A note on parallelizing the parameterized expectations algorithm

The parameterized expectations algorithm (PEA) involves a long simulation and a nonlinear least squares (NLS) fit, both embedded in a loop. Both steps are natural candidates for parallelization. This note shows that parallelization can lead to important speedups for the PEA. I provide example code for a simple model that can serve as a template for parallelization of more interesting models, as well as a download link for an image of a bootable CD that allows creation of a cluster and execution of the example code in minutes, with no need to install any software.

On the identification of monetary (and other) shocks

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we construct a DSGE model which spells out explicitly the instrumentation of monetary policy. The interest rate is determined every period depending on the supply and demand for reserves which in turn are affected by fundamental shocks: unforeseeable changes in cash withdrawal, autonomous factors, technology and government spending. Unexpected changes in the monetary conditions of the economy are interpreted as monetary shocks. We show that these monetary shocks have the usual effects on economic activity without the need of imposing additional frictions as limited participation in asset markets or sticky prices. Second, we show that this view of monetary policy may have important consequences for empirical research. In the model, the contemporaneous correlations between interest rates, prices and output are due to the simultaneous effect of all fundamental shocks. We provide an example where these contemporaneous correlations may be misinterpreted as a Taylor rule. In addition, we use the sign of the impact responses of all shocks on output, prices and interest rates derived from the model to identify the sources of shocks in the data.

Capitalism, unemployment and the transition to the contemporary pattern of growth

A new model of unemployment based on an idea of Marx is presented and used to interpret the development of the British economy from the beginning of capitalism to the present. It is shown that unemployment may be created purposely by capitalists in order to weaken the bargaining position of the workers. This mechanism leads to complex temporal pattern of unemployment and can explain why wages took almost a century and a half to react to the growing capital to labour ratio that characterised early British capitalism.

Collusion in growing and shrinking markets: empirical evidence from experimental duopolies

We study collusive behaviour in experimental duopolies that compete in prices under dynamic demand conditions. In one treatment the demand grows at a constant rate. In the other treatment the demand declines at another constant rate. The rates are chosen so that the evolution of the demand in one case is just the reverse in time than the one for the other case. We use a box-design demand function so that there are no issues of finding and co-ordinating on the collusive price. Contrary to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it grows. We conjecture that the prospect of rapidly declining profit opportunities exerts a disciplining effect on firms that facilitates collusion and discourages deviation.

Implementation of the ordinal shapley value for a three-agent economy

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.

Modeling usage of medical care services: the medical expenditure panel survey data, 1996-2000

We explore the determinants of usage of six different types of health care services, using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data, years 1996-2000. We apply a number of models for univariate count data, including semiparametric, semi-nonparametric and finite mixture models. We find that the complexity of the model that is required to fit the data well depends upon the way in which the data is pooled across sexes and over time, and upon the characteristics of the usage measure. Pooling across time and sexes is almost always favored, but when more heterogeneous data is pooled it is often the case that a more complex statistical model is required.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Los mecanismos de cohesión territorial en España: un análisis y algunas propuestas

El presente informe describe y cuantifica los principales mecanismos de cohesión social y territorial existentes en España, analiza su incidencia sobre la distribución regional de la renta y su contribución a la nivelación de la calidad de los servicios básicos, y propone algunos cambios en su diseño con el objetivo de mejorar sus propiedades de eficiencia y su adecuación a los principios constitucionales de igualdad, solidaridad y autonomía. La tesis central del tabajo es que el proceso de reformas autonómicas que ahora se inicia no debería en ningún caso suponer la ruptura de los mecanismos existentes de cohesión y debería aprovecharse para perfeccionarlos.

It's what you say not what you pay

We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal, increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective messages specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well.

Publishing performances of spanish academics: 1970-2004

The aim of this note is to complement some of the results appearing in Dolado et al. (2003) article “Publishing Performance in Economics: Spanish Rankings” Particularly we want to focus on three issues: the robustness of the results regardless of the time span considered, the evaluation of a researcher to the advance of the knowledge, and to what extent the choice of a particular database to download the results can affect the results. Differences are significant when we expand the time period considered. There are also small but significant differences if we combine datasets to derive the rankings.

Efficient bidding with externalities

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.

The optimal behaviour of firms facing stochastic costs

This paper aims at assessing the optimal behavior of a firm facing stochastic costs of production. In an imperfectly competitive setting, we evaluate to what extent a firm may decide to locate part of its production in other markets different from which it is actually settled. This decision is taken in a stochastic environment. Portfolio theory is used to derive the optimal solution for the intertemporal profit maximization problem. In such a framework, splitting production between different locations may be optimal when a firm is able to charge different prices in the different local markets.

Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory: it provided the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to the theoretical bidding behavior.

User-friendly parallel computations with econometric examples

This paper shows how a high level matrix programming language may be used to perform Monte Carlo simulation, bootstrapping, estimation by maximum likelihood and GMM, and kernel regression in parallel on symmetric multiprocessor computers or clusters of workstations. The implementation of parallelization is done in a way such that an investigator may use the programs without any knowledge of parallel programming. A bootable CD that allows rapid creation of a cluster for parallel computing is introduced. Examples show that parallelization can lead to important reductions in computational time. Detailed discussion of how the Monte Carlo problem was parallelized is included as an example for learning to write parallel programs for Octave.