Rethinking the effects of financial liberalization

During the last few decades, many emerging markets have lifted restrictions on cross-borderfinancial transactions. The conventional view was that this would allow these countries to: (i)receive capital inflows from advanced countries that would finance higher investment and growth;(ii) insure against aggregate shocks and reduce consumption volatility; and (iii) accelerate thedevelopment of domestic financial markets and achieve a more efficient domestic allocationof capital and better sharing of individual risks. However, the evidence suggests that thisconventional view was wrong.In this paper, we present a simple model that can account for the observed effects of financialliberalization. The model emphasizes the role of imperfect enforcement of domestic debts and theinteractions between domestic and international financial transactions. In the model, financialliberalization might lead to different outcomes: (i) domestic capital flight and ambiguous effectson net capital flows, investment, and growth; (ii) large capital inflows and higher investmentand growth; or (iii) volatile capital flows and unstable domestic financial markets. The modelshows how these outcomes depend on the level of development, the depth of domestic financialmarkets, and the quality of institutions.

Human capital and externalities in cities

We combine growth theory with US Census data on individual schooling and wages to estimate the aggregate return to human capital and human capital externalities in cities. Our estimates imply that a one-year increase in average schooling in cities increases their aggregate labor productivity by 8 to 11 percent. We find no evidence for aggregate human capital externalities in cities however althoughwe use three different approaches. Our main theoretical contribution is to show how human capital externalities can be identified (non-parametically) even if workers with different levels of human capital are imperfect substitutes in production.

Combining multivariate density forecasts using predictive criteria

This paper combines multivariate density forecasts of output growth, inflationand interest rates from a suite of models. An out-of-sample weighting scheme based onthe predictive likelihood as proposed by Eklund and Karlsson (2005) and Andersson andKarlsson (2007) is used to combine the models. Three classes of models are considered: aBayesian vector autoregression (BVAR), a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR)and a medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Using Australiandata, we find that, at short forecast horizons, the Bayesian VAR model is assignedthe most weight, while at intermediate and longer horizons the factor model is preferred.The DSGE model is assigned little weight at all horizons, a result that can be attributedto the DSGE model producing density forecasts that are very wide when compared withthe actual distribution of observations. While a density forecast evaluation exercise revealslittle formal evidence that the optimally combined densities are superior to those from thebest-performing individual model, or a simple equal-weighting scheme, this may be a resultof the short sample available.

The persistence of inflation in OECD countries: A fractionally integrated approach

The statistical properties of inflation and, in particular, its degree of persistence and stability over time is a subject of intense debate and no consensus has been achieved yet. The goal of this paper is to analyze this controversy using a general approach, with the aim of providing a plausible explanation for the existing contradictory results. We consider the inflation rates of 21 OECD countries which are modelled as fractionally integrated (FI) processes. First, we show analytically that FI can appear in inflation rates after aggregating individual prices from firms that face different costs of adjusting their prices. Then, we provide robust empirical evidence supporting the FI hypothesis using both classical and Bayesian techniques. Next, we estimate impulse response functions and other scalar measures of persistence, achieving an accurate picture of this property and its variation across countries. It is shown that the application of some popular tools for measuring persistence, such as the sum of the AR coefficients, could lead to erroneous conclusions if fractional integration is present. Finally, we explore the existence of changes in inflation inertia using a novel approach. We conclude that the persistence of inflation is very high (although non-permanent) in most post-industrial countries and that it has remained basically unchanged over the last four decades.

Algunos factores que inciden en el rendimiento y en la evaluación de los alumnos en las PAAU

The context where the university admissions exams are performed is presented and the main concerns about this exams are outlined and discussed from a statistical point of view. The paper offers an illustration of the use of random coefficient models in the study of educational data. The association between two individual scores (one internal and the other external to the school) and the effect of the school in the external exam is analized by a regression model with random intercept and fixed slope. A variance component model for the analysis of the grading process is also presented. The paper ends with an outline of the main findings and the presentation of some specific proposals to improve and control the equity of the system. Some pedagogic reflections are also included.

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

Satisfaction in choice as a function of the number of alternatives: When "goods satiate" but "bads escalate"

Whereas people are typically thought to be better off with more choices, studiesshow that they often prefer to choose from small as opposed to large sets of alternatives.We propose that satisfaction from choice is an inverted U-shaped function of thenumber of alternatives. This proposition is derived theoretically by considering thebenefits and costs of different numbers of alternatives and is supported by fourexperimental studies. We also manipulate the perceptual costs of information processingand demonstrate how this affects the resulting satisfaction function. We furtherindicate that satisfaction when choosing from a given set is diminished if people aremade aware of the existence of other choice sets. The role of individual differences insatisfaction from choice is documented by noting effects due to gender and culture. Weconclude by emphasizing the need to have an explicit rationale for knowing how muchchoice is enough.

Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers

The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.

Asessing public policies. The case of education in Europe and the interaction between personal and institutional factors

The paper deals with the comparative study of European citizens satisfaction with thestate of education in their respective countries. Individual and contextual effects aretested applying multilevel analysis. The results show that educational public policies(level of decentralization, degree of comprehensiveness and public spending) as well asthe students social environment (socioeconomic and cultural status) have a soundimpact on the opinions about the state of education.

Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability

We consider the agency problem of a staff member managing microfinancing programs, who can abuse his discretion to embezzle borrowers' repayments. The fact that most borrowers of microfinancing programs are illiterate and live in rural areas where transportation costs are very high make staff's embezzlement particularly relevant as is documented by Mknelly and Kevane (2002). We study the trade-off between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and find that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from insurance. Our analysis explains rigid repayment schedules used by the Grameen bank as an optimal response to the bank staff's agency problem. Joint liability reduces borrowers' burden of respecting the rigid repayment schedules by providing them with partial insurance. However, the same insurance can be provided byborrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract.

The gain-loss asymmetry and single-self preferences

Kahneman and Tversky asserted a fundamental asymmetry between gains and losses, namely a reflection effect which occurs when an individual prefers a sure gain of $ pz to anuncertain gain of $ z with probability p, while preferring an uncertain loss of $z with probability p to a certain loss of $ pz.We focus on this class of choices (actuarially fair), and explore the extent to which thereflection effect, understood as occurring at a range of wealth levels, is compatible with single-self preferences.We decompose the reflection effect into two components, a probability switch effect,which is compatible with single-self preferences, and a translation effect, which is not. To argue the first point, we analyze two classes of single-self, nonexpected utility preferences, which we label homothetic and weakly homothetic. In both cases, we characterize the switch effect as well as the dependence of risk attitudes on wealth.We also discuss two types of utility functions of a form reminiscent of expected utility but with distorted probabilities. Type I always distorts the probability of the worst outcome downwards, yielding attraction to small risks for all probabilities. Type II distorts low probabilities upwards, and high probabilities downwards, implying risk aversion when the probability of the worst outcome is low. By combining homothetic or weak homothetic preferences with Type I or Type II distortion functions, we present four explicit examples: All four display a switch effect and, hence, a form of reflection effect consistent a single self preferences.

Speculative dynamics in the term structure of interest rates

When long maturity bonds are traded frequently and traders have non-nestedinformation sets, speculative behavior in the sense of Harrison and Kreps (1978) arises.Using a term structure model displaying such speculative behavior, this paper proposesa conceptually and observationally distinct new mechanism generating time varying predictableexcess returns. It is demonstrated that (i) dispersion of expectations about futureshort rates is sufficient for individual traders to systematically predict excess returns and(ii) the new term structure dynamics driven by speculative trade is orthogonal to publicinformation in real time, but (iii) can nevertheless be quantified using only publicly availableyield data. The model is estimated using monthly data on US short to medium termTreasuries from 1964 to 2007 and it provides a good fit of the data. Speculative dynamicsare found to be quantitatively important, potentially accounting for a substantial fractionof the variation of bond yields and appears to be more important at long maturities.

The provision of relative performance feedback information: An experimental analysis of performance and happiness

This paper studies the effect of providing relative performance feedback information onindividual performance and on individual affective response, when agents are rewardedaccording to their absolute performance. In a laboratory set-up, agents perform a realeffort task and when receiving feedback, they are asked to rate their happiness, arousaland feeling of dominance. Control subjects learn only their absolute performance, whilethe treated subjects additionally learn the average performance in the session.Performance is 17 percent higher when relative performance feedback is provided.Furthermore, although feedback increases the performance independent of the content(i.e., performing above or below the average), the content is determinant for theaffective response. When subjects are treated, the inequality in the happiness and thefeeling of dominance between those subjects performing above and below the averageincreases by 8 and 6 percentage points, respectively.

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.