What social security: Beveridgean or Bismarckian?

Why are Bismarckian social security systems associated with largerpublic pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension andlower income in-equality than Beveridgean systems? These facts arepuzzling for political economy theories of social security whichpredict that Beveridgean systems, involving intra-generationalredistribution, should enjoy larger support among low-income people andthus be larger. This paper explains these features in a bidimensionalpolitical economy model. In an economy with three income groups,low-income support a large, redistributive system; middle-income favoran earning-related system, while high-income oppose any public system,since they have access to a superior saving technology, a privatesystem. We show that, if income inequality is large, the voting majorityof high-income and low-income supports a (small) Beveridgean system,and a large private pillar arises; the opposite occurs with lowinequality. Additionally, when the capital market provides higherreturns, a Beveridgean system is more likely to emerge.

Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium

Economics is the science of want and scarcity. We show that want andscarcity, operating within a simple exchange institution (double auction),are sufficient for an economy consisting of multiple inter--related marketsto attain competitive equilibrium (CE). We generalize Gode and Sunder's(1993a, 1993b) single--market finding to multi--market economies, andexplore the role of the scarcity constraint in convergence of economies to CE.When the scarcity constraint is relaxed by allowing arbitrageurs in multiple markets to enter speculative trades, prices still converge to CE,but allocative efficiency of the economy drops. \\Optimization by individual agents, often used to derive competitive equilibria,are unnecessary for an actual economy to approximately attain such equilibria.From the failure of humans to optimize in complex tasks, one need not concludethat the equilibria derived from the competitive model are descriptivelyirrelevant. We show that even in complex economic systems, such equilibriacan be attained under a range of surprisingly weak assumptions about agentbehavior.

Economic ideas and economists in the Parliament in the liberal age: The attempt to implement a tax on incomes in Spain in 1868-1869

[spa] El estudio de la presencia de ideas económicas en los debates parlamentarios se ha convertido recientemente en un objeto importante dentro de la investigación sobre el proceso de institucionalización de la economía política en Europa Occidental en la llamada era liberal. En este marco general, este artículo se centra en el análisis de un caso de particular interés: La relevancia del pensamiento económico y el papel jugado por los economistas en los debates parlamentarios que siguieron a la creación de un nuevo impuesto que trataba de captar la renta personal, que fue lanzado por el ministro de Hacienda Laureano Figuerola en 1868. El artículo intenta demostrar, en primer lugar, que las ideas económicas jugaron efectivamente un papel relevante en las discusiones sobre el impuesto sobre la renta y que la presencia e influencia de los economistas en el Legislativo en este tiempo fue notable. En segundo lugar, que este fue un intento serio de modernizar la estructura fiscal española llevado a cabo por el Gobierno Provisional, el cual trató de diseñar un sistema impositivo capaz de fomentar el crecimiento económico del país.

Economic ideas and economists in the Parliament in the liberal age: The attempt to implement a tax on incomes in Spain in 1868-1869

[spa] El estudio de la presencia de ideas económicas en los debates parlamentarios se ha convertido recientemente en un objeto importante dentro de la investigación sobre el proceso de institucionalización de la economía política en Europa Occidental en la llamada era liberal. En este marco general, este artículo se centra en el análisis de un caso de particular interés: La relevancia del pensamiento económico y el papel jugado por los economistas en los debates parlamentarios que siguieron a la creación de un nuevo impuesto que trataba de captar la renta personal, que fue lanzado por el ministro de Hacienda Laureano Figuerola en 1868. El artículo intenta demostrar, en primer lugar, que las ideas económicas jugaron efectivamente un papel relevante en las discusiones sobre el impuesto sobre la renta y que la presencia e influencia de los economistas en el Legislativo en este tiempo fue notable. En segundo lugar, que este fue un intento serio de modernizar la estructura fiscal española llevado a cabo por el Gobierno Provisional, el cual trató de diseñar un sistema impositivo capaz de fomentar el crecimiento económico del país.

Alimento humano : viabilidad y encaje del diseño permacultural como sistema agrícola

La Permacultura, los Paisajes de retención de agua y la Economía del bien común, se configuran como una alternativa a la situación actual de la agricultura. Mediante la combinación de estas corrientes, se puede desarrollar una agricultura más respetuosa con el entorno natural capaz de ayudar a regenerarlo. Una buena gestión del suelo fija y estabiliza el CO2 y gracias a los paisajes de captación de agua, se consigue cosechar el agua, infiltrándose en los ecosistemas y llenándolos de vida. Sumado a una correcta gestión del agua se mitigan los efectos del cambio climático en nuestras latitudes. Finalmente la economía del bien común, nos permite crear sistemas económicos más justos y sociales, encajando a la perfección con los principios de la Permacultura. Para poder aplicar dicho concepto actualmente, establecer el sistema agrícola como un sistema asociativo (asociación sin ánimo de lucro), nos permite fijar unos precios estables y sociales, dando especial importancia a la mano de obra y a la autosuficiencia.

Learning from Shocks and the Decision to Open

Two claims pervade the literature on the political economy of market reforms: that economic crises cause reforms; and that crises matter because they bring into question the validity of the economic model held to be responsible for them. Economic crises are said to spur a process of learning that is conducive to the abandonment of failing models and to the adoption of successful models. But although these claims have become the conventional wisdom, they have been hardly tested empirically due to the lack of agreement on what constitutes a crisis and to difficulties in measuring learning from them. I propose a model of rational learning from experience and apply it to the decision to open the economy. Using data from 1964 through 1990, I show that learning from the 1982 debt crisis was relevant to the first wave of adoption of an export promotion strategy, but learning was conditional on the high variability of economic outcomes in countries that opened up to trade. Learning was also symbolic in that the sheer number of other countries that liberalized was a more important driver of others’ decisions to follow suit.

Political Competition in Hard Times

This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.

Opening Education Beyond the Property Relation: From Commons to Communism

Open Education, and specifically the OER movement, seeks to provide universal access to knowledge, undermining the historical enclosure and the increasing privatisation of the public education system. In this paper we examine this aspiration by submitting the implicit theoretical assumptions of Open Education to the test of critical political economy. We acknowledge the Open Education movement's revolutionary potential but outline the inherent limitations of its current focus on the commons (property relations) rather than the social relations of capitalist production (wage work, the company) and because of this, argue that it will only achieve limited, rather than revolutionary, impact.

Estimating Gross Value Added (GVA) across multiple scales: theoretical approach and empirical validation

This paper presents an application of the Multi-Scale Integrated Analysis of Societal and Ecosystem Metabolism (MuSIASEM) approach to the estimation of quantities of Gross Value Added (GVA) referring to economic entities defined at different scales of study. The method first estimates benchmark values of the pace of GVA generation per hour of labour across economic sectors. These values are estimated as intensive variables –e.g. €/hour– by dividing the various sectorial GVA of the country (expressed in € per year) by the hours of paid work in that same sector per year. This assessment is obtained using data referring to national statistics (top down information referring to the national level). Then, the approach uses bottom-up information (the number of hours of paid work in the various economic sectors of an economic entity –e.g. a city or a province– operating within the country) to estimate the amount of GVA produced by that entity. This estimate is obtained by multiplying the number of hours of work in each sector in the economic entity by the benchmark value of GVA generation per hour of work of that particular sector (national average). This method is applied and tested on two different socio-economic systems: (i) Catalonia (considered level n) and Barcelona (considered level n-1); and (ii) the region of Lima (considered level n) and Lima Metropolitan Area (considered level n-1). In both cases, the GVA per year of the local economic entity –Barcelona and Lima Metropolitan Area – is estimated and the resulting value is compared with GVA data provided by statistical offices. The empirical analysis seems to validate the approach, even though the case of Lima Metropolitan Area indicates a need for additional care when dealing with the estimate of GVA in primary sectors (agriculture and mining).

The Farm, the city, and the emergence of social security

We study the social, demographic and economic origins of social security. The data for the U.S. and for a cross section of countries suggest that urbanization and industrialization are associated with the rise of social insurance. We describe an OLG model in which demographics, technology, and social security are linked together in a political economy equilibrium. In the model economy, there are two locations (sectors), the farm (agricultural) and the city (industrial) and the decision to migrate from rural to urban locations is endogenous and linked to productivity differences between the two locations and survival probabilities. Farmers rely on land inheritance for their old age and do not support a pay-as-you-go social security system. With structural change, people migrate to the city, the land loses its importance and support for social security arises. We show that a calibrated version of this economy, where social security taxes are determined by majority voting, is consistent with the historical transformation in the United States.

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.

Toward a theory of labor market institutions

Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmfulfor job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodoxreforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because ofpolitical opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why weobserve such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they fit together. This theory is fully developed in aforthcoming book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred forfurther details.

State capacity and military conflict

In 1500, Europe was composed of hundreds of statelets and principalities, with weak central authority,no monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, and overlapping jurisdictions. By 1800, only ahandful of powerful, centralized nation states remained. We build a model that explains both the emergenceof capable states and growing divergence between European powers. We argue that the impactof war was crucial for state building, and depended on: i) the financial cost of war, and ii) a country sinitial level of domestic political fragmentation. We emphasize the role of the "Military Revolution",which raised the cost of war. Initially, this caused more cohesive states to invest in state capacity, whilemore divided states rationally dropped out of the competition, causing divergence between Europeanstates. As the cost of war escalated further, all states engaged in a "race to the top" towards greater statebuilding.

Bowling for fascism: Social capital and the rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, 1919-33

Social capital a dense network of associations facilitating cooperation within a community typically leads to positive political and economic outcomes, as demonstrated by a large literature following Putnam. A growing literature emphasizes the potentially "dark side" of social capital. This paper examines the role of social capital in the downfall of democracy in interwar Germany by analyzing Nazi party entry rates in a cross-section of towns and cities. Before the Nazi Party's triumphs at the ballot box, it built an extensive organizational structure, becoming a mass movement with nearly a million members by early 1933. We show that dense networks of civic associations such as bowling clubs, animal breeder associations, or choirs facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party. The effects are large: Towns with one standard deviation higher association density saw at least one-third faster growth in the strength of the Nazi Party. IV results based on 19th century measures of social capital reinforce our conclusions. In addition, all types of associations veteran associations and non-military clubs, "bridging" and "bonding" associations positively predict NS party entry. These results suggest that social capital in Weimar Germany aided the rise of the Nazi movement that ultimately destroyed Germany's first democracy.

The survival of the welfare state

This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfectequilibria in a politico-economic model with repeated voting, whereagents vote over distortionary income redistribution. The key featureof the theory is that the future constituency of redistributive policiesdepends positively on the current level of redistribution, since thisaffects both private investments and the future distribution of voters.Agents vote rationally and fullly anticipate the effects of their politicalchoice on both private incentives and future voting outcomes. The modelfeatures multiple equilibria. In "pro-welfare" equilibria, both welfarestate policies and their effects on distribution persist forever. In"anti-welfare equilibria", even a majority of beneficiaries ofredistributive policies vote strategically so as to induce the formationof a future majority that will vote for zero redistribution.