Accounting information and the prediction of farm viability

Until recently farm management made little use of accounting and agriculture has been largely excluded from the scope of accounting standards. This article examines the current use of accounting in agriculture and points theneed to establish accounting standards for agriculture. Empirical evidence shows that accounting can make a significant contribution to agricultural management and farm viability and could also be important for other agents involved in agricultural decision making. Existing literature on failureprediction models and farm viability prediction studies provide the starting point for our research, in which two dichotomous logit models were applied to subsamples of viable and unviable farms in Catalonia, Spain. The firstmodel considered only non-financial variables, while the other also considered financial ones. When accounting variables were added to the model, a significant reduction in deviance was observed.

Wage structures and family economies in the Catalan textile industry in an age of nascent capitalism

This paper deals with changes in managerial practices in Catalonia in anage of nascent capitalism (1830-1925) and adaptive family strategies inorder to face the absence of state welfare. During the 19 t h Century andin the absence of recorded labor contracts, human resources of the firmwere organized by means of implicit contracts and informal labor markets.With the advent of scientific organization of labor, wage per hour workedbegan to be recorded. This is why in the 1920s the perfect competitionmodel applies to our case. On the other hand, in the same period, and inthe absence of state welfare, ideas stemming from cooperative game theoryapply to the pattern of household income formation. Kin related networkswere used to improve the living standards of the household. In thisparticular direction we also show that there was a demonstration effectby means of which migrant s living standards were higher than those ofnatives.

Bundling electronic journals and competition among publishers

Site licensing of e-journals has been revolutionizing the way academicinformation is distributed. However, many librarians are concerned aboutthe possibility that publishers might abuse site licensing by practicingbundling. In this paper, we analyze the private and social incentives forthe publishers to use bundling in the context of STM electronic journalmarket. In the short run in which the number of journals is exogenouslygiven, we find a strong conflict between the two incentives: each publisherfinds bundling optimal and bundling increases the industry profit butreduces social welfare. However, in the long run we find that publishersmight have higher incentives to introduce new journals under bundlingthan without bundling and, in this case, bundling can reduce the industryprofit while increasing social welfare. Finally, we examine publishers incentive to provide links to the websites of the rival publishers underbundling and show that even asymmetric publishers have incentive tointerconnect.

Property enforcement as organized consent

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that makeproperty rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing thecollateral value of assets and promoting growth. In contrast tocontractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affectedonly with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement butis costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in thesame asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consentsto overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs:recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights and evena regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionallysimilar services, but their relative performance varies with the numberof transactions, the risk of political opportunism and regulatoryconsistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowingcompetition in the preparation and support of private contractswhile requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registrationactivities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.

How political parties, rather than member-states, are building the European Union

Political party formation and coalition building in the European Parliament is being a driving force for making governance of the highly pluralistic European Union relatively effective and consensual. In spite of successive enlargements and the very high number of electoral partiesobtaining representation in the European Union institutions, the number of effective European Political Groups in the European Parliament has decreased from the first direct election in 1979 to the fifth in 1999. The formal analysis of national party¹s voting power in different Europeanparty configurations can explain the incentives for national parties to join large European Political Groups instead of forming smaller nationalistic groupings. Empirical evidence shows increasing cohesion of European Political Groups and an increasing role of the European Parliament in EU inter-institutional decision making. As a consequence of this evolution, intergovernmentalism is being replaced with federalizing relations. The analysis can support positive expectations regarding the governability of the European Union after further enlargements provided that new member states have party systems fitting the European PoliticalGroups.

The P-median problem in a changing network: The case of Barcelona

In this paper a p--median--like model is formulated to address theissue of locating new facilities when there is uncertainty. Severalpossible future scenarios with respect to demand and/or the travel times/distanceparameters are presented. The planner will want a strategy of positioning thatwill do as ``well as possible'' over the future scenarios. This paper presents a discrete location model formulation to address this P--Medianproblem under uncertainty. The model is applied to the location of firestations in Barcelona.

Take-the-best and other simple strategies: Why and when they work 'well' in binary choice

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of bothrules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifiesthe relative predictive accuracies of the lexicographic rule 'take-the-best'(TTB) and other simple strategies for binary choice. We identify threefactors: how the environment weights variables; characteristics of choicesets; and error. For cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTBis effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights(EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become morecompensatory. In the presence of error, TTB and similar models do not predictmuch better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. We emphasizepsychological implications and the need for more complete theories of theenvironment that include the role of error.

Endogenous price leadership

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the highcost firm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.

Technology diffusion and the spatial distribution of wages in the US

What explains the spatial distribution of wages across US counties? I find that two of the most important factors are spatial technology diffusion and externalities due to the aggregate scale of production. One empirical finding supporting the importance of spatial technology diffusion is that average wages in a county decrease with the average level of schooling in neighboring counties when employment in the county and average wages in neighboring counties are held constant. All empirical results are obtained using anovel instrument for (endogenous) employment at the county-leveland take into account other factors (e.g. productivity-differencesacross states, climate) that may determine wages.

A portrait of the Spanish accounting community

This study presents a portrait of the Spanish academic accountingcommunity in 1995, based upon a questionnaire circulated to Spanishaccounting academics in 1995 and upon an analysis of authorship andcitations in the main Spanish accounting journals. The approach tothese analyses is grounded in similar studies which have been carriedout in the United States, Spain and elsewhere. but the combination oftechniques used in this study is particularly broad in range.The results of the study are used to describe a range ofcharacteristics of Spanish accounting academics, for example,publications records and length of academic experience. The analysisof publications produces a ranking by institutional affiliation ofthe most significant contributors to current debates on accounting.Citation analysis is used to identify the range and extent ofinternational influences upon the Spanish academic accountingcommunity, and to provide an additional ranking by institutionalaffiliation of the most frequently cited sources A significantfinding was that the nature and extent of international influence hadchanged very little over the ten year period since Spain entered theEuropean Union and started to implement European Directives.Perceptions of journal quality were elicited by questionnaire. Fortyfive journals, Spanish and international are included in a listranked for perceived importance as outlets for publication. and assources of support for teaching and research. The results of thisexercise show that Spanish journals were ranked low relative tojournals published in the United Kingdom and United States.Finally the study examines the extent of purpose upon Spanishaccounting academies to publish, by presenting results of a questionabout criteria for promotion, and also by examining and increasingtendency to publish co-authored work.

On the relevance of modeling volatility for pricing purposes

This paper presents a two-factor (Vasicek-CIR) model of the term structure of interest rates and develops its pricing and empirical properties. We assume that default free discount bond prices are determined by the time to maturity and two factors, the long-term interest rate and the spread. Assuming a certain process for both factors, a general bond pricing equation is derived and a closed-form expression for bond prices is obtained. Empirical evidence of the model's performance in comparisson with a double Vasicek model is presented. The main conclusion is that the modeling of the volatility in the long-term rate process can help (in a large amount) to fit the observed data can improve - in a reasonable quantity - the prediction of the future movements in the medium- and long-term interest rates. However, for shorter maturities, it is shown that the pricing errors are, basically, negligible and it is not so clear which is the best model to be used.

Algunos factores que inciden en el rendimiento y en la evaluación de los alumnos en las PAAU

The context where the university admissions exams are performed is presented and the main concerns about this exams are outlined and discussed from a statistical point of view. The paper offers an illustration of the use of random coefficient models in the study of educational data. The association between two individual scores (one internal and the other external to the school) and the effect of the school in the external exam is analized by a regression model with random intercept and fixed slope. A variance component model for the analysis of the grading process is also presented. The paper ends with an outline of the main findings and the presentation of some specific proposals to improve and control the equity of the system. Some pedagogic reflections are also included.

Ethics outside, within or beyond OR models

Since ethical concerns are calling for more attention within OperationalResearch, we present three approaches to combine Operational Researchmodels with ethics. Our intention is to clarify the trade-offs faced bythe OR community, in particular the tension between the scientificlegitimacy of OR models (ethics outside OR models) and the integrationof ethics within models (ethics within OR models). Presenting anddiscussing an approach that combines OR models with the process of OR(ethics beyond OR models), we suggest rigorous ways to express the relationbetween ethics and OR models. As our work is exploratory, we are trying toavoid a dogmatic attitude and call for further research. We argue thatthere are interesting avenues for research at the theoretical,methodological and applied levels and that the OR community can contributeto an innovative, constructive and responsible social dialogue about itsethics.

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Multiple prisoner's dilemma games with (out) an outside option: An experimental study

Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite prisoner's dilemma supergames with and without an outside optionreveal that: (i) subjects use probabilistic start and endeffect behaviour, (ii) the freedom to choose whether to play the prisoner's dilemma game enhances cooperation, (iii) if the payoff for simultaneous defection is negative, subjects' tendency to avoid losses leads them to cooperate; while this tendency makes them stick to mutual defection if its payoff is positive.