North-South trade and directed technical change

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights (IPRs), market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Through this channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where IPRs are weakly protected can slow down the world growth rate. An important implication of these results is that protection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction, which is novel in the literature, is consistent with evidence from a panel of 53 countries observed in the years 1965-1990. The paper also provides empirical support for the mechanism linking North-South trade to the direction of technical change: an increase in import penetration from low-wage, low-IPRs, countries is followed by a sharp fall in R&D investment in a panel of US manufacturing sectors.

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firing cost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country will specialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existing goods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primary innovation', that is, invention of new goods.

Heterogeneous information and trade policy

Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At thesame time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection.This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters whichexplains both facts and predicts the pattern of trade policy across industries. In themodel, each agent endogenously acquires more information about his sector of employment. As a result, voters support protectionism, because they learn more about thetrade barriers that help them as producers than those that hurt them as consumers.In equilibrium, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. Thestructure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to existing models. The modelpredicts a Dracula effect: trade policy for a sector is less protectionist when there ismore public information about it. Using a measure of newspaper coverage across industries, I find that cross-sector evidence from the United States bears out my theoreticalpredictions.

North-south trade and directed technical change

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual propertyrights, market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Throughthis channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the sametime, integration with countries where intellectual property rights are weakly protectedcan slow down the world growth rate. A crucial implication of these results is thatprotection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction,which is novel in the literature, finds support in the data on a panel of 53 countriesobserved in the years 1965-1990.

Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.

Why did modern trade fairs appear?

According to our interpretation, modern trade fairs started in Europe during the FirstWorld War and in its immediate aftermath. With the closing of trade movements duringthe war, many cities had to resort to the old medieval tradition of providing especialpermits to traders to guarantee them personal protection during their trade meetings.During the tough post war crisis many more cities typically industrial districts-discovered in the creation of trade fairs a powerful competitive tool to attract markettransactions. We compare these developments with the remote origins of fairs, as, inboth cases, trade fair development is a reaction to the closing of free markets under thepressure of political violence.

Employment protection, international specialization and innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentivesfor R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firingcost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relativelysecure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle.Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where,roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country willspecialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existinggoods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primaryinnovation', that is, invention of new goods.

The Role of Trade in the Structural Transformations of South Korea and the United Kingdom

[cat] El comerç internacional en béns agrícoles té el potencial d'accelerar la transformació estructural dels països amb baixa productivitat agrícola perquè els dóna la possiblitat d'importar aliments. L'objectiu d'aquest article és estudiar l'importància del comerç internacional en aquest context a través dels exemples de Corea del Sud i el Regne Unit. Per fer l'anàlisi, introdueixo comerç internacional en un model de creixement neoclàssicc amb dos sectors, agricultura i no-agricultura. Una característica clau del model és la baixa elasticitat-ingrés del bé agrícola.

The Role of Trade in the Structural Transformations of South Korea and the United Kingdom

[cat] El comerç internacional en béns agrícoles té el potencial d'accelerar la transformació estructural dels països amb baixa productivitat agrícola perquè els dóna la possiblitat d'importar aliments. L'objectiu d'aquest article és estudiar l'importància del comerç internacional en aquest context a través dels exemples de Corea del Sud i el Regne Unit. Per fer l'anàlisi, introdueixo comerç internacional en un model de creixement neoclàssicc amb dos sectors, agricultura i no-agricultura. Una característica clau del model és la baixa elasticitat-ingrés del bé agrícola.

Trade disclosure and price dispersion

This paper determines the effects of post-trade opaqueness on market performance. We find that the degree of market transparency has important effects on market equilibria. In particular, we show that dealers operating in a transparent structure set regret-free prices at each period making zero expected profits in each of the two trading rounds, whereas in the opaque market dealers invest in acquiring information at the beginning of the trading day. Moreover, we obtain that if there is no trading activity in the first period, then market makers only change their quotes in the opaque market. Additionally, we show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices and reduces volatility. Finally, concerning welfare of market participants, we obtain ambiguous results. Keywords: Market microstructure, Post-trade transparency, Price experimentation, Price dispersion.

Accuracy vs. simplicity: a complex trade-off

Inductive learning aims at finding general rules that hold true in a database. Targeted learning seeks rules for the predictions of the value of a variable based on the values of others, as in the case of linear or non-parametric regression analysis. Non-targeted learning finds regularities without a specific prediction goal. We model the product of non-targeted learning as rules that state that a certain phenomenon never happens, or that certain conditions necessitate another. For all types of rules, there is a trade-off between the rule's accuracy and its simplicity. Thus rule selection can be viewed as a choice problem, among pairs of degree of accuracy and degree of complexity. However, one cannot in general tell what is the feasible set in the accuracy-complexity space. Formally, we show that finding out whether a point belongs to this set is computationally hard. In particular, in the context of linear regression, finding a small set of variables that obtain a certain value of R2 is computationally hard. Computational complexity may explain why a person is not always aware of rules that, if asked, she would find valid. This, in turn, may explain why one can change other people's minds (opinions, beliefs) without providing new information.

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.