities will face. Inthe future regulation has to change, but it is not clear that it will change in the right direction. Thismay occur if regulatory authorities, possibly influenced by public opinion and political pressure,adopt an incorrect view of financial crisis prevention and management. Indeed, there are twoapproaches to post-crisis regulation. One is the rare event approach, whereby financial crises willoccur infrequently, but are inescapable.

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.

The geophysical electromagnetic prospecting in the spatial location of the travertine deposits of the Banyoles Depression (Girona)

The results of the application of the geophysical electromagnetic prospection methods in the resolution of the problems of the spatial location of the travertine quaternary formations of the Banyoles depression are presented

Mid Holocene in Sant Julià de Boada (Baix Empordà, Girona): Stratigraphical sequence and paleoenvironmental records of the paludal deposits

Descripció de la seqüència estratigràfica i dels registres paleoambientals dels sediments holocens de Sant Julià de Boada

Is bank debt special for the transmission of monetary policy? Evidence from the stock market

We combine existing balance sheet and stock market data with two new datasets to studywhether, how much, and why bank lending to firms matters for the transmission of monetarypolicy. The first new dataset enables us to quantify the bank dependence of firms precisely,as the ratio of bank debt to total assets. We show that a two standard deviation increase inthe bank dependence of a firm makes its stock price about 25% more responsive to monetarypolicy shocks. We explore the channels through which this effect occurs, and find that thestock prices of bank-dependent firms that borrow from financially weaker banks display astronger sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with the banklending channel, a theory according to which the strength of bank balance sheets mattersfor monetary policy transmission. We construct a new database of hedging activities andshow that the stock prices of bank-dependent firms that hedge against interest rate riskdisplay a lower sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with aninterest rate pass-through channel that operates via the direct transmission of policy ratesto lending rates associated with the widespread use of floating-rates in bank loans and creditline agreements.

The Hercynian ore deposits from the Catalonian Coastal Ranges

Many mineralizations, showings and geochemical anomalies have been found in the Hercynian of the Catalonian Coastal Ranges during the last ten years. Many of them are enclosed in the Paleozoic sediments and volcanics and display pre-metamorphic syngenetic characteristics. The lower carboniferous manganese and base meta1 deposits appear to be formed from hydrothermal fluids springing up in the sea floor through active fractures controlling the filling of the basins in a extensional geotectonic setting. Although less evidence and more controversy is available, similar ore forming processes could have taken place in older Paleozoic times. The deformation and metamorphism have not played an important remobilization role, and most epigenetic deposits of Hercynian age are related to the hydrothermal cells induced by the post-metamorphic granitic intrusives.

Magnetostratigraphy of the Miocene continental deposits of the Montes de Castejón (central Ebro basin, Spain): geochronological and paleoenvironmental implications

A detailed magnetostratigraphic study has been carried out in the early to middle Miocene distal alluvial and lacustrine sediments of the Montes de Castejón (central Ebro Basin). The study was based on the analysis of 196 magnetostratigraphic sites sampled along a stratigraphic interval of about 240 meters. Local magnetostratigraphy yielded a sequence of 12 magnetozones (6 normal and 6 reverse) which could be correlated with the Geomagnetic Polarity Time Scale (GPTS) interval C5Cr to C5AD (between 17 and 14.3 Ma.). The sampled sedimentary sequences include the boundary between two tectosedimentary units (TSU, T5 and T6) already defined in the Ebro Basin. The magnetostratigraphy of the Montes de Castejón allows to date the T5/T6 TSU boundary at 16.14 Ma, within chron C5Cn.1n. This magnetostratigraphy also allows us to analyse in detail as well as to discuss the variations in sedimentation rates through space and time between different lacustrine environments: Outer carbonate lacustrine fringes and distal alluvial plains (Montes de Castejón sections) show higher sedimentation rates than offshore lacustrine areas (San Caprasio section, 50 km east of Montes de Castejón).

An inventory of the marine and transitional Middle/Upper Eocene deposits of the Southeastern Pyrenean Foreland Basin (NE Spain)

In the southeastern Ebro Foreland Basin, the marine deposits of Lutetian and Bartonian age show excellent outcrop conditions, with a great lateral and horizontal continuity of lithostratigraphic units. In addition, the rich fossil record -mainly larger foraminifers-, provides biostratigraphic data of regional relevance for the whole Paleogene Pyrenean Basin, that can be used for the Middle Eocene biocorrelation of the western Tethys. This contribution is a sedimentary and biostratigraphic synthesis of the basic outcrops and sections of the Lutetian andBartonian marine and transitional deposits in the southeastern sector of the Ebro Foreland Basin.

An inventory of the marine and transitional Middle/Upper Eocene deposits of the Southeastern Pyrenean Foreland Basin (NE Spain)

In the southeastern Ebro Foreland Basin, the marine deposits of Lutetian and Bartonian age show excellent outcrop conditions, with a great lateral and horizontal continuity of lithostratigraphic units. In addition, the rich fossil record -mainly larger foraminifers-, provides biostratigraphic data of regional relevance for the whole Paleogene Pyrenean Basin, that can be used for the Middle Eocene biocorrelation of the western Tethys. This contribution is a sedimentary and biostratigraphic synthesis of the basic outcrops and sections of the Lutetian andBartonian marine and transitional deposits in the southeastern sector of the Ebro Foreland Basin.

The Conservativeness of the Central Bank when Institutional Quality is Poor

We propose an extension of Alesina and Tabellini 's model (1987) to include corruption, which is understood as the presence of weak institutions collecting revenue through formal tax channels. This paper analyses how conservative should an independent central bank be when the institutional quality is poor. When there are no political distortions, we show that the central bank has to be more conservative than the government, except with complete corruption. In this particular case, the central bank should be as conservative as the government. Further, we obtain that the relationship between the optimal relative degree of conservativeness of the central bank and the degree of corruption is affected by supply shocks. Concretely, when these shocks are not important, the central bank should be less conservative if the degree of corruption increases. However, this result may not hold when the shocks are relevant. JEL classi fication: D6, D73, E52, E58, E62, E63. Keywords: Central Bank Conservativeness; Corruption; Fiscal Policy; Monetary Policy; Seigniorage.