Teacher strategies to elicit knowledge from students in the CLIL classroom: the purpose of questions in controlled patterns of teacher-student interaction

This Master Dissertation comprises two parts: a personal reflection and an empirical study. The personal reflection reviews the process of professionalization undergone by its author throughout the Master. The empirical study tackles teacher strategies to elicit knowledge from students in the CLIL classroom and more specifically the purpose of questions in controlled patterns of teacher-student interaction. The theories of relevant authors such as Vigotsky, Mercer and Tsui are used as a framework to analyze the data presented. The analysis shows the different strategies to elicit knowledge used by the teacher and the appropriateness of her questions in the analyzed interaction

How to avoid gender bias in classroom interaction? A cooperative learning experience

This project aims to analyse the kind of questions the teacher asks students in order to encourage them to participate in her classes. Consequently, the researcher has read relevant literature and has analysed a short excerpt of a video recorded during her first practicum. She has also analysed a number of activities carried out during her second practicum in order to find out if she had improved her questioning skills in the classroom

Repeated Interaction and the Revelation of the Monitor's Type: A Principal-Monitor-Agent Problem

This paper studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic principal delegates the task of monitoring the effort of a strategic agent to a third party. The latter we call the monitor, whose type is initially unknown. Through repeated interaction the agent might learn his type. We show that this process damages the principal's payoffs. Compensation is assumed exogenous, limiting to a great extent the provision of incentives. We go around this difficulty by introducing costly replacement strategies, i.e. the principal replaces the monitor, thus disrupting the agent's learning. We found that even when replacement costs are null, if the revealed monitor is strictly preferred by both parties, there is a loss in efficiency due to the impossibility of bene…tting from it. Nonetheless, these strategies can partially recover the principal's losses. Additionally, we establish upper and lower bounds on the payoffs that the principal and the agent can achieve. Finally we characterize the equilibrium strategies under public and private monitoring (with communication) for different cost and impatience levels.

Interfície de control de dades en una fàbrica

Aquest treball tracta de l'estudi i creació de la interfície d'una aplicació que reculli les dades de control generades en un procés productiu real en una petita planta de fabricació amb cinc treballadors.