Asymmetric effects of monetary policy in the US: Positive vs. negative or big vs. small?

This paper reconsiders the empirical evidence on the asymmetricoutput effects of monetary policy. Asymmetric effects is a common feature ofmany theoretical models, and there are many different versions of suchasymmetries. We concentrate on the distinctions between positive andnegative money-supply changes, big and small changes in money-supply, andpossible combinations of the two asymmetries. Earlier research has foundempirical evidence in favor of the former of these in US data. Using M1 asthe monetary variable we find evidence in favor of neutrality of big shocksand non-neutrality of small shocks. The results may, however, be affected bystructual instability of M1 demand. Thus, we substitute M1 with the federalfunds rate. In these data we find that only small negative shocks affectreal aggregate activity. The results are interpreted in terms of menu-costmodels.

Full insurance, asymmetric information and genetic testing

This paper extends previous resuls on optimal insurance trading in the presence of a stock market that allows continuous asset trading and substantial personal heterogeneity, and applies those results in a context of asymmetric informationwith references to the role of genetic testing in insurance markets.We find a novel and surprising result under symmetric information:agents may optimally prefer to purchase full insurance despitethe presence of unfairly priced insurance contracts, and other assets which are correlated with insurance.Asymmetric information has a Hirschleifer-type effect whichcan be solved by suspending insurance trading. Nevertheless,agents can attain their first best allocations, which suggeststhat the practice of restricting insurance not to be contingenton genetic tests can be efficient.

Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information

When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an importantinstrument in the development of an optimal R&D policy. Theregulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant informationto regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there existappropriability problems between the firms is one such variable thatis private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopolysetting we analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policywhere the government can either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sumsubsidies to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy withoutsubsidies will either block some welfare improving RJVs or allow somewelfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies, the second-best policytrades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasingRJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones.

Fiscal decentralization in Spain: An asymmetric transition to democracy

Asymmetric fiscal decentralization, by which we mean different fiscal arrangements between the central government and different groups of, or individual, lower-level governments, may be justified from an economic efficiency perspective. As argued by Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972) and others, a decentralized system of regional and local governments is better able to accommodate differences in tastes for public goods and services. This efficiency argument calls for decentralization of fiscal authority to regional and local governments, but not necessarily asymmetric decentralization. However, when the differences in tastes for public goods and services arise out of differences in history, culture and language across regions of a country, asymmetric treatment may be justified. History, culture and language may influence how a group of people (a region) views autonomy, independence and fiscal authority. Some regions may have had experience with autonomous government in the past, they may have a culture that is strongly reliant upon (or leery of) the central government, or they may be fearful of losing their separate languages if they do not have special arrangements. To accommodate differences in taste for independence, autonomy, and fiscal authority, it may be necessary to have different fiscal arrangements between the central government and the different regions comprising the country.

Failure to collude in the presence of asymmetric information

In this paper, we design the optimal contract when two agents can collude under asymmetric information. They have correlated types, produce complementary inputs and are protected by limited liability. Therefore, a joint manipulation of reports allows them to internalize informational and productive externalities. We show that by taking advantage of the transaction costs created by asymmetric information, even though they collude, the principal can achieve the outcome without collusion regardless of the sign and the degree of correlation. In particular, the principal can implement a non-monotonic quantity schedule in a collusion-proof way while this is impossible if collusion occurs under complete information.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

Specialisation in Europe and asymmetric shocks: potential risks of EMU

Most optimistic views, based on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) literature, have concluded that the probability of asymmetric shocks to occur at anational level will tend to diminish in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)as a result of the intensification of the integration process during the most recent years. Therefore, since Economic Geography Theories predict a higherspecialisation of regions, it is expected that asymmetric shocks will increase.Previous studies have examined to what extent asymmetric shocks have been relevant in the past using, mainly, static measures of asymmetries such as the correlation coefficients between series of shocks previously calculated from astructural VAR model (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992).In this paper, we study the evolution of manufacturing specific asymmetries in Europe from a dynamic point of view (applying the modelproposed by Haldane and Hall, 1991) in order to obtain new evidence about potential risks of EMU.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Specialisation in Europe and asymmetric shocks: potential risks of EMU

Most optimistic views, based on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) literature, have concluded that the probability of asymmetric shocks to occur at anational level will tend to diminish in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)as a result of the intensification of the integration process during the most recent years. Therefore, since Economic Geography Theories predict a higherspecialisation of regions, it is expected that asymmetric shocks will increase.Previous studies have examined to what extent asymmetric shocks have been relevant in the past using, mainly, static measures of asymmetries such as the correlation coefficients between series of shocks previously calculated from astructural VAR model (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992).In this paper, we study the evolution of manufacturing specific asymmetries in Europe from a dynamic point of view (applying the modelproposed by Haldane and Hall, 1991) in order to obtain new evidence about potential risks of EMU.

Correlations in hot asymmetric nuclear matter

Bulk and single-particle properties of hot hyperonic matter are studied within the Brueckner-Hartree-Fock approximation extended to finite temperature. The bare interaction in the nucleon sector is the Argonne V18 potential supplemented with an effective three-body force to reproduce the saturating properties of nuclear matter. The modern Nijmegen NSC97e potential is employed for the hyperon-nucleon and hyperon-hyperon interactions. The effect of temperature on the in-medium effective interaction is found to be, in general, very small and the single-particle potentials differ by at most 25% for temperatures in the range from 0 to 60 MeV. The bulk properties of infinite matter of baryons, either nuclear isospin symmetric or a Beta-stable composition that includes a nonzero fraction of hyperons, are obtained. It is found that the presence of hyperons can modify the thermodynamical properties of the system in a non-negligible way.

Sum rules and correlations in asymmetric nuclear matter

The neutron and proton single-particle spectral functions in asymmetric nuclear matter fulfill energy-weighted sum rules. The validity of these sum rules within the self-consistent Green's function approach is investigated. The various contributions to these sum rules and their convergence as a function of energy provide information about correlations induced by the realistic interaction between the nucleons. The study of the sum rules in asymmetric nuclear matter exhibits the isospin dependence of the nucleon-nucleon correlations.

Asymmetric reversal in inhomogeneous magnetic heterostructures

Asymmetric magnetization reversal is an unusual phenomenon in antiferromagnet/ferromagnet (AF/FM) exchange biased bilayers. We investigated this phenomenon in a simple model system experimentally and by simulation assuming inhomogeneously distributed interfacial AF moments. The results suggest that the observed asymmetry originates from the intrinsic broken symmetry of the system, which results in local incomplete domain walls parallel to the interface in reversal to negative saturation of the FM. The magneto-optical Kerr effect unambiguously confirms such an asymmetric reversal and a depth-dependent FM domain wall in accord with the magnetometry and simulations.

Asymmetric Little spin-Glass model

We study the static properties of the Little model with asymmetric couplings. We show that the thermodynamics of this model coincides with that of the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model, and we compute the main finite-size corrections to the difference of the free energy between these two models and to some clarifying order parameters. Our results agree with numerical simulations. Numerical results are presented for the symmetric Little model, which show that the same conclusions are also valid in this case.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Backflow-induced asymmetric collapse of disclination lines in liquid crystals

We present experiments where opposed pairs of planar parallel disclination lines of topological strength s=±1 move due to their mutual attraction. Our measurements show that their motion is clearly asymmetric, with +1 defects moving up to twice as fast as -1 ones. This is a clear indication of backflow, given the intrinsic isotropic elasticity of our system. A phenomenological model is able to account for the experimental observations by renormalizing the orientational diffusivity estimated from the velocity of each defect.