Technical inefficiency and public capital in US States: A stochastic frontier approach

This paper estimates a translog stochastic frontier production function in the analysis of all 48 contiguous U.S. states in the period 1970-1983, to attempt to measure and explain changes in technical efficiency. The model allows technical inefficiency to vary over time, and inefficiency effects to be a function of a set of explanatory variables in which the level and composition of public capital plays an important role. Results indicated that U.S. state inefficiency levels were significantly and positively correlated with the ratio of public capital to private capital. The proportion of public capital devoted to highways is negatively correlated with technical inefficiency, suggesting that not only the level but also the composition of public capital influenced state efficiency.

Health care provider choice in the case of patient-initiated contacts. An extended version of discrete choice of model demand

This paper analyzes the nature of health care provider choice inthe case of patient-initiated contacts, with special reference toa National Health Service setting, where monetary prices are zeroand general practitioners act as gatekeepers to publicly financedspecialized care. We focus our attention on the factors that mayexplain the continuously increasing use of hospital emergencyvisits as opposed to other provider alternatives. An extendedversion of a discrete choice model of demand for patient-initiatedcontacts is presented, allowing for individual and town residencesize differences in perceived quality (preferences) betweenalternative providers and including travel and waiting time asnon-monetary costs. Results of a nested multinomial logit model ofprovider choice are presented. Individual choice betweenalternatives considers, in a repeated nested structure, self-care,primary care, hospital and clinic emergency services. Welfareimplications and income effects are analyzed by computingcompensating variations, and by simulating the effects of userfees by levels of income. Results indicate that compensatingvariation per visit is higher than the direct marginal cost ofemergency visits, and consequently, emergency visits do not appearas an inefficient alternative even for non-urgent conditions.

Putting health in all policies: The National Institute for Welfare Enhancement

Welfare is a rather vague term whose meaning depends on ideology, values andjudgments. Material resources are just means to enhance people s well-being, butgrowth of the Gross Domestic Production is still the standard measure of thesuccess of a society. Fortunately, recent advances in measuring social performanceinclude health, education and other social outcomes. Because what we measureaffects what we do it is hoped that social policies will change. The movementHealth in all policies and its associated Health Impact Assessment methodologywill contribute to it. The task consists of designing transversal policies thatconsider health and other welfare goals, the short term and long-term implicationsand intergenerational redistributions of resources. As long as marginalproductivity on health outside the healthcare system is higher than inside it,efficiency needs cross-sectoral policies. And fairness needs them even more,because in order to reduce social inequalities in health, a wide social and politicalresponse is needed.Unless we reduce the well-documented inefficiencies in our current health caresystems the welfare states will fail to consolidate and the overall economic wellbeingcould be in serious trouble. In this article we sketched some policy solutionssuch as pricing according to net benefits of innovation and public encouragementof radical innovation besides the small type incremental and market-ledinnovation. We proposed an independent agency, the National Institute forWelfare Enhancement to guarantee long term fair and efficient social policies inwhich health plays a central role.

Turbulence and unemployment in a job matching model

According to Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), high European unemployment since the 1980s can be explained by a rise in economic turbulence, leading to greater numbers of unemployed workers with obsolete skills. These workers refuse new jobs due to high unemployment benefits. In this paper we reassess the turbulence-unemployment relationship using a matching model with endogenous job destruction. In our model, higher turbulence reduces the incentives of employed workers to leave their jobs. If turbulence has only a tiny effect on the skills of workers experiencing endogenous separation, then the results of Lungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2004) are reversed, and higher turbulence leads to a reduction in unemployment. Thus, changes in turbulence cannot provide an explanation for European unemployment that reconciles the incentives of both unemployed and employed workers.

Do agglomeration economies reduce the sensitivity of firm location to tax differentials?

Low corporate taxes can help attract new firms. This is the main mechanism underpinning the standard 'race-to-the-bottom'view of tax competition. A recent theoretical literature has qualified this view by formalizing the argument that agglomeration forces can reduce firms' sensitivity to tax differentials across locations. We test this proposition using data on firm startups across Swiss municipalities. We find that, on average, high corporate income taxes do deter new firms, but that this relationship is significantly weaker in the most spatially concentrated sectors. Location choices of firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the twentieth percentile of the sample distribution are estimated to be twice as responsive to a given difference in local corporate tax burdens as firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the eightieth percentile. Hence, our analysis confirms the theoretical prediction: agglomeration economies can neutralize the impact of tax differentials on firms' location choices.

Evaluating Spanish pension expenditure under alternativa reform scenario

In this paper we evaluate the quantitative impact that a number ofalternative reform scenarios may have on the total expenditure for publicpensions in Spain. Our quantitative findings can be summarized in twosentences. For all the reforms considered, the financial impact of themechanical effect (change in benefits) is order of magnitudes larger thanthe behavioral impact or change in behavior. For the two Spanish reforms,we find once again that their effect on the outstanding liability of theSpanish Social Security System is essentially negligible: neither themechanical nor the behavioral effects amount to much for the 1997 reform,and amount to very little for the 2002 amendment.

Employment consequences of restrictive permanent contracts: Evidence from Spanish labor market reforms

Temporary employment contracts allowing unrestricted dismissals wereintroduced in Spain in 1984 and quickly came to account for most new jobs.As a result, temporary employment increased from around 10% in themid-eighties to more than 30% in the early nineties. In 1997, however,the Spanish government attempted to reduce the incidence of temporaryemployment by reducing payroll taxes and dismissal costs for permanentcontracts. In this paper, we use individual data from the Spanish LaborForce Survey to estimate the effects of reduced payroll taxes anddismissal costs on the distribution of employment and worker flows. Weexploit the fact that recent reforms apply only to certain demographicgroups to set up a natural experiment research design that can be usedto study the effects of contract regulations. Our results show that thereduction of payroll taxes and dismissal costs increased the employmentof young workers on permanent contracts, although the effects for youngwomen are not always significant. Results for older workers showinsignificant effects. The results suggest a moderately elastic responseof permanent employment to non-wage labor costs for young men. We alsofind positive effects on the transitions from unemployment and temporaryemployment into permanent employment for young and older workers, althoughthe effects for older workers are not always significant. On the otherhand, transitions from permanent employment to non-employment increasedonly for older men, suggesting that the reform had little effect ondismissals.

Social security, retirement, and the single-mindedness of the electorate

We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important featuresof social security programs around the world: (1) they redistributeincome from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct avoting model that includes a political campaign or debate prior to theelection. The model incorporates single-mindedness of the groups that donot work: while the workers divide their political capital between their age concerns and occupational concerns , the retired concentrate alltheir political capital to support their age group. In our model, theelderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young)and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly.In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work morewill tend to have more political power. The opposite is true fornon-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidencethat supports these additional predictions.

Employee referrals and efficiency wages

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.

Globalization and wage inequality in South and East Asia, and Latin America: A gender approach

In this paper we analyse the reasons behind the evolution of the gender gap and wage inequality in South and East Asian and Latin American countries. Health human capital improvements, the exposure to free market openness and equal treatment enforcement laws seem to be the main exogenous variables affecting women s economic condition. During the second globalization era (in the years 1975-2000) different combinations of these variables in South East Asian and Latin American countries have had as a result the diminution of the gender gap. The main exception to this rule according to our data is China where economic reforms have been simultaneous to the increase of gender differences and inequality between men and women.This result has further normative consequences for the measure of economic inequality. Theimprovement of women s condition has as a result the diminution of the dispersion of wages.Therefore in most of the countries analysed the consequence of the diminution of the gender gapduring the second global era is the decrease of wage inequality both measured with Gini and Theil indexes.

Catalan government popularity. An example of economic effects on sub-national government support

The aim of this essay is to deal with economic voting in contexts ofmultilevel governance and to be a contribution to the debate on attribution of responsibilities in popularity functions literature. We use aggregate and individual data from Catalonia in order to analyse the relation between the state of the economy and the support for a sub-state government. The empirical analysis shows that the responsibility hypothesis works in regional governments without explicit macroeconomic competencies. We have also considered the evaluations of government performance on certain specific policies in order to clarify and determine the factors that drive Catalan government support. The article considers the implications of the findings for future attempts to model party support in a context of the European Union.

Diversity and regional inequalities: Assessing the outcomes of the Spanish 'System of Health Care Services'

The consolidation of a universal health system coupled with a process of regionaldevolution characterise the institutional reforms of the National Health System(NHS) in Spain in the last two decades. However, scarce empirical evidence hasbeen reported on the effects of both changes in health inputs, outputs andoutcomes, both at the country and at the regional level. This paper examinesthe empirical evidence on regional diversity, efficiency and inequality ofthese changes in the Spanish NHS using cross-correlation, panel data andexpenditure decomposition analysis. Results suggest that besides significantheterogeneity, once we take into account region-specific needs there is evidenceof efficiency improvements whilst inequalities in inputs and outcomes, althoughmore visible , do not appear to have increased in the last decade. Therefore,the devolution process in the Spanish Health System offers an interesting casefor the experimentation of health reforms related to regional diversity butcompatible with the nature of a public NHS, with no sizeable regionalinequalitiest.

Fixed-term contracts and the duration distribution of unemployment

In the mid-1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts.Since then their labor markets have become more dynamic. This paper studiesthe implications of such reforms for the duration distribution ofunemployment, with particular emphasis on the changes in the durationdependence. I estimate a parametric duration model using cross-sectionaldata drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey from 1980 to 1994 to analyzethe chances of leaving unemployment before and after the introduction offixed-term contracts. I find that duration dependence has increased sincesuch reform. Semi-parametric estimation of the model also shows that forlong spells, the probability of leaving unemployment has decreased sincesuch reform.

Selling to consumers with endogenous types

For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist s optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer s valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that consumers are anonymous, i.e. the monopolist can t observe a consumer s past consumption history. For myopic consumers, the optimal consumption schedule is distorted upwards, involving substantial discounts for low valuation types. This pushes low types into higher valuations, from which rents can be extracted.For forward looking consumers, there may be a further upward distortion of consumption due to a reversal of the adverse selection effect; low valuation consumers now have a strong interest in consumption in order to increase their valuations. Firms will find it profitable to educate consumers and encourage forward looking behavior.

The importance of relative performance feedback information: Evidence from a natural experiment using high school students

We study the effect of providing relative performance feedback information onperformance, when individuals are rewarded according to their absolute performance. Anatural experiment that took place in a high school offers an unusual opportunity to testthis effect in a real-effort setting. For one year only, students received information thatallowed them to know whether they were performing above (below) the class average aswell as the distance from this average. We exploit a rich panel data set and find that theprovision of this information led to an increase of 5% in students grades. Moreover, theeffect was significant for the whole distribution. However, once the information wasremoved, the effect disappeared. To rule out the concern that the effect may beartificially driven by teachers within the school, we verify our results using nationallevel exams (externally graded) for the same students, and the effect remains.