Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives

The 1998 Spanish reform of the Personal Income Tax eliminated the 15% deduction for private medical expenditures including payments on private health insurance (PHI) policies. To avoid an undesirable increase in the demand for publicly funded health care, tax incentives to buy PHI were not completely removed but basically shifted from individual to group employer-paid policies. In a unique fiscal experiment, at the same time that the tax relief for individually purchased policies was abolished, the government provided for tax allowances on policies taken out through employment. Using a bivariate probit model on data from National Health Surveys, we estimate the impact of said reform on the demand for PHI and the changes occurred within it. Our findings suggest that the total probability of buying PHI was not significantly affected. Indeed, the fall in the demand for individual policies (by 10% between 1997 and 2001) was offset by an increase in the demand for group employer-paid ones, so that the overall size of the market remained virtually unchanged. We also briefly discuss the welfare effects on the state budget, the industry and society at large.

Redistributive taxation, public expenditure, and size of governent

We introduce a model of redistributive income taxation and public expenditure. This joint treatment permits analyzing the interdependencies between the two policies: one cannot be chosen independently of the other. Empirical evidence reveals that partisan confrontation essentially falls on expenditure policies rather than on income taxation. We examine the case in which the expenditure policy (or the size of government) is chosen by majority voting and income taxation is consistently adjusted. This adjustment consists of designing the income tax schedule that, given the expenditure policy, achieves consensus among the population. The model determines the consensus in- come tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure and the size of government. The main results are that inequality is negatively related to the size of government and to the pro-rich bias in public expenditure, and positively or negatively related to the marginal income tax, depending on substitutability between government supplied and market goods. These implications are validated using OECD data.

Toward partial reorientation of land management for sustainability in view of material circulation: biophysical and historical analysis

This paper explores two major issues, from biophysical and historical viewpoints. We examine land management, which we define as the long-term fertility maintenance of land in relation to agriculture, fishery and forestry. We also explore humans’ positive role as agents aiming to reinforce harmonious materials circulation within the land. Liebig’s view on nature, agriculture and land, emphasizes the maintenance of long-term land fertility based on his agronomical thought that the circulation of matter in agricultural fields must be maintained with manure as much as possible. The thoughts of several classical economists, on nature, agriculture and land are reassessed from Liebig’s view point. Then, the land management problem is discussed at a much more fundamental level, to understand the necessary conditions for life in relation to land management. This point is analyzed in terms of two mechanisms: entropy disposal on the earth, and material circulation against gravitational field. Finally from the historical example of the metropolis of Edo, it is shown that there is yet another necessary condition for the sustainable management of land based on the creation of harmonious material cycles among cities, farm land, forests and surrounding sea areas in which humans play a vital role as agent.

The size of the underground economy in Germany: A correction of the record and new evidence from the Modified-Cash-deposit-Ratio approach

Based on the Ahumada et al. (2007, Review of Income and Wealth) critique we revise existing estimates of the size of the German underground economy. Among other things, it turns out that most of these estimates are untenable and that the tax pressure induced size of the German underground economy may be much lower than previously thought. To this extent, German policy and law makers have been misguided during the last three decades. Therefore, we introduce the Modified-Cash-Deposit-Ratio (MCDR) approach, which is not subject to the recent critique and apply it to Germany for the period 1960 to 2008. JEL: O17, Q41, C22, Keywords: underground economy, shadow economy, cash-depositratio, currency demand approach, MIMIC approach

Ecological Footprint Inequality across countries: the role of environment intensity, income and interaction effects

Recently, White (2007) analysed the international inequalities in Ecological Footprints per capita (EF hereafter) based on a two-factor decomposition of an index from the Atkinson family (Atkinson (1970)). Specifically, this paper evaluated the separate role of environment intensity (EF/GDP) and average income as explanatory factors for these global inequalities. However, in addition to other comments on their appeal, this decomposition suffers from the serious limitation of the omission of the role exerted by probable factorial correlation (York et al. (2005)). This paper proposes, by way of an alternative, a decomposition of a conceptually similar index like Theil’s (Theil, 1967) which, in effect, permits clear decomposition in terms of the role of both factors plus an inter-factor correlation, in line with Duro and Padilla (2006). This decomposition might, in turn, be extended to group inequality components (Shorrocks, 1980), an analysis that cannot be conducted in the case of the Atkinson indices. The proposed methodology is implemented empirically with the aim of analysing the international inequalities in EF per capita for the 1980-2007 period and, amongst other results, we find that, indeed, the interactive component explains, to a significant extent, the apparent pattern of stability observed in overall international inequalities.

Ecological Footprint Inequality across countries: the role of environment intensity, income and interaction effects

Recently, White (2007) analysed the international inequalities in Ecological Footprints per capita (EF hereafter) based on a two-factor decomposition of an index from the Atkinson family (Atkinson (1970)). Specifically, this paper evaluated the separate role of environment intensity (EF/GDP) and average income as explanatory factors for these global inequalities. However, in addition to other comments on their appeal, this decomposition suffers from the serious limitation of the omission of the role exerted by probable factorial correlation (York et al. (2005)). This paper proposes, by way of an alternative, a decomposition of a conceptually similar index like Theil’s (Theil, 1967) which, in effect, permits clear decomposition in terms of the role of both factors plus an inter-factor correlation, in line with Duro and Padilla (2006). This decomposition might, in turn, be extended to group inequality components (Shorrocks, 1980), an analysis that cannot be conducted in the case of the Atkinson indices. The proposed methodology is implemented empirically with the aim of analysing the international inequalities in EF per capita for the 1980-2007 period and, amongst other results, we find that, indeed, the interactive component explains, to a significant extent, the apparent pattern of stability observed in overall international inequalities. Key words: ecological footprint; international environmental distribution; inequality decomposition

Tax incentives and direct support for R&D: What do firms use and why?

This paper studies whether firms' use of R&D subsidies and R&D tax incentives is correlated to two sources of underinvestment in R&D, financing constraints and appropriability. We find that financially constrained SMEs are less likely to use R&D tax credits and more likely to obtain subsidies. SMEs using legal methods to protect their intellectual property are more likely to use tax incentives. Results are ambiguous for large firms. For both having previous experience in R&D increases the likelihood of using tax incentives, while it reduces the likelihood of using exclusively subsidies, suggesting that the latter induce entry into R&D. Results imply that direct funding and tax credits do not have the same ability to address each source of R&D underinvestment, and that on average subsidies may be better suited than tax credits at least for SMEs. From a policy perspective these tools may be complements rather than substitutes.

Transfers, social safety nets and economic growth

The role of social safety nets in the form of redistributional transfersand wage subsidies is analyzed using a simple model of criminal behavior. Itis argued that public welfare programs act as a crime--preventing ordisruption--preventing devices because they tend to increase the opportunitycost of engaging in crime or disruptive activities. It is shown that, in thepresence of a leisure choice, wage subsidies may be better than pure transfers. Using a simple growth model, it is shown that it is not optimal for the governmentto try to fully eliminate crime. The optimal size of the public welfare programis found and it is argued that public welfare should be financed with income(not lump--sum) taxes, despite the fact that income taxes are distortionary.The intuition for this result is that income taxes act as a user fee oncongested public goods and transfers can be thought of as {\it productive}public goods {\it subject to congestion}. Finally, using a cross-section of 75 countries, the partial correlation betweentransfers and growth is shown to be significantly positive.

Tax incentives and the city

It is difficult to justify tax incentives within the existing economicsliterature on tax competition. We develop a model in which communitiesare interested in attracting firms not only for their own capital butalso for the concentration externalities, a form of agglomerationeconomies, their location bestows on existing firms. We find that itis efficient in this case for communities to offer tax incentives,defined as a tax rate below the benefit tax level, to firms. We presentthe recent relocation of the Boeing Corporation's headquarters fromSeattle to Chicago as a case study.

Income taxation in a frictional labor market

A new model of wage dispersion is used to examine welfare aspects of income taxation. The model retains the dynamics of wage posting modelswhile exogenizing search e¤ort, therefore allowing more insight into policy issues. The results highlight effects that standard analyses do not take into account. The optimal income tax should depend on an incidenceeffect between workers and firms. This incidence effect arises from firmstrying to lower wages as much as possible. An employment tax proves, incertain cases, to be the best method to encourage labor force participation.

Income and body mass index in Europe

The problem of obesity is alarming public health authorities around the world. Therefore, it is important to study its determinants. In this paper we explore the empirical relationship between household income and body mass index (BMI) in nine European Union countries. Our findings suggest that the association is negative for women, but we find no statistically significant relationship for men. However, we show that the different relationship for men and women appears to be driven by the negative relationship for women between BMI and individual income from work. We tentatively conclude that the negative relationship between household income and BMI for women may simply be capturing the wage penalty that obese women suffer in the labor market.

The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France

Optimal tax formulas expressed in "sufficient statistics" are usually calibrated under the assumptionthat the relevant tax elasticities are unaffected by other available policy instruments.In practice though, tax authorities have many more instruments than the mere tax rates andtax elasticities are functions of all these policy instruments. In this paper we provide evidencethat tax elasticities are extremely sensitive to a particular policy instrument: the level of taxenforcement. We exploit a natural experiment that took place in France in 1983, when the taxadministration tightened the requirements to claim charitable deductions. The reform led to asubstantial drop in the amount of contributions reported to the administration, which can becredibly attributed to overreporting of charitable contributions before the reform, rather thanto a real change in giving behaviours. We show that the reform was also associated with asubstantial decline in the absolute value of the elasticity of reported contributions. This findingallows us to partially identify the elasticity of overreporting contributions, which is shown tobe large and inferior to -2 in the lax enforcement regime. We further show using bunching oftaxpayers at kink-points of the tax schedule that the elasticity of taxable income also experienceda significant decline after the reform. Our results suggest that optimizing the tax rate fora given tax elasticity when other policy instruments are not optimized can lead to misleadingconclusions when tax authorities have another instrument that could set the tax elasticity itselfat its optimal level as in Kopczuk and Slemrod [2002].