Pork Barrel politics in semi-democracies: the Spanish 'Parlamentary roads', 1874-1915

This paper analyzes the effects of parliamentary representation on road infrastructure expenditure during the Spanish Restoration. Using a panel dataset of Spanish provinces in 1880-1914 we find that the allocation of administrative resources among provinces depended both on the delegation characteristics (such as the share of MPs with party leadership positions, and their degree of electoral independence), and the regime"s global search for stability. These results point to the importance of electoral dynamics within semi-democratic political systems, and offer an example of the influence of government tactics on infrastructure allocation.

Pork Barrel politics in semi-democracies: the Spanish 'Parlamentary roads', 1874-1915

This paper analyzes the effects of parliamentary representation on road infrastructure expenditure during the Spanish Restoration. Using a panel dataset of Spanish provinces in 1880-1914 we find that the allocation of administrative resources among provinces depended both on the delegation characteristics (such as the share of MPs with party leadership positions, and their degree of electoral independence), and the regime"s global search for stability. These results point to the importance of electoral dynamics within semi-democratic political systems, and offer an example of the influence of government tactics on infrastructure allocation.

La garantia jurídica de la democràcia com a dret fonamental. Una anàlisi de la jurisprudència del Tribunal Constitucional sobre la participació política

L'art. 23 de la CE consagra el dret fonamental dels ciutadans a participar en els assumptes públics, preveient-ne dues grans modalitats, la participació directa i la representativa. La doctrina jurisprudencial elaborada pel Tribunal Constitucional durant quasi trenta anys ha atorgat a aquest dret una configuració especial: el seu abast es veu reduït a l'estricta participació política (aspecte que tindrà conseqüències en el vessant de la participació directa reduïda a la iniciativa legislativa popular i el referèndum, deixant fora del seu abast altres possibles institucions participatives); però, per altra banda, amplia el nucli de protecció del dret, garantint no només l'accés dels ciutadans als càrrecs públics (un ius ad officium) en condicions d'igualtat; sinó també el dret dels representants a romandre en el seu càrrec lliures de qualsevol pertorbació i el tercer contingut, el dret dels representants a exercir les facultats inherents a la funció que desenvolupen tot atorgant-los un status constitucionalment garantit. Aquesta construcció jurisprudencial del dret esdevé així la garantia jurídica de la democràcia. Certament, aquest enteniment del dret fonamental de participació té conseqüències prou rellevants en l'àmbit dels partits polítics com a instruments fonamentals per a la participació política. L'abundància de resolucions per part del Tribunal Constitucional, majoritàriament a través de recursos d'empara, ha fet possible l'entrada del dret de participació en dos àmbits singularment rellevants del procés polític, com són el sistema electoral i el dret parlamentari, i ha permès al Tribunal construir tota una teoria de la representació política en seu de drets fonamentals.

Asymptotic analysis of stock price densities and implied volatilities in mixed stochastic models

In this paper, we obtain sharp asymptotic formulas with error estimates for the Mellin con- volution of functions de ned on (0;1), and use these formulas to characterize the asymptotic behavior of marginal distribution densities of stock price processes in mixed stochastic models. Special examples of mixed models are jump-di usion models and stochastic volatility models with jumps. We apply our general results to the Heston model with double exponential jumps, and make a detailed analysis of the asymptotic behavior of the stock price density, the call option pricing function, and the implied volatility in this model. We also obtain similar results for the Heston model with jumps distributed according to the NIG law.

Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism

We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have im- perfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate offers the most leftist/rightist platform. We assume that candidates are purely office motivated and that one candidate enjoys a valence advan- tage over the other. We characterize the unique Sequential Equilibrium in very-weakly undominated strategies of the game. In this equilibrium the behavior of the two candidates tends to maximum extremism, due to the voters' lack of information. But it may converge or diverge depending on the size of the advantage. For small values of the advantage candidates converge to the extreme policy most preferred by the median and for large values of the advantage candidates strategies diverge: each candidate specializes in a different extreme policy. These results are robust to the introduction of a proportion of well informed voters. In this case the degree of extremism decreases when the voters become more informed.