Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and Growth

This paper studies the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). The paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). The conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship. The paper further develops an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility (namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial depth and fragility in classic panel growth regressions.

Financial development, financial fragility and growth

This paper studies the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). The paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). The conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship. The paper further develops an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility(namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial depth and fragility in classic panel growth regressions.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages ofeconomic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

Financial integration, productivity and capital accumulation

Understanding the mechanism through which financial globalization affect economic performance is crucial for evaluating the costs and benefits of opening financial markets. This paper is a first attempt at disentangling the effects of financial integration on the two main determinants of economic performance: productivity (TFP)and investments. I provide empirical evidence from a sample of 93 countries observed between 1975 and 1999. The results suggest that financial integration has a positive direct effect on productivity, while it spurs capital accumulation only with some delay and indirectly, since capital follows the rise in productivity. I control for indirect effects of financial globalization through banking crises. Such episodes depress both investments and TFP, though they are triggered by financial integration only to a minor extent. The paper also provides a discussion of a simple model on the effects of financial integration, and shows additional empirical evidence supporting it.

Fiscal policy and interest rates: the role of financial and economic integration

It is commonly believed that a fiscal expansion raises interest rates. However, these crowding out effects of deficits have been found to be small or non-existent. One explanation is that financial integration offsets interest rate differentials on globalised bond markets. This paper measures the degree of integration of government bond markets, using spatial modelling techniques to take this spillover on financial markets into account. Our main finding is that the crowding out effect on domestic interest rates is significant, but is reduced by spillover across borders. This spillover is important in major crises or in periods of coordinated policy actions. This result is generally robust to various measures of cross-country linkages. We find spillover to be much stronger among EU countries.

Financial development, labor and market regulations and growth

This paper investigates the importance that market regulation and financial imperfections have on firm growth. We analyse institutions af- fecting labor market as Employment Protection Laws (EP) and Product Market Regulation (PM). We show that together with the beneficial effects of financial development, a firm will get less financing, and thus investless, in a weak financial market (finance effect), the strictness of product and labor market regulations also affect firm growth (labor effect). In particular, we show that the stricter the rules the more detrimental the influence on growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. We also show that the labor effect overcomes the positive finance effect.

Governance mechanisms in Spanish financial intermediaries

This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.

Are one factor logarithmic volatility models useful to fit the features of financial data? An application to microsoft data.

This paper provides empirical evidence that continuous time models with one factor of volatility, in some conditions, are able to fit the main characteristics of financial data. It also reports the importance of the feedback factor in capturing the strong volatility clustering of data, caused by a possible change in the pattern of volatility in the last part of the sample. We use the Efficient Method of Moments (EMM) by Gallant and Tauchen (1996) to estimate logarithmic models with one and two stochastic volatility factors (with and without feedback) and to select among them.

Financial intermediation in a model of growth through creative destruction

This paper presents an endogenous growth model in which the research activity is financed by intermediaries that are able to reduce the incidence of researcher's moral hazard. It is shown that financial activity is growth promoting because it increases research productivity. It is also found that a subsidy to the financial sector may have larger growth effects than a direct subsidy to research. Moreover, due to the presence of moral hazard, increasing the subsidy rate to R\&D may reduce the growth rate. I show that there exists a negative relation between the financing of innovation and the process of capital accumulation. Concerning welfare, the presence of two externalities of opposite sign steaming from financial activity may cause that the no-tax equilibrium provides an inefficient level of financial services. Thus, policies oriented to balance the effects of the two externalities will be welfare improving.

Financial incentives in academia: research versus development

This paper investigates the effects of monetary rewards on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable to obtain innovative ideas. We analyse how the legal environment affects the allocation of researcher's time between research and development. Although technology transfer objectives reduce the time spent in research, they might also induce researchers to conduct research that is more basic in nature, contrary to what the skewing problem would presage. We also show that our results hold even if development delays publication.

A nonlinear threshold model for the dependence of extremes of stationary sequences

One of the main implications of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is that expected future returns on financial assets are not predictable if investors are risk neutral. In this paper we argue that financial time series offer more information than that this hypothesis seems to supply. In particular we postulate that runs of very large returns can be predictable for small time periods. In order to prove this we propose a TAR(3,1)-GARCH(1,1) model that is able to describe two different types of extreme events: a first type generated by large uncertainty regimes where runs of extremes are not predictable and a second type where extremes come from isolated dread/joy events. This model is new in the literature in nonlinear processes. Its novelty resides on two features of the model that make it different from previous TAR methodologies. The regimes are motivated by the occurrence of extreme values and the threshold variable is defined by the shock affecting the process in the preceding period. In this way this model is able to uncover dependence and clustering of extremes in high as well as in low volatility periods. This model is tested with data from General Motors stocks prices corresponding to two crises that had a substantial impact in financial markets worldwide; the Black Monday of October 1987 and September 11th, 2001. By analyzing the periods around these crises we find evidence of statistical significance of our model and thereby of predictability of extremes for September 11th but not for Black Monday. These findings support the hypotheses of a big negative event producing runs of negative returns in the first case, and of the burst of a worldwide stock market bubble in the second example. JEL classification: C12; C15; C22; C51 Keywords and Phrases: asymmetries, crises, extreme values, hypothesis testing, leverage effect, nonlinearities, threshold models

Private Governance of Financial Markets: the US Regulatory Regime on Hedge Funds

The article investigates the private governance of financial markets by looking at the evolution of the regulatory debate on hedge funds in the US market. It starts from the premise that the privatization of regulation is always the result of a political decision and analyzes how this decision came about and was implemented in the case of hedge funds. The starting point is the failure of two initiatives on hedge funds that US regulators launched between 1999 an 2004, which the analysis explains by elaborating the concept of self-capture. Facing a trade off between the need to tackle publicly demonized issues and the difficulty of monitoring increasingly sophisticated and powerful private markets, regulators purposefully designed initiatives that were not meant to succeed, that is, they “self-captured” their own activity. By formulating initiatives that were inherently flawed, regulators saved their public role and at the same time paved the way for the privatization of hedge fund regulation. This explanation identifies a link between the failure of public initiatives and the success of private ones. It illustrates a specific case of formation of private authority in financial markets that points to a more general practice emerging in the regulation of finance.

Small firms, growth and financial constraints

This paper analyses the impact of different sources of finance on the growth of firms. Using panel data from Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 2000-2006, we investigate the effects of internal and external finances on firm growth. In particular, we examine three dimensions of these financial sources: a) the performance of the firms’ capital structure in accordance with firm size; b) the effects of internal and external financial sources on growth performance; c) the combined effect of equity, external debt and cash flow on firm growth. We find that low-growth firms are sensitive to cash flow and short-term bank debt, while high-growth firms are more sensitive to long-term debt. Furthermore, equity capital seems to reduce barriers to external finance. Our main conclusion is that during the start-up phase, firms are unable to increase their financial leverage and so their capital structure fails to promote correct investment strategies. However, as their equity capital increases, alternative financial mechanisms, in particular long-term debt, become available, which have a positive impact on firm growth.

La crisi sub-prime i el crack de 1929: Comparació d'episodis d'eufòria financera

Treball de recerca realitzat per un alumne d'ensenyament secundari i guardonat amb un Premi CIRIT per fomentar l'esperit científic del Jovent l'any 2009. La present investigació té per objecte d’estudi la relació, atès el període de turbulències econòmiques que travessa el món globalitzat, entre els episodis d’eufòria financera i les crisi financeres i econòmiques, i la periodicitat amb les que aquestes es produeixen. Aquesta pretén confrontar-se des d’una aproximació històric-econòmica, mitjançant l’anàlisi i la comparació de dos successos -el crack borsari de 1929 i la crisi sub-prime- per tal de demostrar la existència de comuns denominadors, i, a la llum dels resultats, apreciar les conclusions que aporta la Història. Serà, doncs, aquesta periodicitat i les seves implicacions la qual s'ambicionarà contrastar amb la realitat mitjançant l'aplicació i l'anàlisi pràctica de dos episodis rellevants i paradigmàtics, amb el recolzament i l'autoritat del model comparatiu establerts per l'economista John Kenneth Galbraith al seu llibre ''Breve historia de la euforia financiera''.