96 resultados para Arte e moral
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Proyecto que recoge el estado del arte de los gestores de ventanas de GNU/Linux, incorporando un análisis y comparativa de los principales gestores de ventanas.
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Aquest treball s'enquadra en l'àmbit del que s'anomena bioètica animal i es desenvolupa al voltant de la consideració moral dels animals no humans a partir d'un tractament interdisciplinari que implica l'encontre de disciplines tan diverses com filosofia, història, psicologia o estudis de gènere, entre d'altres.
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Aquest document és un esborrany. Amb l'objectiu d'aprofundir en el procés d'institucionalització, vam dissenyar una investigació empírica que permetés visualitzar les tendències discursives i àmbits d'activitats de les pràctiques relacionades amb les interseccions entre l'art, la ciència i la tecnologia. La metodologia va consistir en la implementació de tres bases de dades que recullen l'activitat dels últims anys en relació a: 1) els congressos (i festivals associats) realitzats a nivell internacional 2) les publicacions acadèmiques i divulgatives centrades en aquest àmbit interdisciplinar 3) els programes acadèmics.
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Este trabajo tiene por objeto el estudio de las relaciones entre arte y política en el contexto del capitalismo neoliberal. Propone una lectura e interpretación de las tesis estético-políticas de Jacques Rancière incidiendo en dos ejes fundamentales de las mismas. De un lado, la elaboración de su concepto de política, planteado como un desacuerdo respecto a la hegemonía contemporánea del pensamiento neoliberal. Del otro, el modo en que su razonamiento se sostiene sobre una original reflexión estética, la cual desemboca en unaredefinición de las prácticas artísticas como medios eficaces de intervención política en la realidad. Es importante subrayar que esta investigación no se limita a una simple paráfrasis del pensamiento del filósofo francés. Así, sus ideas serán puestas en diálogo con lasaportaciones de otros autores y disciplinas y, sobre todo, se ensayará su pertinencia en el análisis de un caso concreto de estudio: el proyecto Megafone.net del artista catalán Antoni Abad, tomado como un ejemplo terminado del concepto de “arte político” elaborado por Rancière.
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El disseny i la implementació d'un prototip de display interactiu perifèric per a la cerca divergent de relacions conceptuals entre obres (films).
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Catholicism has built up a legalistic religion based on two pillars: salvation by works and 'auricular' confession of sins to a priest with judicial functions. Since the Reformation, many consider auricular confession inferior to less institutional and more individual conceptions of faith. This article analyzes how all these historical solutions trade off specialization advantages against exchange costs to produce moral enforcement. After showing the behavioral foundations of confession and the adaptiveness of its historical evolution, it tests hypotheses on its efficacy, exploitation and opportunity cost. Econometric evidence supports the efficacy but not the exploitative character of Catholic confession. It also explains its secular decline as a consequence of two factors. First, the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly. Second, the productivity gap suffered by confession, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.
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In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime and show thatlaw enforcement has different roles depending on the equilibrium characterization and the value of social norms. When an economy has a unique stable equilibrium where a fraction of the population is productive and the remaining predates, the government can choose an optimal law enforcement policy to maximize a welfare function evaluated at the steady state. If such steady state is not unique, law enforcement is still relevant but in a completely different way because the steady state that prevails depends on the initial proportions of productive and predator individuals in the economy. The relative importance of these proportions can be changed through law enforcement policy.
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Recent research on the dynamics of moral behavior has documented two contrastingphenomena - moral consistency and moral balancing. Moral balancing refers to thephenomenon whereby behaving (un)ethically decreases the likelihood of doing so againat a later time. Moral consistency describes the opposite pattern - engaging in(un)ethical behavior increases the likelihood of doing so later on. Three studies supportthe hypothesis that individuals' ethical mindset (i.e., outcome-based versus rule-based)moderates the impact of an initial (un)ethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethicallyin a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mindset facilitates moralbalancing and a rule-based mindset facilitates moral consistency.
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Moral codes are produced and enforced by more or less specialized means and are subject to standard economic forces. This paper argues that the intermediary role played by the Catholic Church between God and Christians, a key difference from Protestantism, faces the standard trade-off of specialization benefits and agency costs. It applies this trade-off hypothesis to confession of sins to priests, an institution that epitomizes such intermediation, showing that this hypothesis fits cognitive, historical and econometric evidence better than a simpler rent-seeking story. In particular, Catholics who confess more often are observed to comply more with the moral code; however, no relationship is observed between mass attendance and moral compliance. The data also links the current decline in confession to the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly, and to the productivity gap suffered by confession services, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.
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We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.
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This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).
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We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.
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In this paper, I analyze the ownership dynamics of N strategic risk-averse corporate insiders facing a moral hazard problem. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider stake is obtained in two cases: when agents can crediblycommit to an optimal ownership policy and when they cannot commit (time-consistent case). Inthe latter case, the aggregate stake gradually adjusts towards the competitive allocation. The speed of adjustment increases with N when outside investors are risk-averse, and does not depend on it when investors are risk-neutral. Predictions of the model are consistent with recent empirical findings.
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[cat] El problema de la consideració de qualsevol interès com a usura i les formes per a evitar la condemna eclesiàstica foren uns dels principals temes econòmics i morals de l’Europa tradicional. Aquest paper mostra els orígens i fonaments de la doctrina eclesiàstica sobre la usura, l’aparición dels instruments comercials i financers que evitaven la condemna de l’església i les excepcions i noves doctrines que consideraven lícit el benefici procedent del préstec.